People v. Griffith

Citation245 Ill. 532,92 N.E. 313
PartiesPEOPLE v. GRIFFITH et al.
Decision Date29 June 1910
CourtSupreme Court of Illinois

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Cook County Court; Lewis Rinaker, Judge.

Proceeding by the People against Jennie Sanford Griffith, Ex'x, and others to fix the inheritance taxes on the estate of Merritt E. Sanford, deceased. From a judgment of the county court the People appeal, and the executrix and others assign cross-errors. Reversed in part and remanded, with directions.W. H. Stead, Atty. Gen., and Walter K. Lincoln, for the people.

Musgrave & Lee, for appellees.

CARTER, J.

This is an appeal by the people from a judgment of the county court of Cook county fixing inheritance taxes upon certain property owned by Merritt E. Sanford at the time of his death. He died in Chicago October 28, 1906. At that time, and for a number of years immediately prior thereto, he was a resident of Oneida county, N. Y. During the last 14 years of his life he had spent a considerable portion of his time in Chicago where he stayed at the home of his sister, Jennie Sanford Griffith. His will was admitted to probate in Cook county on the petition of said sister, and also probated, afterward, in Oneida county, N. Y. His sister, the said Jennie Sanford Griffith, of Chicago, and Elihu Dwight Church, Jr., of New York City, were named in the will as executors. Letters testamentary were issued by the probate court of Cook county to Jennie Sanford Griffith alone, and by the surrogate of Oneida county to both of the persons named as executors. Sanford died seised of real estate in the city of Chicago valued at $20,000. For at least 14 years immediately preceding his death he rented a safety deposit vault from the Fidelity Safe Deposit Company of Chicago, in which he kept certificates of stock, bonds, and other papers. This box was found to contain, after his death, belonging to his estate, securities of the following values: Certificates of stock of Illinois corporations, $21,575; certificates of foreign corporations, $24,962.50; bonds issued by Illinois corporations, $19,484.58; bonds issued by foreign corporations, $38,910, and bonds of a railroad company organized under the laws of Illinois and Iowa, of the value of $9,100. He also left cash on deposit with certain Chicago banks to the amount of $1,194.76, and other personal effects and chattels in Cook county valued at $1,523. The remainder of his personal estate was valued at $3,000, and consisted of household furniture, horses, and other chattel property in the state of New York. The appraiser appointed by the county court of Cook county included in his appraisement of property within this state all the property above mentioned except the chattel property in New York. The county judge of Cook county, upon such report and appraisement, assessed and fixed the inheritance taxes to be paid by the beneficiaries under the will at $1,423.25. April 26, 1907, the executrix, in compliance with said order of the county judge, paid under protest to the county treasurer of Cook county the sum of $1,352.09, being the taxes so fixed, less 5 per cent. thereof deducted in accordance with the statute on account of payment within six months after testator's death. From this order of the county judge fixing the taxes, an appeal was prayed to the county court of Cook county, where, after a hearing on May 17, 1909, the stocks and bonds of foreign corporations were held not to be property within the state of Illinois at the time of Sanford's death and not subject to any inheritance tax under the laws of this state. The court found that the taxes on the remainder of the property included in the appraiser's report should be $900, and ordered that the county treasurer refund to the executrix the sum of $497.09, beingthe difference between the amount previously fixed by the county judge and the amount as finally fixed by the county court, less the discount in both cases. On this appeal, counsel for the state insist that the county court erred in holding that the foreign stocks and bonds kept by Sanford in the safety deposit box in Chicago were not property within the state, according to the meaning of the inheritance tax statute. Appellees have assigned cross-errors questioning the action of the county court in holding that any of the personal property of the deceased was subject to the tax.

Counsel for appellees argue that in construing the inheritance tax statute, if there is doubt as to the meaning of any of its provisions, the rule that the situs of the personal property follows the domicile of its owner should be followed. The English rule is that in these matters the maxim ‘mobilia sequuntur personam’ applies, and such tax on personal property is levied only at the domicile of the decedent. Thompson v. Advocate General, 12 Cl. & Fin. 1; Dos Passos on Inheritance Tax Law (2d Ed.) 149. In many of our states the actual or real situs of the property having a visible and tangible existence, rather than the domicile of the owner, has been the place for the fixing of such taxes. Dos Passos on Inheritance Tax Law (2d Ed.) 167. The tendency of modern legislation in this country is to extend the state's taxing power to all property within its jurisdiction (27 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law [2d Ed.] 650), and this is especially true as to inheritance taxes on the right of succession to all property, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible, which passes, testate or intestate, from decedents to other persons.

The ancient maxim ‘that movables follow the domicile of the person’ was an outgrowth of conditions which have long since ceased to exist, and the rule has been greatly limited in certain matters, such as taxation and the subjecting of personal property of nonresidents to the claims of local creditors. It is usually, however, the law that personal property is sold, transmitted, or obtained under the will or intestate laws according to the law of the domicile, and not that of the situs of the property. Davis v. Upson, 230 Ill. 327, 82 N. E. 824;Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U. S. 578, 22 Sup. Ct. 515, 46 L. Ed. 697. The law as to probating foreign wills has been modified by the Legislature of this state as to personal property since the decision in Davis v. Upson, supra. Laws 1909, § 10, p. 472. An inheritance tax is not upon the property itself, but upon the right to succeed to the property. United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 16 Sup. Ct. 1073, 41 L. Ed. 287;Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 18 Sup. Ct. 594, 42 L. Ed. 1037. The laws that govern the descent and devise of property are statutory, and are subject to legislative change, at discretion. Kochersperger v. Drake, 167 Ill. 122, 47 N. E. 321,41 L. R. A. 446. The succession to the ownership of property being by permission of the state, the state can impose conditions in granting such privilege or permission. The courts, therefore, have upheld the imposition of an inheritance tax whenever the state had jurisdiction of the beneficiary or the subject-matter, regardless of the actual location of the personal property or the domicile of the decedent. It has been held that a tax could be collected on a deposit left by a nonresident testator with a trust company in New York, and also on a debt due him in the same state (Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277, 47 L. Ed. 439); the theory being that the transfer of the deposit was subject to the laws of New York, and that the collection of the debt could only be enforced because of the control of the state courts over the debtor. Stocks and bonds of domestic corporations and bonds of foreign corporations owned by a nonresident decedent but deposited in the state have been held subject to such tax (In re Whiting, 150 N. Y. 27, 44 N. E. 715, 34 L. R. A. 232, 55 Am. St. Rep. 640; In re Morgan, 150 N. Y. 35, 44 N. E. 1126). Tangible personal property outside of the state, of a resident decedent, has been held subject to this tax (In re Swift, 137 N. Y. 77, 32 N. E. 1096,18 L. R. A. 709), as has been, also, the stock of a foreign corporation (In re Merriam, 141 N. Y. 479, 36 N. E. 505). The liability of property to an inheritance tax does not depend upon the location, but upon whether the beneficiary came into its possession through the exercise of a privilege conferred by the state (Hull's Estate, Matter of, 111 App. Div. 322,97 N. Y. Supp. 701). The question in this case, as in all other cases, is not the constitutional power of the Legislature to levy an inheritance tax on personal property of a nonresident decedent, whether such property be tangible or intangible, since that has been firmly established, but is as to the intent to do so under the particular act in question.

Counsel further insist that as there has been no previous decision in this state construing this law on the questions here involved, the rulings of this court on general taxes should not only be persuasive, but controlling. We cannot so hold. One of the chief reasons given in support of the legality of inheritance taxes has been that they were not ‘taxes' in the strict sense of the term. This law has no relation to the general revenue law. The two acts cannot be held to be in pari materia. ‘While the object of both is to raise revenue for the support of the government, they have nothing else in common.’ In re Knoedler, 140 N. Y. 377, 35 N. E. 601. They were passed at different times, and upon entirely different theories. One taxes the property itself, and the other the right of succession to the property. ‘Laws imposing general taxes upon real and personal property are not controlling when applied to taxes upon the succession, when such succession takes place and is governed by the laws of a foreign country. The actual situs of the property in such cases cuts but a small figure, while in the case of general taxes upon such property it is now considered determinative of the whole question.’ Eidman v. Martinez, supra, on...

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