People v. Green
| Decision Date | 17 February 1987 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Troy Lee GREEN, Defendant and Appellant. B020562. |
Fred Kilbride, Burbank, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.
John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Gary Hahn and William R. Weisman, Supervising Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.
A jury found defendant Troy Lee Green guilty of voluntary manslaughter (Pen.Code, § 192, subd. (a)), a lesser and necessarily included offense of murder (Pen.Code, § 187) with which he was originally charged. The jury further found true the allegation that defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, to wit, a knife during the commission of the killing (Pen.Code, § 12022, subd. (b)). Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5, subdivision (c), the trial court ordered that defendant serve his state prison sentence at the California Youth Authority.
Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it denied his motion to exclude from evidence his tape-recorded extrajudicial statement and admitted it over objections that his "purported waiver of his right to counsel was not knowledgeable and that it was produced by coercion." We shall affirm.
On February 19, 1985, defendant, who was then age 18 years and 10 months, voluntarily went to the police station after learning that the police wanted to talk to him and that Harlan Wilson whom he had stabbed four days earlier had died. Defendant was accompanied to the police station by one or both of his parents.
In his statement to Detective Victor Pietrantoni, defendant admitted that he had stabbed the victim but claimed that he had done so in self-defense. Defendant stated that the victim had pulled a knife and after an ensuing struggle defendant had managed to turn the knife against the victim and stab him. The prosecution established defendant's criminal liability for the killing by introducing evidence which tended to demonstrate that the exculpatory details of defendant's statement were false.
On appeal, defendant maintains that his tape-recorded statement was inadmissible as evidence in his criminal trial because he did not knowingly waive his right to counsel and that the "waiver" he did make in that regard was the product of coercion. He concedes, however, that he went to the police station for the specific purpose of informing the police that he stabbed the victim in self-defense. Defendant does not attack the validity of his waiver of his right to remain silent.
The transcript of defendant's tape-recorded statement reflects that defendant was properly advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. When Detective Pietrantoni asked defendant if he wanted to give up his right to speak to an attorney and have him present during questioning, the following colloquy transpired:
At the conclusion of the hearing to exclude defendant's tape-recorded statement, the trial court found that defendant voluntarily went to the police station so that he could explain to the police what happened and that the defendant intelligently, voluntarily and honestly waived his Miranda rights. The trial court further decided that defendant wanted to tell his side of the story, that he did so without hesitation, that he did not desire the aid of counsel and that there was no deception.
In People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 608, 147 Cal.Rptr. 172, 580 P.2d 672, the California Supreme Court held that under California law the prosecution is required to prove the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt.
Presently pending before this state's high court is the question of whether the Truth-in-Evidence provision of Proposition 8 (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d)) nullifies the standard enunciated by the Jimenez court by permitting the prosecution to prove voluntariness of a confession by the less stringent federal constitutional preponderance of the evidence standard established in Lego v. Twomey (1972) 404 U.S. 477, 488, 92 S.Ct. 619, 626, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 and reaffirmed in Colorado v. Connelly (1986) --- U.S. ----, ----, 107 S.Ct. 515, 521, 93 L.Ed.2d 473. (See People v. Markham (Crim. 25539); People v. Fuller & Alexander (Crim. 25813); People v. Campos (Crim. 25816); People v. Tijerina (Crim. 26049).)
Because we conclude that defendant's tape-recorded statement was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, it follows that it was necessarily voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence. We therefore deem it unnecessary to decide which standard of proof is currently applicable in this state.
"In California, before a confession can be used against a defendant, the prosecution has the burden of proving that it was voluntary and not the result of any form of compulsion or promise of reward." (People v. Jimenez, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 602, 147 Cal.Rptr. 172, 580 P.2d 672.) "The totality of the circumstances must be examined to determine whether the confession was the product of a rational intellect and a free will." (People v. Dingle (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 21, 27, 219 Cal.Rptr. 707.)
As the reviewing court it is our duty to examine the uncontradicted facts of this case in order to make an independent determination of whether the trial court properly concluded that defendant's extrajudicial statement was voluntary. (People v. Jimenez, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 609, 147 Cal.Rptr. 172, 580 P.2d 672; People v. Loftis (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 229, 235, 203 Cal.Rptr. 590.)
"Threats, express or implied, of heavy punishment, accompanied by promises or suggestions of leniency or other advantage if a confession is given, render a statement inadmissible." (People v. Hinds (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 222, 238, 201 Cal.Rptr. 104.)
Defendant maintains that Detective Pietrantoni's advisement that if he wanted to confer with an attorney prior to questioning, he would be able to call one after he was booked, amounted to a threat. Defendant's "use an attorney, go to jail" argument is specious. When asked, "So you let Mr. Green know that if he wanted to speak to an attorney he was going to be processed and be going to jail before he would speak to an attorney?", Detective Pietrantoni replied,
Detective Pietrantoni's statement to defendant was simply an explanation of the procedure that would be taken if defendant exercised his right to speak with counsel. A criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to meet and confer with counsel before being booked by the police.
Detective Pietrantoni did not either overtly or covertly try to dissuade defendant from exercising his right to counsel, nor did he expressly or impliedly tell defendant that he would have to wait an inordinate time in jail before he could confer with an attorney or that he would not be processed and would be able to go home after the interview if he spoke to them without counsel. Detective Pietrantoni informed defendant that he was a suspect in this case, and defendant unequivocally acknowledged his status as a suspect. The mere fact, if it is a fact, that defendant personally, honestly, but mistakenly, believed that he would be able to go home after the interview 1 does not render his waiver of his right to counsel invalid in the absence of any evidence demonstrating that he was induced by the police to harbor this belief.
"Miranda protects defendants against government coercion leading them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment; it goes no further than that." (Colorado v. Connelly, supra, 479 U.S. at p. ----, 107 S.Ct. at p. 524.) We simply cannot conclude that there is evidence of government coercion in this case.
We note additionally that Detective Pietrantoni's failure to tell defendant that free public counsel could be provided within an hour did not nullify defendant's waiver. In accordance with Miranda, defendant was advised of his right to counsel and advised that he would be provided with an attorney free of charge if he could not afford one.
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Porter
...intended to invoke his or her Miranda rights is to be resolved in favor of the defendant as an invocation...." (Peo ple v. Green (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 685, 693, 234 Cal.Rptr. 497; see People v. Randall, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 955, 83 Cal.Rptr. 658, 464 P.2d 114 ["[t]o strictly limit the mann......
-
People v. Carranza
...pressures (Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298, 304-305), including advising the suspect to tell the truth. (People v. Green (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 685, 694.) As our Supreme Court has observed, "'The compulsion to confess wrong has deep psychological roots, and while confession may bring le......
-
People v. Carranza
...pressures (Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298, 304-305), including advising the suspect to tell the truth. (People v. Green (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 685, 694.) As our Supreme Court has observed, "'The compulsion to confess wrong has deep psychological roots, and while confession may bring le......
-
People v. Hernandez
...accused of telling the truth, no implication of leniency or favorable treatment at the hands of the authorities arises"]; People v. Green (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 685, 694 [telling defendant that interview was a way of "getting this thing straightened out" was no more than an exhortation to te......