People v. Grigsby

• Decision Date: 19 June 1934
• Docket Number: No. 22402.,22402.
• Citation: 191 N.E. 264,357 Ill. 141
• Parties: PEOPLE v. GRIGSBY.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

357 Ill. 141

191 N.E. 264

PEOPLE

v.GRIGSBY.

No. 22402.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 19, 1934.

Error to Circuit Court, Christian County; William B. Wright, Judge.

John W. Grigsby was convicted of assault with intent to murder, and he brings error.

Reversed and remanded.

J. D. Wilson, of Nokomis, for plaintiff in error.

Otto Kerner, Atty. Gen., John W. Coale, State's Atty., of Taylorville, and J. J. Neiger, of Springfield, for the People.

SHAW, Justice.

Plaintiff in error, John W. Grigsby, was indicted in the circuit court of Christian county on a charge of assault with intent to murder. He was tried and convicted, and prosecutes this writ of error to review that judgment.

At above 10 o'clock in the evening of September 8, 1933, James Walker and James Cameron were shot and wounded on or near a highway about nine miles south of Taylorville, which was the assault for which plaintiff in error was indicted. Walker testified that he left Taylorville about 10 o'clock p. m. in an automobile, and that about two miles out of Nokomis he picked up a man who was walking; that he was not then acquainted with this man, but learned afterwards that his name was James Cameron; that at the home of a Mr. Fine they stopped to go into his residence for a drink of water, at which time another car which had been following them came along and also stopped; that when he and Cameron got out and started across the road the occupant of the following car commenced shooting, wounding the witness in the wrist and chest, and then shot Cameron, after which the assailant got in his car and drove away. The witness identified the man who did the shooting as the plaintiff in error, Grigsby, and testified that he had known him for thirty-five years, living two miles from him and within a half mile of the scene of the shooting. He also testified that he and the defendant were friendly and had never had any trouble. After the shooting the witness went into the Fine residence, but found no one at home, then drove to Shafer's, then to Cameron's, then to Vanderville's store, from which place an ambulance was called and he was taken to the hospital.

James Cameron, the other man assaulted, testified that he received a flesh wound over the heart. In general he corroborated the testimony of Walker, except on the vital point of identification. As to that he stated that it was not the plaintiff in error who shot him, but that his assailant was a larger man. He testified that there was only one man there at the time of the assault, and that he was quite certain that man was not the plaintiff in error.

Mary Lockard was called for the people for the purpose of proving that the defendant had come to her home late the night of the shooting and told her that he ‘had just shot a couple of guys.’ After a few preliminary questions it became apparent that her testimony would not be satisfactory to the state's attorney, who thereupon started asking leading questions. After objections by the defendant to the procedure were made and sustained the jury was taken from the room, and the state's attorney then stated to the court that he was surprised at the attitude of the witness, and presented to the court a written but unsigned statement claimed to have been taken from Mrs. Lockard the next day after the offense. The court thereupon permitted the state's attorney to withdraw the witness, and orally instructed the jury that the witness was withdrawn and that her testimony up to that time should not be considered. After the testimony of another witness, which need not be noted here, the jury was again withdrawn from the room, and the court announced his intention of calling Mrs. Lockard back to the stand as the court's witness, to permit the state's attorney to examine her. Upon objection by counsel for the defendant, the court heard the testimony, out of the presence of the jury, of a stenographer for the state's attorney tending to show that a certain statement had been made by Mrs. Lockard as claimed by the prosecutor. The making of this statement was also corroborated, out of the presence of the jury, by the testimony of a deputy sheriff. The court then ruled that the witness, Mrs. Lockard, should be recalled as the court's witness. The jury was brought in, and the state's attorney proceeded to question her as to statements to him and his stenographer. He was permitted, over objection of counsel for the defense, to ask the witness a long series of questions as to whether or not she had, in response to questions read to her, made certain answers to the state's attorney on the early morning of September 9; the entire examination being in the usual impeachment form. The examination is too long to quote in full, but among other questions was the following: ‘And were you not further asked what else he said, and if you didn't reply that he said that he had shot a couple of guys?’ As to which the witness replied, ‘Yes, sir.’ Practically the entire examination is confined to the answer, ‘Yes, sir,’ in response to the state's attorney's questions as to whether or not she had been asked certain questions and made certain answers. The answers to twenty-four out of twenty-five questions are, ‘Yes, sir.’ This was the only evidence for the people.

The defendant on his behalf introduced the evidence of certain witnesses who testified to facts tending to show an alibi, and certain other witnesses who testified that the complaining witness, James Walker, immediately after the shooting, had said that he did not know who shot him. The defendant himself denied any connection with the crime. Inasmuch as the case must be tried again, we will refrain from further comment on the evidence, except to point out that the case is at least close on the facts and one requiring a trial as nearly as possible free from error.

Plaintiff in error first contends that the court erred in overruling a motion to quash the indictment. It was proved in connection with this motion, and preserved in the bill of exceptions, that the court had entered no order previous to the term requiring the presence of a grand jury. The provisions of the statute in regard to entry of an order for the calling of a grand jury are for the information and convenience of the board of supervisors, rather than for the benefit of any defendant. In People v. Donaldson, 255 Ill. 19, 99 N. E. 62, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 90, it was held that the statutory requirement that a grand jury shall be selected twenty days before the term is merely for the convenience of the sheriff. In People v. Kramer, 352 Ill. 304, 185 N. E. 590, it was held that although the venire was entirely void, nevertheless the grand jury appearing and being sworn in made that point immaterial. In People v. Brautigan, 310 Ill. 472, 142 N. E. 208, 209, we held: ‘Though the statute of this state does not in express language require a grand jury to be summoned at every term of the circuit court or at any term, such requirement has been assumed, in accordance with the proceedings at common law, unless the statute has expressly provided that no grand jury be...