People v. Green

• Decision Date: 29 March 1990
• Citation: 554 N.Y.S.2d 821,75 N.Y.2d 902,553 N.E.2d 1331
• Parties: , 553 N.E.2d 1331 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ronnie GREEN, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 821

554 N.Y.S.2d 821

75 N.Y.2d 902, 553 N.E.2d 1331

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ronnie GREEN, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 29, 1990.

Kristin M. Preve, Linda S. Reynolds and Barbara Davies Eberl, Buffalo, for appellant.

Kevin M. Dillon, Dist. Atty. (Susan D. Nusbaum and John J. DeFranks, Buffalo, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order appealed from should be affirmed essentially for the reasons stated by Justice John F. Lawton at the Appellate Division (146 A.D.2d 281, 540 N.Y.S.2d 95) and in People v. Prescott, 66 N.Y.2d 216, 495 N.Y.S.2d 955, 486 N.E.2d 813, cert. denied 475 U.S. 1150, 106 S.Ct. 1804, 90 L.Ed.2d 349, People v. Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d 1, 489 N.Y.S.2d 152, 478 N.E.2d 755 and People v. Siciliano, 40 N.Y.2d 996, 391 N.Y.S.2d 106, 359 N.E.2d 700.

"A guilty plea generally represents a compromise or bargain struck after negotiation between defendant and the People. As such, it marks the end of a criminal case, not a gateway to further litigation." (People v. Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d 1, 5, 489 N.Y.S.2d 152, 478 N.E.2d 755, supra .) Exceptions to this principle have been limited (People v. Prescott, 66 N.Y.2d 216, 219-220, 495 N.Y.S.2d 955, 486 N.E.2d 813, supra; People v. Taylor, supra [and cases cited in each].

We all agree completely with the policy considerations that warrant remedying and ending Batson violations in the selection of trial juries (Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69; see also, People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 554 N.E.2d 1235 [decided today]; People v. Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d 550, 555 N.Y.S.2d 10, 554 N.E.2d 47 [decided today]; People v. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d 350, 553 N.Y.S.2d 85, 552 N.E.2d 621; People v. Scott, 70 N.Y.2d 420, 522 N.Y.S.2d 94, 516 N.E.2d 1208). Those important considerations would not be served by a reversal of the order of the Appellate Division in this guilty plea case or by an abandonment of the precedents providing guidance in this area of the law.

The assertion of a Batson violation based on the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges in this case, followed by a guilty plea, does not fit into any of the accepted exceptions and does not qualify as a new one. By pleading guilty instead of going to trial, the defendant waived all of his trial rights and thus necessarily surrendered his right to challenge on appeal any alleged trial errors. The claimed Batson violation is a trial matter which is part of the jury trial right itself. Inasmuch as we have held that the whole jury trial right may be waived (People v. Dwight S., 29 N.Y.2d 172, 175-176, 324 N.Y.S.2d 58, 272 N.E.2d 558), there is no basis in law or logic for permitting one component of the plenary right to survive a guilty plea.

The proffered rationale for reversal in the dissent, on the other hand, would erect a test based on what may be deemed "important," "fundamental" or "fair" at a given time. This would not provide a reasoned basis for distinction as to which exceptional and limited issues survive a guilty plea.

The order affirming the judgment of conviction of attempted rape in the first degree must be affirmed.

HANCOCK, Judge (dissenting).

The only question on this appeal is whether racial discrimination in the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges affects the fundamental fairness of a trial or implicates societal interests in the integrity of the criminal process; if so, then under our prior decisions (see, e.g., People v. Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d 97, 108, 476 N.Y.S.2d 79, 464 N.E.2d 447; People v. Blakley, 34 N.Y.2d 311, 314, 357 N.Y.S.2d 459, 313 N.E.2d 763; see also, People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968, 541 N.E.2d 1022; People v. Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d 1, 5, 489 N.Y.S.2d 152, 478 N.E.2d 755), a defendant's claim of such discrimination survives his guilty plea and may be raised on appeal. Because in my view it does, I dissent.

Defendant in this case is black; the complainant white. During jury selection, one black venireman was excused by the court with the consent of both counsel; the four remaining black prospective jurors were peremptorily challenged by the prosecutor. Defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor had systematically excluded blacks from the jury. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing, and defendant, who protested his innocence throughout the proceedings, entered an Alford plea ¹ rather than proceed to trial with an all-white jury.

At sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. He argued that he was under stress when he entered his plea and believed then that he could withdraw it at any time prior to sentencing. The court denied defendant's motion and sentenced him in accordance with the plea bargain.

At the Appellate Division, defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. The Appellate Division acknowledged that defendant made out a prima facie case of discrimination but declined to rule further on the merits of the claim, holding, instead, that defendant had waived that claim when he pleaded guilty and waived his trial rights (146 A.D.2d 281, 284, 540 N.Y.S.2d 95). The court reasoned that, "[b]y pleading guilty, a defendant * * * surrenders his constitutional rights to confrontation and trial by jury and his privilege against self-incrimination". Because "[d]efendant's Batson's rights are no greater than his right to a jury trial itself", the court continued, they are "subsumed within the waiver of his right to a trial and [do] not survive his guilty plea" (id.).

The rule applied by the Appellate Division ignores the critical difference between those rights which are necessarily waived in a guilty plea and those which are not; and it conflicts with the guidelines established in our prior decisions. When a defendant enters a plea of guilty, he necessarily relinquishes his rights to a jury trial, to confront adverse witnesses and to avoid self-incrimination. The knowing and voluntary waiver of those rights is inherent in a constitutionally valid guilty plea. The very essence of pleading guilty is to forego the exercise of those three rights and to consent, instead, to a finding of guilt without a trial (see, People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9, 18-19, 471 N.Y.S.2d 61, 459 N.E.2d 170; North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S.Ct. 160, 167, 27 L.Ed.2d 162; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274). Put otherwise, it is simply impossible to plead guilty and, at the same time, to invoke those rights.

But a decision to plead guilty is certainly not a decision to relinquish the right to equal racial protection in the conduct of the criminal proceeding--regardless of the stage in the process. Unlike the rights to a jury trial, to confront adverse witnesses and to avoid self-incrimination, the right to equal protection need not be surrendered in order to enter a plea of guilty. The guilty plea in no sense represents a choice to forego the right to equal protection or to consent to a violation of that right earlier in the proceeding. Indeed, a decision to plead guilty may well reflect the belief that some violation has made a fair trial impossible.

Nor can it be denied that a racially neutral trial--including, specifically, the racially neutral selection of a petit jury--is essential to the fundamental fairness of the criminal process. Racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges is hardly one of those "technical defects in the proceedings" that are waived by a guilty plea (see, People v. Pelchat, supra, 62 N.Y.2d at 108, 476 N.Y.S.2d 79, 464 N.E.2d 447); nor is it an "issue of factual guilt" rendered irrelevant by the plea (see, People v. Taylor, supra, 65 N.Y.2d at 5, 489 N.Y.S.2d 152, 478 N.E.2d 755). Surely, it is a fundamental flaw that implicates both the individual defendant's entitlement to basic fairness and society's interests in the integrity of the criminal process itself (cf., People v. Seaberg, supra, 74 N.Y.2d at 9, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968, 541 N.E.2d 1022; People v. Taylor, supra, 65 N.Y.2d at 5, 489 N.Y.S.2d 152, 478 N.E.2d 755; People v. Pelchat, supra, 62 N.Y.2d at 109, 476 N.Y.S.2d 79, 464 N.E.2d 447; People v. Blakley, supra, 34 N.Y.2d at 315, 357 N.Y.S.2d 459, 313 N.E.2d 763). And, if there is any clear rule emerging from our pertinent decisions, it is that just such a "fundamental matter" (People v. Taylor, supra, 65 N.Y.2d at 5, 489 N.Y.S.2d 152, 478 N.E.2d 755) does survive a guilty plea.

The line we have drawn to differentiate those claims that survive a guilty plea from those that do not reflects the critical distinction between jurisdictional or constitutional defects which implicate the integrity of the process and other less fundamental flaws--e.g., evidentiary or technical matters. The test, in short, is whether the claimed defect is a matter of basic fairness affecting societal interests in our criminal justice system. Hence, the claims which this court has held are forfeited by a guilty plea include the failure to provide statutorily required notice of evidence to be introduced (People v. Taylor, supra ), nonjurisdictional defects in an accusatory instrument (People v. Levin, 57 N.Y.2d 1008, 457 N.Y.S.2d 472, 443 N.E.2d 946), statutory double jeopardy (People v. Prescott, 66 N.Y.2d 216, 495 N.Y.S.2d 955, 486 N.E.2d 813), insufficiency of the factual basis for a plea (People v. Foster, 19 N.Y.2d 150, 278 N.Y.S.2d 603, 225 N.E.2d 200), and insufficiency of the evidence presented to a Grand Jury (People v. Kazmarick, 52 N.Y.2d 322, 438 N.Y.S.2d 247, 420 N.E.2d 45). By contrast, the claims which we have held do survive a guilty plea include jurisdictional defects in an accusatory instrument (People v. Case, 42 N.Y.2d 98, 396 N.Y.S.2d 841, 365 N.E.2d 872), speedy trial violations (People v. Blakley, supra), constitutional double jeopardy (People v. Prescott, supra),...