People v. Gray

• Decision Date: 02 February 1904
• Citation: 98 N.W. 261,135 Mich. 542
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. GRAY.

98 N.W. 261

135 Mich. 542

PEOPLE v. GRAY.

Supreme Court of Michigan

Feb, 2, 1904

Error to Circuit Court, Otsego County; Nelson Sharpe, Judge.

John Gray was convicted of having dynamite in his possession with intent to destroy a dwelling house, and he brings error. Affirmed.

Albert M. Hilton, Pros. Atty., and W. L. Townsend, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.

W. S Mesick (Alex. J. Groesbeck, of counsel), for defendant.

CARPENTER, J.

Respondent was convicted in the circuit court of the offense of having 'in his possession dynamite, with intent to willfully and maliciously destroy the dwelling house of one Albert L Morse, contrary to the statute' (section 11,599, Comp Laws 1897). Respondent and one Lewis La Fever owned two saloons in the village of Vanderbilt, Otsego county, in this state. These saloons were run in the name of Charles La Fever, son of respondent's partner, and respondent was one of the sureties on his bond. Said Albert L. Morse was the village marshal of Vanderbilt, and it was the theory of the people that respondent hoped, by destroying Morse's house, to deter him from enforcing the liquor law.

Respondent became a witness in his own behalf, and on cross-examination the trial court permitted the prosecution, for the purpose of affecting his credibility, to prove that, as a surety on the bond heretofore mentioned, he swore falsely as to his pecuniary responsibility; and, in addressing the jury counsel for the people argued that this testimony proved that respondent had committed perjury. It is claimed that, in admitting this testimony and in making this argument, error was committed, to respondent's prejudice. It is obvious that the argument was not improper if the testimony was admissible, and that we have, therefore, to consider only the question of its admissibility. The testimony was objected to, not on the ground that respondent was compelled to testify against himself--an objection which would be disposed of on very different reasoning from that applicable to this case (see People v. Dupounce [Mich.] 94 N.W. 388)--but on the ground that the testimony was incompetent and immaterial. It was admitted solely for the purpose of affecting respondent's credibility as a witness. It is insisted that the credibility of respondent as a witness in his own behalf cannot be attacked by proving from his own lips on cross-examination that he has committed other offenses than that for which he is being tried. If this is true, some of the rules of cross-examination to test the veracity of witnesses do not apply if the witness is a party charged with crime, for it is settled that, in the case of an ordinary witness, the cross-examination complained of was proper. See Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218; People v. Arnold, 40 Mich. 713. Is a respondent who testifies in his own behalf in a criminal case subject to the rules of cross-examination which apply to an ordinary witness? In support of the claim that he is not, respondent relies on the case of People v. Pinkerton, 79 Mich. 110, 44 N.W. 180. In that case the court said: 'Among other testimony which we think was improperly let in was the testimony of various persons who claimed that she made statements to them about her husband who was not living in this house, and of her arrest many years before on a charge of prostitution. All testimony, even of conviction, and not merely of accusation, of crimes or misconduct not...