People v. Greenwood

Decision Date21 March 1995
Docket NumberDocket No. 166361
Citation209 Mich.App. 470,531 N.W.2d 771
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leonard Darnell GREENWOOD, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Carl J. Marlinga, Pros. Atty., Robert J. Berlin, Chief Appellate Atty., and Benjamin F. Liston, Asst. Pros. Atty., for people.

Lee A. Somerville, Bingham Farms, for defendant on appeal.

Before FITZGERALD, P.J., and MARILYN J. KELLY and BASHARA, * JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of larceny in a building, M.C.L. § 750.360; M.S.A. § 28.592, and was sentenced to a prison term of two to four years. Defendant appeals as of right. We reverse and remand.

Defendant, a truck driver for the Salvation Army, and a co-worker, Keith Dyas, went to the home of Paula Otrompke to pick up a donation of furniture and other items. According to Otrompke, she was on the telephone when Dyas first came to the door. Dyas stepped a foot into the apartment, retrieved a small box of items, and left. Dyas and defendant returned, and defendant asked to use her bathroom. While defendant was in the bathroom, Otrompke and Dyas stood in the hallway and talked. After defendant and Dyas left, Otrompke noticed that a diamond ring was missing from her jewelry box in the bathroom. She had last seen the ring the day before, and, to her knowledge, no one else had been in the apartment.

After the prosecution rested, the trial court denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Defendant then testified that he used the bathroom before he and Dyas moved any items and that each of them made three or four trips to and from the truck carrying small items. They then made one or two trips together carrying the larger items. According to defendant, Otrompke was on the telephone the entire time he was at her apartment, and he and Dyas went in and out of the house without assistance from Otrompke.

The jury convicted defendant of larceny in a building. Defendant's subsequent motions for a directed verdict of acquittal or a new trial were denied.

On appeal, defendant first contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. We disagree. Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from the evidence may constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the offense. People v. Saunders, 189 Mich.App. 494, 495, 473 N.W.2d 755 (1991). The evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Jolly, 442 Mich. 458, 466, 502 N.W.2d 177 (1993); People v. Mumford, 171 Mich.App. 514, 518, 430 N.W.2d 770 (1988).

Defendant next argues that his conviction must be reversed because the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony that defendant refused to discuss his version of the events with the police, who then used his silence as substantive evidence of his guilt. Because defendant's nonresponsive conduct did not occur during a custodial interrogation situation and was not in reliance on Miranda warnings, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), defendant's silence was not constitutionally protected. People v. Schollaert, 194 Mich.App. 158, 166-167, 486 N.W.2d 312 (1992).

Nonetheless, we must determine whether the testimony regarding defendant's failure to appear at the police station for questioning was admissible under the Michigan Rules of Evidence. MRE 801(d)(2)(B). People v. Alexander, 188 Mich.App. 96, 104, 469 N.W.2d 10 (1991). In this case, defendant testified that he contacted a detective and told the detective that he did not have any knowledge of the ring. On rebuttal, the detective testified that defendant initially stated that he did not recall being in Otrompke's apartment. The detective also testified that defendant did not accept his invitation to come to the police station to "offer an explanation."

In her closing argument, the prosecutor argued:

Detective Stiers told you that in the phone conversation he asked the Defendant to come in for more formal interview, and the Defendant never did. And he never did because he took the ring. Because he's guilty. Because he's not believable.

Admission of evidence of a defendant's silence as a tacit admission of guilt is prohibited, unless the defendant has shown his adoption of or belief in the...

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3 cases
  • Marsack v. Howes
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
    • January 14, 2004
    ...reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence may constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the crime. People v. Greenwood, 209 Mich.App. 470, 472, 531 N.W.2d 771 (1995). From the above-stated facts, we believe that it is readily conceivable that defendant committed this crime. The p......
  • People v. Marsack
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • August 21, 1998
    ...reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence may constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the crime. People v. Greenwood, 209 Mich.App. 470, 472, 531 N.W.2d 771 (1995). From the above-stated facts, we believe that it is readily conceivable that defendant committed this crime. The p......
  • Berry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • October 11, 1996
    ...Circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom can constitute satisfactory proof. See, e.g., People v. Greenwood, 209 Mich.App. 470, 472, 531 N.W.2d 771 (1995). However, inferences may be drawn only from established facts, not from other inferences. See, e.g., People v. McW......

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