People v. Green
| Decision Date | 14 November 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-1019,86-1019 |
| Citation | 179 Ill.App.3d 1,535 N.E.2d 413 |
| Parties | , 128 Ill.Dec. 902 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles GREEN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Richard M. Daley, State's Atty., County of Cook (Kenneth T. McCurry, Kim A. Novi, Robert McNamara, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), Richard J. Daley, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee.
After a bench trial, defendant Charles Green was found guilty of four counts of murder, aggravated arson, residential burglary, home invasion, armed robbery, and four counts of armed violence. He was sentenced to natural life imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections. On appeal, defendant argues: (1) he was improperly tried and sentenced as an adult; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash his arrest; (3) he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the admission of evidence indicating that persons other than he committed the offenses for which he was charged. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
On January 12, 1985, police officer Joe Deases, in responding to a fire call, discovered the burned bodies of Raynard Rule, Lauren Rule, and Yvonne Brooks in a second-floor apartment located at 458 North Hamlin Avenue in Chicago. The victims had been gagged and their hands tied behind their backs, Raynard Rule had been stabbed, and Lauren Rule and Yvonne Brooks had been shot. Deases also found Kim Brooks outside of the apartment building. She told Deases that one of her assailants attempted to shoot her, the bullet missed her and she had managed to free herself and escape from the apartment after her assailants left. Brooks, who was severely burned, was rushed to a hospital for treatment, but subsequently died on February 16.
The events leading up to the deaths of the victims, according to defendant's grand jury testimony, consisted of the following. On January 12, at approximately noon, defendant Following a police investigation, defendant was implicated in the Rule murders, taken to a police station on February 5, taken before a grand jury on February 6, subsequently charged with the crimes set forth above, found guilty after a bench trial, and sentenced to natural life imprisonment. This appeal followed.
[128 Ill.Dec. 905] who was 16 years old at the time, met Derrick House in a "game room" at 750 North Lawndale in Chicago. Upon leaving the game room, defendant and House met Teddy Bobo. House and Bobo asked defendant if he would get Raynard Rule, who defendant had known for three years, to open the burglar bars which were in front of the door to his apartment on the pretext that he wanted to buy some drugs. House gave defendant $25, defendant went to Rule's apartment, went up to the door by himself and knocked, Rule answered and asked defendant what he wanted, defendant said he wanted to buy a bag of cocaine [179 Ill.App.3d 6] and told Rule he had $25 to pay for same, Rule opened the burglar bars, defendant stepped into the apartment, and immediately thereafter House and Bobo ran in after him. House grabbed Rule and put a pistol to his head and said something about money to him. House then took Rule to the kitchen while Bobo went into another room where three girls were sleeping on two mattresses. Bobo woke the girls up and tied them up with a brown extension cord. At that time defendant heard Rule yelling "No, no" in the kitchen. House came out of the kitchen shortly thereafter and went into the room where Bobo and the girls were. After talking with Bobo and the girls, House left the room, went back to the kitchen, and took Rule to a back bedroom, supporting him as they went. House then again went to the room where Bobo and the girls were, the girls "started to panicking" because they smelled smoke which was coming from the back bedroom, and House told the girls not to worry about the smoke because the extension cord binding them was loose enough for them to free themselves and to get out of the apartment before it "started flaming." Immediately thereafter House shot one of the girls, Bobo shot another, and House shot the third girl. Kerosene was poured over the girls and ignited by Bobo. Defendant, who had been standing inside the doorway of the apartment throughout this time, then ran out and went to the game room on Lawndale. He subsequently met House in the game room and House told him he had stabbed Rule
Defendant first argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try and sentence him as an adult. We find defendant's argument without merit. Section 2-7(6)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act (the Act) provides as follows:
(Emphasis added.) Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 37, par. 702-7(6)(a).
Here, defendant was 16 years old at the time he was charged with the murders of the victims, as well as the other offenses arising out of the same incident. Defendant argues, however, that since he was convicted on a theory of accountability and did not directly participate in the crimes, section 2-7(6)(a) is inapplicable, i.e., he in fact did not actually commit any of the crimes enumerated in section 2-7(6)(a), triggering application of that section.
It is well settled that the accountability statute (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, pars. 5-1, 5-2) makes both parties guilty as principals; the statute admits of no degrees. (People v. Clark (1986), 144 Ill.App.3d 420, 98 Ill.Dec. 429, 494 N.E.2d 551, rev'd on other grounds (1987), 119 Ill.2d 1, 115 Ill.Dec. 613, 518 N.E.2d 138.) Furthermore, the language of section 2-7(6)(a) provides for automatic trial of a defendant as an adult who is charged with the offenses We also reject defendant's similar argument with respect to the trial court's sentencing him as an adult. The pertinent section of the Act provides as follows:
[128 Ill.Dec. 906] enumerated in that section and who is at least 15 years of age at the time he allegedly commits those offenses. Therefore, whether a defendant is charged with those offenses on an accountability theory or otherwise is irrelevant; the fact remains that he is charged with the pertinent offenses, triggering application of section 2-7(6)(a).
(Emphasis added.) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 702-7(6)(c).)
Defendant again argues that he was not convicted of an offense covered by section 2-7(6)(a), i.e., he insists that his convictions on an accountability theory are convictions for qualitatively different offenses. As indicated above, defendant, under an accountability theory, is deemed to be as guilty as a principal in committing the offenses charged and whether or not he directly participated in the crimes is irrelevant. Defendant was convicted of the offenses of murder and armed robbery, among others, and thus subject to sentencing under the Unified Code of Corrections.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash his arrest, contending that his warrantless "arrest" was made without probable cause during an illegal entry of his home on February 5, his arrest and detention violated his fourth amendment rights and the Juvenile Court Act, and his testimony before the grand jury "should be deemed tainted and unable to provide probable cause for his arrest" on February 6 when he was officially charged by the police.
At the hearing on defendant's motion to quash his arrest, Detective John Summerville testified that pursuant to his investigation of the deaths of Raynard and Lauren Rule and Yvonne and Kim Brooks, he spoke to James Davis on February 3. Davis told Summerville that on January 11 he saw Rule and House get into an argument and fistfight over money; Rule "got the better of House" in front of a crowd which included House's girl friend. On January 12 at 11 a.m., he saw defendant and House at the Lawndale game room at which time they said they were going to "peep" or look for Rule, and later that evening he saw defendant, House and a boy named Virgil, who all had handguns and were smoking "happy sticks" (marijuana laced with PCP), and heard House say, "We got them, we got them, we just burnt Raynard." Summerville further stated that he subsequently identified Virgil as defendant's cousin, Virgil Bridges. Bridges later told Summerville that he had met defendant on January 12 at 7:30 p.m. and asked defendant what he "had done wrong," to which defendant responded that he had "gone up to Raynard's dope house with someone else and got Raynard to open the burglar gates" and, after the gates were opened, "things happened that were not suppose to happen," and that ...
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