People v. Green

• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Docket Number: 367951
• Decision Date: 23 December 2025
• Citation: People v. Green, 367951 (Mich. App. Dec 23, 2025)
• Parties: PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL GREEN, Defendant-Appellant.

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL GREEN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 367951

Court of Appeals of Michigan

December 23, 2025

UNPUBLISHED

Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 19-007230-01-FC

Before: GARRETT, P.J., and PATEL and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM

In February 2020, a jury convicted defendant of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(2)(b) (sexual penetration of a victim less than 13 years old by an individual at least 17 years old), and two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-II), MCL 750.520c(2)(b) (sexual contact of a victim less than 13 years old by an individual at least 17 years old). Defendant was sentenced, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12 to concurrent prison terms of 25 to 40 years for each count of CSC-I and 15 to 25 years for each count of CSC-II. The trial court granted defendant's motion for new trial. The prosecution appealed by delayed leave granted,^[1] and we reversed. People v Green, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 30, 2022 (Docket No 357640) (Green I). On remand, the trial court denied defendant's renewed motion for new trial on the issues previously raised but not addressed by the trial court. Defendant now appeals by right the trial court's amended judgment of sentence.^[2] Finding no errors warranting reversal, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant's convictions arise from his conduct in 2017 involving AO, the eleven-year-old daughter of his then-girlfriend, VO. Defendant and VO began dating in 2011. In 2012, defendant moved in with VO and her three children. The couple argued often and the police were called frequently. In approximately 2013, the couple broke up and defendant moved out. They rekindled their relationship in 2014, and defendant moved back in. In November 2017, the couple got into a verbal argument that allegedly became physical. The couple broke up that day and defendant left the household. Three days later, AO disclosed to her mother that defendant had sexually assaulted her. VO immediately took AO to the hospital and reported the matter to the police.

At the time that defendant allegedly assaulted AO, he was on parole for operating while intoxicated-third offense, MCL 257.625(1), and felonious assault, MCL 750.82. The new criminal activity resulted in parole-violation charges relating to domestic violence involving VO and sexual abuse of AO. Defendant was arrested on November 21, 2017 for his alleged parole violation. A parole revocation hearing was held, and defendant was found guilty of physical abuse of VO and sexual abuse of AO.

On March 1, 2018, a complaint was authorized charging defendant with two counts of CSC-I, MCL 750.520b(2)(b), and two counts of CSC-II, MCL 750.520c(2)(b). The warrant was signed on March 13, 2018. Defendant was arraigned on the warrant on April 23, 2018. A preliminary examination was held on May 11, 2018. The district court dismissed the charged counts of CSC-I on the basis that insufficient evidence had been presented to support the charges, but bound defendant over on the charged counts of CSC-II.

The case proceeded to a jury trial. Jury selection began on February 5, 2019. The parties appeared on February 6, 2019, but the prosecutor was ill. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the trial court dismissed the potential jurors and rescheduled the trial for March 12, 2019. The parties appeared for trial on March 12, 2019. The prosecution informed the trial court that AO and her brother, both of whom were expected to testify during trial, had the flu and were unable to appear. The prosecution asserted that the circumstances provided good cause for an adjournment and requested a continuance. Defense counsel opposed the prosecution's request for a continuance because defendant had already been incarcerated for an extended period of time. Defense counsel asserted that the case should be dismissed and the charges should be reissued. The trial court dismissed the case without prejudice and stated that the prosecution could reissue the charges.

On the same day, the prosecution charged defendant with two counts of CSC-I and two counts of CSC-II. The warrant was signed on March 13, 2019. On July 2, 2019, the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) issued a 180-day notice under MCL 780.131. Defendant was arraigned on August 13, 2019. Defendant stood mute, and a plea of not guilty was entered by the district court on each count. A preliminary examination was held on September 20, 2019. Defendant was bound over on the charged counts of CSC-I and CSC-II.

Trial was scheduled for February 12, 2020. One month before trial, defendant moved to dismiss the charges alleging speedy-trial and 180-day violations. Although defendant did not dispute that the prosecution's witnesses were sick and unavailable to appear for the March 2019 trial, he argued that the prosecution could have had defendant arraigned immediately after the warrant was reissued in March 2019 as opposed to waiting until August 2019. Defendant maintained that his extended incarceration caused undue anxiety and impaired his defense.

In response, the prosecution argued that the time should be calculated from the August 2019 arraignment because the first case was dismissed without prejudice at defendant's request. Because the time period since the arraignment was less than six months, the prosecution asserted that there was no violation. Even assuming that the time period began to run with defendant's initial arraignment in April 2018, the prosecution maintained that an analysis of the four-factor test did not establish a speedy-trial violation for the 21-month delay. The prosecution further argued that there were no violations of the 180-day rule because defendant was arraigned within 36 days of the MDOC's 180-day notice to the prosecutor and the prosecutor promptly readied the case for trial.

At the motion hearing, the trial court clarified with defense counsel, "What [defendant]'s talking about is the delay between the time the warrant was issued on March 13th of 2019, and the time that he was arraigned on the new warrant in response to the MDOC letter of July 2nd, 2019; is that correct?" Defense counsel responded, "That's correct." The trial court found that defendant was arraigned within 180 days of the MDOC's notice to the prosecutor and thus concluded that there was not a speedy-trial or a 180-day violation. The trial court denied defendant's motion, but noted that the issue could be revisited if it was determined that evidence was lost.

The case proceeded to a four-day jury trial. Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced as indicated. Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial on several grounds. The trial court held that a new trial was warranted. The trial court found that the second preliminary examination did not comply with MCR 6.110(F) because it was conducted by a different judge. The trial court concluded that defendant was denied his due-process right to a fair proceeding. The trial court further held that defense counsel was ineffective by failing to assert that the second preliminary examination did not comply with MCR 6.110(F), and failing to move to quash the CSC-I charges. The prosecution appealed by delayed leave granted,^[3] and this Court reversed.^[4]

On remand, defendant renewed his motion for new trial on the issues that the trial court did not address in his initial motion. In particular, defendant argued that his trial counsel did not properly address the speedy-trial and 180-day violation and thus was ineffective. Defendant also argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct during her closing argument by evoking sympathy and vouching for the victim's credibility, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object. The trial court denied the motion. This appeal followed.

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Defendant argues that the evidence at trial did not establish that defendant's mouth or tongue touched AO's genital opening to support the two CSC-I convictions. We disagree.

"Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are reviewed de novo." People v Xun Wang, 505 Mich. 239, 251; 952 N.W.2d 334 (2020). "In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must view the evidence-whether direct or circumstantial-in a light most favorable to the prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt." People v Kenny, 332 Mich.App. 394, 402-403; 956 N.W.2d 562 (2020). "[A] reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict." People v Oros, 502 Mich. 229, 240; 917 N.W.2d 559 (2018) (cleaned up). "It is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to determine what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded those inferences." Id. (cleaned up). Any and all conflicts that arise in the evidence must be resolved "in favor of the prosecution." People v Mikulen, 324 Mich.App. 14, 20; 919 N.W.2d 454 (2018).

There is sufficient evidence for a guilty verdict when "a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." People v Tennyson, 487 Mich. 730, 735; 790 N.W.2d 354 (2010). "The prosecution need not negate every reasonable theory of innocence instead, it need only prove the elements of the crime in the face of whatever contradictory evidence is provided by the defendant." Mikulen, 324 Mich.App. at 20. "Circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences that arise from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the...