People v. Griffin

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SCHAEFER
• Citation: People v. Griffin, 223 N.E.2d 158, 36 Ill.2d 430 (Ill. 1967)
• Decision Date: 19 January 1967
• Docket Number: No. 40008,40008
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Robert L. GRIFFIN, Appellant.

Page 158

223 N.E.2d 158

36 Ill.2d 430

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Robert L. GRIFFIN, Appellant.

No. 40008.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 19, 1967.

John E. Howarth, Springfield, for appellant.

Don P. Boggs, State's Atty., Havana, for appellee.

SCHAEFER, Justice.

A verified complaint charged the defendant, Robert L. Griffin, with reckless driving. He pleaded not guilty, but was found guilty after a trial before the court. His motion in arrest of judgment was overruled and he was fined $150 and placed on probation for six months. He appeals directly to this court upon the ground that the complaint was insufficient to advise him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and that his rights under section 9 of article II of the constitution of Illinois, S.H.A., were therefore violated. That provision of the constitution states: 'In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right * * * to demand the nature and cause of the accusation * * *.'

The verified complaint, which was filed in the circuit court of Mason county, read as follows: 'That on the 7th day of March, 1965, in said County, Robert L. Griffin committed the offense of Reckless Driving in that he did on Main Street in Mason City, Illinois drive his vehicle with a willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, in violation of Paragraph 145, Chapter 95 1/2, Illinois Revised Statutes.' The complaint is thus cast in the language of the statute: '(a) Any person who drives any vehicle with a wilful or a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 95 1/2, par. 145.

The defendant relies upon People v. Green, 368 Ill. 242, 13 N.E.2d 278, 115 A.L.R. 348. There the court sustained the validity of the statute against a challenge on the ground that it was so vague as to violate due process. The court also considered the sufficiency of an information which charged that the defendant, on February 9, 1937, did 'drive a vehicle upon a public highway of this State situated within the limits of the city of Chicago * * * with a wilful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property'. The court said: 'The information in the present case did not allege a single fact and there was nothing in it from which the defendant could tell definitely, or even guess, what acts he may have been charged with. It might have been driving while intoxicated, or running through a stop-light, or driving at an excessive speed or without brakes, lights or horn; he may have been driving on the wrong side of the road or on the sidewalk, or without keeping proper lookout for children, or any one of dozens of things which might constitute willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. Neither does it specify where the offense took place, as it might have been on any street or highway in the whole of Chicago, and it might have taken place on any date within eighteen months prior to the filing of the information. All that appears in this information is that in the opinion of the person who wrote it and the person who signed it, the defendant had been guilty of driving a vehicle with willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. It thus fails to meet either of the two basic requirements of an information. It does not give defendant enough information to prepare his defense, and it is not sufficiently definite to be of any value as a bar to further prosecution.' (People v. Green, 368 Ill. 242, 254--255, 13 N.E.2d 278, 284.) Justices Stone and Wilson dissented.

The purposes of the constitutional right of an accused 'to demand the nature and cause of the accusation and to have a copy thereof' are '* * * to secure to the accused such specific designation of the offense charged against him as will enable him to fully prepare for his defense, and to plead the judgment in bar of a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.' People v. Peters, 10 Ill.2d 577, 580, 141 N.E.2d 9, 10.

In the Green case the court held that the information then before it failed to satisfy these purposes because it was thought that neither the time nor the place of the alleged violation was specified with sufficient particularity, and because the information did not tell the defendant what specific acts he was charged with. To the extent that the Green case was based upon the insufficiency of the information with respect to the time and place of the offense charged, it is no longer controlling. In People v. Blanchett, 33 Ill.2d 527, 212 N.E.2d 97, and People v. Reed, 33 Ill.2d 535, 213 N.E.2d 278, the court held that since a motion for a bill of...