People v. Green

• Citation: 2011 IL App (2d) 091123,957 N.E.2d 1233,354 Ill.Dec. 440
• Decision Date: 22 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2–09–1123.,2–09–1123.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Rochelle GREEN, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2011 IL App (2d) 091123

354 Ill.Dec. 440

957 N.E.2d 1233

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Rochelle GREEN, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 2–09–1123.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Sept. 22, 2011.

Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender (Court-appointed), Kathleen Weck (Court- appointed), Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for Rochelle Green.

Michael J. Waller, Lake County State's Attorney, Lawrence M. Bauer, Deputy Director, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Christopher M. Kanis, Attorney at Law, Savoy, for People.

OPINION

Justice BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[354 Ill.Dec. 442] ¶ 1 Following a bench trial, defendant, Rochelle Green, was convicted of domestic battery for making physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with her son, Rafayel Mahomes, pursuant to section 12–3.2(a) (2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12–3.2(a)(2) (West 2010)). The trial court sentenced defendant to one year of conditional discharge and ordered her to attend a parenting class, perform public service, and contribute $100 to “A Safe Place.” Defendant raises two arguments on appeal: (1) because her son sustained no bodily injuries, her actions as a parent constituted a reasonable use of corporal punishment, requiring reversal of her conviction; and (2) the trial court exceeded its statutory authority in ordering defendant to contribute $100 to “A Safe Place.” We affirm.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 On March 14, 2008, Christine Schmidt witnessed defendant and her son “fighting” inside a car, which was parked in the parking lot of St. John's School in Libertyville, Illinois. Schmidt testified that defendant first was seated in the driver's seat and was reaching back to her son in the backseat. Although the doors to defendant's car were closed, Schmidt could see “arms * * * kind of moving around” inside the car. Schmidt then saw defendant outside the car, holding a snow brush while she stood over Rafayel. The back of Rafayel's head was inside the back passenger doorway of the car, but his body was on the ground, outside the car, in a supine position. The snow brush was about 2 1/2 feet long with bristles on one end and a scraper on the other. Schmidt saw defendant beating the child with the snow brush while defendant stood over him.¹ Schmidt estimated that defendant struck Rafayel on the upper part of his body around eight times. During the altercation, the school secretary, Christine Grasenick, attempted to stop defendant. Schmidt heard defendant say that Rafayel “was being disrespectful” and that he had tried to hit or kick out the car windows.

¶ 4 Schmidt called 911 at Grasenick's request. As defendant drove off, Schmidt saw the boy turn around in the car, place “his hands out in the back window” and “flex his fingers,” as though he was saying “help me.” Schmidt believed that Rafayel looked sad.

¶ 5 During cross-examination, Schmidt stated that, when she first saw defendant and Rafayel fighting in the car, Rafayel was “hitting the windows in the car,” his arms were moving, and defendant and Rafayel were “talking or yelling.” Rafayel was wearing a down jacket.

¶ 6 Grasenick testified that, while looking out a second-story window of Saint John's School, she saw a woman inside a car, swinging an object at a backseat passenger. After witnessing three swats, Grasenick rushed down to the parking lot to find defendant standing over Rafayel. Grasenick yelled to defendant to “stop that!” Defendant responded that Rafayel “was being disrespectful” and that he had tried to hit or kick out the car windows. Defendant continued to swing the snow brush 10 to 15 more times, striking Rafayel from his legs to his upper torso, before Grasenick told Schmidt to call the police. Grasenick saw defendant strike Rafayel “all over from the legs to the upper body” with multiple “hard blows.” After Grasenick told Schmidt to call 911, defendant put Rafayel in the backseat of the car and drove off. As defendant drove away, Grasenick saw Rafayel “in the back window with his arms stretched out saying [‘]help.[’]”

¶ 7 After the report to 911, Libertyville police officer James Daniel stopped defendant's car. Defendant told Daniel that she never struck Rafayel but that she had shaken the snow brush at him while he was in the car, because he was misbehaving. Rafayel told Daniel that defendant “got mad and hit him” on his arms and legs with the snow brush. He also told Daniel that he felt no pain. However, at the police station, Rafayel reported that the back of his calf hurt from being hit by the snow brush. After an inspection, Daniel could find no visible injuries to Rafayel.

¶ 8 Rafayel was 10 years old at the time of trial. Rafayel testified that he was upset that he could not go to a school dance and he was so upset that he slammed the car door. Rafayel acknowledged that he told Daniel that his mother struck him, but he stated that it was not true and that he said it because he was mad at her. He also denied that his mother yelled at him or hit him with a snow brush.

¶ 9 Defendant had been charged by information with two counts of domestic battery. Count I alleged that defendant knowingly caused bodily harm to Rafayel (720 ILCS 5/12–3.2(a)(1) (West 2010)). Count II alleged that defendant made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature when she struck her son about the body (720 ILCS 5/12–3.2(a)(2) (West 2010)). The trial court found that defendant did not cause bodily harm to Rafayel, and the court dismissed count I. However, as to count II, the court found defendant guilty. The court found that defendant's actions constituted discipline, but the court had to determine whether defendant had the constitutional right to discipline her child in the manner that she did. Relying on People v. Roberts, 351 Ill.App.3d 684, 286 Ill.Dec. 524, 814 N.E.2d 174 (2004), the court observed that parents have a common-law right to discipline their children, “even with the use of corporal punishment,” but that the corporal punishment must be reasonable given the circumstances. The court noted that the basis for the guilty finding was not that any corporal punishment is insulting by its very nature, but that striking the child “8 to 16” times with the snow brush was not reasonable under the circumstances.

¶ 10 Following the denial of defendant's posttrial motions, defendant timely appeals.

¶ 11 ANALYSIS

¶ 12 Physical Contact of an Insulting or Provoking Nature

¶ 13 We begin with defendant's contention that the trial court erred by finding her guilty of domestic battery for making physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with her son. Defendant asserts that the punishment she administered was reasonable and thus legally justified, as she had a parental right to discipline her son and Rafayel suffered no physical harm. The governing statute on this point is section 12–3.2(a)(2) of the Code, which provides that a person commits domestic battery if he or she “intentionally or knowingly without legal justification by any means * * * [m]akes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with any family or household member.” 720 ILCS 5/12–3.2(a)(2) (West 2010).

¶ 14 A parent's right to corporally punish his or her child is derived from the right to privacy, which is viewed as implicit in the United States Constitution. This right encompasses the right to care for, control, and discipline one's own children. The “ ‘[d]iscipline’ ” allowed has been interpreted by courts “to extend to reasonable corporal punishment.” (Emphasis in original.) In re F.W., 261 Ill.App.3d 894, 898, 199 Ill.Dec. 769, 634 N.E.2d 1123 (1994). While parents have a general right to privacy in the manner in which they raise their children, this right must be balanced against the State's legitimate interest in preventing and deterring the mistreatment of children. In re B.H., 389 Ill.App.3d 316, 320, 329 Ill.Dec. 55, 905 N.E.2d 893 (2009); People v. Sambo, 197 Ill.App.3d 574, 587, 144 Ill.Dec. 41, 554 N.E.2d 1080 (1990) (State has legitimate interest in the welfare of juveniles and “protecting [them] from ‘unreasonable’ parental discipline”). A parent who inflicts corporal punishment “exceeding the boundaries of reasonableness” may, depending on the circumstances, be subject to prosecution for cruelty to children. F.W., 261 Ill.App.3d at 898, 199 Ill.Dec. 769, 634 N.E.2d 1123; see People v. Ball, 58 Ill.2d 36, 39, 317 N.E.2d 54 (1974); Roberts, 351 Ill.App.3d at 690, 286 Ill.Dec. 524, 814 N.E.2d 174.

¶ 15 Initially, the parties disagree as to our standard of review. Defendant asserts that the questions of whether she had the parental right to use corporal punishment on her misbehaving child and whether such punishment could be characterized as “unreasonable” when her son sustained no injury at all are not factual issues but legal questions, which are reviewed de novo. Defendant further maintains that appellate review is de novo when, as in this case, the facts are undisputed and the legal question is whether the uncontested facts were sufficient to prove the elements of the offense. The State argues that whether the trial court erred in finding defendant's method of discipline unreasonable is a factual question, which we review under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. We disagree with both arguments.

¶ 16 Even though the parental right to discipline is not a statutory affirmative defense, the common-law rule that parents may take “ ‘reasonable steps to discipline their children when necessary’ ” is, like self-defense, a legal justification for an otherwise criminal act. See Roberts, 351 Ill.App.3d at 688–89, 286 Ill.Dec. 524, 814 N.E.2d 174 (quoting F.W., 261 Ill.App.3d at 901, 199 Ill.Dec. 769, 634 N.E.2d 1123, and citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 147(1) (1965)). In order to negate such a legal justification, the State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a...