People v. Green

• Decision Date: 30 December 1977
• Docket Number: No. 14497,14497
• Citation: 371 N.E.2d 356,13 Ill.Dec. 639,55 Ill.App.3d 903
• Parties: , 13 Ill.Dec. 639 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Russell Alvin GREEN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 356

371 N.E.2d 356

55 Ill.App.3d 903, 13 Ill.Dec. 639

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Russell Alvin GREEN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14497.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Dec. 30, 1977.

Richard J. Wilson, Deputy State Appellate Defender, Donald T. McDougall, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for defendant-appellant.

Thomas J. Difanis, State's Atty., Urbana, Robert C. Perry, Principal Atty., Ill. State's Attys. Ass'n, Statewide Appellate Assistance Service, Marc D. Towler, Staff Atty., Springfield, for plaintiff-appellee.

REARDON, Presiding Justice.

After pleading guilty to the offenses of rape, deviate sexual assault, and armed robbery, violations of sections 11-1, 11-3, and 18-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, pars. 11-1, 11-3, 18-2), the defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 17 to 48 years for the sex offenses and 16 to 45 years for the armed robbery offense. The sentences were ordered to run consecutive to a 15-year-sentence of imprisonment which had been imposed in the State of Indiana for similar offenses committed within 24 hours of those involved in this cause.

On appeal, defendant's sole contention is that the imposition of allegedly excessive minimum sentences consecutive to the Indiana sentence frustrates the constitutional objective of restoring the defendant to useful citizenship. Defendant contends that the sheer length of the sentences precludes the possibility of effective rehabilitation.

Briefly summarized, the facts of this case are that defendant was an 18-year-old Caucasian at the time the offenses were committed. Defendant and several other young men had been drinking and ingesting an animal tranquilizer known as phencyclidine or PCP on June 9, 1976, after which they set out in an automobile on Interstate 57 for the expressed purpose of raping black women. When they discovered another automobile with a flat tire near Champaign, three of the defendant's acquaintances escorted the male driver of that automobile to a gas station while the defendant, Jerry Richardson, and Scotty Turner remained with the man's wife and child in the broken-down automobile.

Before her husband returned, the woman was choked, poked with a screwdriver, beaten by the defendant, and dragged into a nearby ditch where the defendant and Richardson tore her clothing off. Richardson was the first to have intercourse with the woman. His assault was followed by the defendant who forced the victim to submit to an oral sex act by him after which Richardson forced her to resume intercourse with him. Richardson, thereafter, assaulted her anally while, at the same time, defendant performed another oral sex act. The defendant then had intercourse with the victim and Turner followed by performing an oral sex act upon her. When Turner finished, Richardson resumed having oral sex with her and Turner followed by forcing her to submit to intercourse with him. Green concluded the incident by forcing oral sex upon her just as the woman's husband and police arrived. During the course of the incident, Green held a screwdriver to her side, forcing the victim to surrender the five dollars she had in her wallet.

When the defendant was informed of the arrival of his victim's husband, he prodded her with a screwdriver and ordered her to dress. The defendant asked the victim how much money her husband was carrying and the defendant threatened to stab her if she told her husband about what had happened.

In People v. Honn (1977), 47 Ill.App.3d 378, 5 Ill.Dec. 777, 362 N.E.2d 90, we discussed section 11 of article I of the 1970 Illinois Constitution and the sentencing objective of crafting sentences for individual offenders with due regard for their conduct and rehabilitative potential. We are, as Honn demonstrates, sensitive to the tension inherent in the sometimes conflicting factors which a judge must weigh when he imposes a sentence. As we noted in Honn and other cases (e. g. People v. Hines (1976), 44 Ill.App.3d 204, 206, 2 Ill.Dec. 664, 665, 357 N.E.2d 884, 885), we will not tinker with a sentence imposed by the trial court unless the court has somehow abused its discretion in imposing the sentence.

The defendant contends that he has an excellent potential for rehabilitation because he has expressed remorse for his crimes, voluntarily surrendered to the police, and voluntarily confessed to the crimes. While it does appear that defendant has potential for rehabilitation, we cannot overlook the heinous character of the acts to which he subjected his victim. We also note that remorse did not come quickly to the defendant. He did not surrender to the police immediately after attacking the victim. He fled from the scene, returned to Indiana, and hid from the police until he spoke with his mother. Before surrendering, he most certainly must have realized that his only other alternative was to live the hopeless life of a fugitive from the law.

Defendant also contends that his guilty pleas are themselves evidence of his remorse and are indicative of self-rehabilitation. We note, however, that defendant entered his guilty pleas only after receiving discovery materials from the prosecution which overwhelmingly evidenced his guilt. This delay demonstrates to us that the defendant at that stage came to a realistic appraisal of the undesirable alternatives facing him as a result of his criminal conduct. In pleading guilty, defendant may well have hoped for a resulting demonstration of leniency at the time his sentence was imposed. Neither the prosecutor nor the court made assurances to the defendant that such leniency would be forthcoming.

In oral argument before this court, defendant's counsel, ably suggested that to severely punish the defendant for acts which he alleged were committed in a drug-and-alcohol-crazed state of mind would be tantamount to punishing Robert Louis Stevenson's character Dr. Jekyll for the crimes of Mr. Hyde. Of course,...