People v. Griffin

• Decision Date: 15 November 2013
• Citation: People v. Griffin, 2013 NY Slip Op 7620, 111 A.D.3d 1413, 975 N.Y.S.2d 306 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Anthony GRIFFIN, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

111 A.D.3d 1413

975 N.Y.S.2d 306

2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 07620

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Anthony GRIFFIN, Defendant–Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Nov. 15, 2013.

D.J. & J.A. Cirando, Esqs., Syracuse (Bradley E. Keem of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.

William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (James P. Maxwell of Counsel), for Respondent.

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CENTRA, FAHEY, CARNI, and WHALEN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of, inter alia, two counts each of burglary in the first degree (Penal Law § 140.30[2], [3] ), intimidating a victim or witness in the second degree (§ 215.16[1], [2] ) and criminalcontempt in the second degree (§ 215.50[3] ), three counts of robbery in the second degree (§ 160.10 [1], [2][a]; [3] ), and one count each of robbery in the first degree (§ 160.15[3] ), assault in the second degree (§ 120.05[6] ) and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (§ 265.02[1] ). We reject defendant's contention that County Court erred in denying his motion to sever the counts of the indictment relating to the order of protection and drug possession from the robbery and burglary counts. Where counts of an indictment are properly joined because “either proof of the first offense would be material and admissible as evidence in chief upon a trial of the second, or proof of the second would be material and admissible as evidence in chief upon a trial of the first” (CPL 200.20[2][b] ), the trial court has no discretion to sever counts pursuant to CPL 200.20(3) ( see People v. Bongarzone, 69 N.Y.2d 892, 895, 515 N.Y.S.2d 227, 507 N.E.2d 1083; People v. Lane, 56 N.Y.2d 1, 7, 451 N.Y.S.2d 6, 436 N.E.2d 456). Here, the counts were properly joined pursuant to CPL 200.20(2)(b), and thus the court “lacked statutory authority to grant defendant's [severance] motion” (People v. Murphy, 28 A.D.3d 1096, 1097, 813 N.Y.S.2d 837, lv. denied7 N.Y.3d 760, 819 N.Y.S.2d 885, 853 N.E.2d 256). Defendant “did not seek to reopen the [ Huntley ] hearing based on the trial testimony or move for a mistrial” (People v. Kendrick, 256 A.D.2d 420, 420, 682 N.Y.S.2d 234, lv. denied93 N.Y.2d 900, 689 N.Y.S.2d 712, 711 N.E.2d 988), and he thus failed to preserve for our review his further contention that the court erred in refusing to suppress his statement to the police based on that trial testimony. We decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice ( seeCPL 470.15[6][a] ).

Contrary to defendant's contention, the testimony of the victim concerning the uncharged crimes of rape and sexual assault was admissible “as background material that completed the narrative of the episode,” and the court properly instructed the jury that the testimony was admitted for that limited purpose (People v. Strong, 234 A.D.2d 990, 990, 651 N.Y.S.2d 823, lv. denied89 N.Y.2d 1016, 658 N.Y.S.2d 254, 680 N.E.2d 628; see also People v. Robinson, 283 A.D.2d 989, 991, 725 N.Y.S.2d 505, lv. denied96 N.Y.2d 906, 730 N.Y.S.2d 804, 756 N.E.2d 92).

We agree with defendant, however, that the conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree and intimidating a victim or witness in the second degree is not supported by legally sufficient evidence. Although defendant failed to preserve his contention with respect to those crimes for our review ( see People v. Devane, 78 A.D.3d 1586, 1586–1587, 911 N.Y.S.2d 552, lv. denied16 N.Y.3d 858, 923 N.Y.S.2d 420, 947 N.E.2d 1199), we nevertheless exercise our power to review it as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice ( seeCPL 470.15[6][a] ), and we modify the judgment accordingly. With respect to criminal possession of a weapon, the evidence is legally insufficient to establish either that defendant knew that his coconspirator possessed a knife or that he intended to use it unlawfully against another ( seePenal Law §§ 265.01[2]; 265.02[1]; People v. Smith, 87 A.D.3d 1169, 1170, 930 N.Y.S.2d 234). With respect to intimidating a victim or witness, the evidence likewise is legally insufficient to establish that defendant shared his coconspirator's intent to cause physical injury to the victim during the burglary and robbery ( see§ 215.16[1], [2]; cf. People v. Boler, 4 A.D.3d 768, 769, 771 N.Y.S.2d 617, lv. denied2 N.Y.3d 761, 778 N.Y.S.2d 779, 811 N.E.2d 41). Although defendant preserved for our review his legal insufficiency contention with respect to the remaining crimes, we conclude that it lacks merit ( see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Furthermore, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the remaining crimes as charged to the jury ( see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence ( see generally Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672).

Defendant's challenge to the severity of the...