People v. Griswold

• Decision Date: 10 November 1914
• Citation: 106 N.E. 929,213 N.Y. 92
• Parties: PEOPLE v. GRISWOLD.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

213 N.Y. 92

106 N.E. 929

PEOPLE

v.GRISWOLD.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 10, 1914.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Hector Griswold was convicted of practicing dentistry without a license, and his conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division (151 App. Div. 933,135 N. Y. Supp. 1132) and he appeals. Affirmed.Max J. Kohler, of New York City, for appellant.

Charles S. Whitman, Dist. Atty., of New York City (Robert C. Taylor, of New York City, for counsel), for the People.

W. A. Purrington, of New York City, for Dental Society of State of New York.

MILLER, J.

The defendant became a resident of this state three years before his conviction. He had theretofore practiced dentistry in other states since 1881 and had been licensed to practice in the states of Kansas and Utah. He was convicted of a violation of section 169d of chapter 215 of the Laws of 1901 (now section 203 of the Public Health Law, chapter 49 of the Laws of 1909; Consol. Laws, c. 45). The constitutional validity of the said act is challenged, and it is necessary to state the substance of the provisions complained of. Section 164 (now 194) provides that only two classes of persons shall be deemed licensed to practice dentistry: (1) Those duly licensed and registered as dentists in this state prior to August 1, 1895; and (2) those duly licensed and registered thereafter pursuant to the provisions of said act. Section 166 (now 196) prescribed the qualifications of applicants for examination by the regents, which, as far as material, are that the applicant must have had a preliminary education equivalent to graduation from a four-year high school course registered by the regents, or an education accepted by the regents as fully equivalent, and subsequently to receiving such preliminary education he must either have been graduated in course with a dental degree from a registered dental school, or else, having been graduated in course from a registered medical school with a degree of doctor of medicine, have pursued thereafter a course of special study of dentistry for at least two years in a registered dental school, and received therefrom its degree of doctor of dental surgery, or else he must hold a diploma or license conferring full right to practice dentistry in some foreign country and granted by some registered authority. The section also contains a proviso with respect to students under private preceptorship, not now important. Section 168 (now 198) provides for the granting of licenses by the regents: (1) To candidates who have passed the examination on certification by the board of dental examiners; (2) on recommendation of the board of dental examiners without examination to applicants who either have been duly graduated from a registered dental school and have been thereafter lawfully and reputably engaged in the practice of dentistry for six years next preceding their application, or hold a license to practice dentistry in any other of the United States granted by a state board of dental examiners, indorsed by the Dental Society of the State of New York, provided that in either case their preliminary and professional education shall have been not less than that required in this state. Section 169d (now 203, subd. E) prescribes the penalties imposed for a violation of the statute, and that:

‘All fines, penalties and forfeitures of bail imposed or collected on account of violations of the laws regulating the practice of dentistry must be paid to the state dental society.’

The appellant complains that the door of the examination room has been closed to him regardless of his actual qualifications, his long experience in other states and of the fact that when he began the study and practice of dentistry no such preliminary and professional requirements were imposed, and he asserts that he is thus precluded from following a lawful calling by an unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory statute in violation of various provisions of the state and federal Constitutions.

The decision of the Appellate Division was unanimous. All of the facts necessary to the people's case must therefore be deemed established. If the statutory provisions, which prescribe the qualifications with respect to preliminary and professional education, are void, it would seem that the appellant might have applied to the regents to be admitted to examination, and, upon refusal, have successfully invoked the aid of the courts by mandamus to compel his admission, and that he was not at liberty to ignore the statute altogether, and practice dentistry without being licensed. However, as the point is not raised, we shall assume, without deciding, that if the appellant's objections to the statute are well taken, he was not subject to a criminal prosecution for violating it.

[1] The general power of the state to exact proper skill and learning of those who follow pursuits involving the public health, safety, and welfare, and to prescribe appropriate tests therefor, cannot at this day be questioned. It has been exercised from time immemorial, and has been sustained by repeated decisions of the courts. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 9 Supp. Ct. 231, 32 L. Ed. 623;Watson v. Maryland, 218 U. S. 173, 30 Sup. Ct. 644, 54 L. Ed. 987;Collins v. Texas, 223 U. S. 288, 32 Sup. Ct. 286, 56 L. Ed. 439;Hewitt v. Charier, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 353;State v. Vandersluis, 42 Minn. 129, 43 N. W. 789,6 L. R. A. 119.

[2] In determining whether statutory requirements are arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory, it must be borne in mind that the choice of measures is for the Legislature, who are presumed to have investigated the subject and to have acted with reason, not from caprice. Legislation passed in the exercise of the police power must be reasonable in the sense that it must be based on reason as distinct from being wholly arbitrary or capricious, but when the Legislature has power to legislate on a subject, the courts may only look into its enactment far enough to see whether it is in any view adapted to the end intended. If it is, the court must give it effect, however unwise they may regard it, or however much they might, if given the choice, prefer some other measure as more fit and appropriate.

[3] Coming then to the particular provisions of the act in question, the requirement as to preliminary and professional education is not, in and of itself, either arbitrary or unreasonable. A preliminary education equivalent to a four-year high school course registered by the regents and a professional education in a registered dental or medical school, or both, are certainly appropriate to fit one to pursue the calling of dentistry, and with the wisdom of that requirement we have nothing to do.

[4] The appellant has no grievance from the provision that those duly licensed and registered as dentists in this state prior to the 1st day of August, 1895, are deemed licensed to practice. It is the rule for such acts to preserve the status of those lawfully engaged in the pursuit regulated. As said by the United States Supreme Court:

‘The fourteenth amendment does not forbid statutes and statutory changes to have a beginning and thus to discriminate between the rights of an earlier and later time.’ Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Rhodes, 220 U. S....