People v. Guagliata

Decision Date14 February 1936
Docket NumberNo. 23283.,23283.
PartiesPEOPLE v. GUAGLIATA.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Error to Circuit Court, Winnebago County; Arthur E. Fisher, Judge.

Vincent Guagliata was convicted of selling narcotic drugs in violation of the Narcotic Drug Control Law, and he brings error.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

Ryan & Hood, of Rockford (Bernard P. Barasa, of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Otto Kerner, Atty. Gen., Robert E. Nash, State's Atty., of Rockford, A. B. Dennis, of Danville, and Max A. Weston, of Rockford, for the People.

HERRICK, Justice.

Dr. Vincent Guagliata (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) was indicted for selling a narcotic drug in violation of the provisions of the Narcotic Drug Control Law (Smith-Hurd Ann.St. c. 38, § 192a et seq.), in force July 3, 1931. In a trial before a jury in the circuit court of Winnebago county, beginning on July 8, 1935, the jury returned a verdict finding him guilty and fixed his punishment at one year in the penitentiary. There was a judgment on the verdict. The defendant brings the case here for review.

The defendant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the verdict of conviction. A review of the evidence therefore becomes necessary.

The record shows the defendant was a duly licensed physician and pharmacist in the city of Rockford, where he operated a drug store. On April 10, 1934, Bennie Cromartie purchased from the defendant at his store thirteen morphine tablets and on the 12th eight more, each tablet containing approximately one-quarter grain of morphine. No prescription was written by the defendant covering the sale of any of these tablets. The vial or package containing the tablets was in neither instance labeled and showed thereon no directions as to how the contents should be taken.

The prosecuting witness testified that he had been buying morphine tablets from the defendant regularly for three or four months prior to April 10th, sometimes twice a day and some days none; that the defendant had never on any occasion made any examination of him; that in making his purchases the witness had informed the defendant he was getting the tablets for his wife, who was a drug addict and whom the defendant had never seen; that he informed Police Officers Phelan and Johnson that he could buy drugs from the defendant; that on the evening of April 10th these officers met him, searched him and his car for narcotics but found none, then gave him $3 with which to buy narcotics; that he then entered the defendant's store, inquired if he could let him have $3 worth of the one-quarter-grain morphine tablets; that the doctor went to the rear, brought out a vial containing the tablets, which he gave Cromartie, who paid him $3 therefor. A few minutes later he handed this vial to Officer Johnson. Again, on the night of the 12th, Cromartie, by appointment, met the officers in the presence of Ray Degan, of the federal narcotic bureau. Cromartie and his car were thoroughly searched by them without finding any narcotics. Cromartie was then given two $1 bills, after the officers had made a memorandum of the serial numbers thereof. He took the bills with the understanding that he was to purchase more of the morphine tablets from the defendant. Cromartie then went to the defendant's store and asked him for another dollar's worth of the tablets. The defendant handed him eight tablets wrapped in a paper package and received from him a $1 bill. The package was turned over by Cromartie to the officers, who were waiting outside. They then entered the defendant's store and arrested him. Degan asked to see the defendant's money, and in it found one of the bills which had been given Cromartie a few minutes before.

The officers testified that when arrested the defendant became very excited and began searching his desk for a gun, whereupon they grabbed his arms. Officers Phelan and Johnson corroborated the testimony of Cromartie regarding the search of his person and car on the two occasions and the handing of the money to Cromartie. They further testified they were on the street opposite the defendant's store when Cromartie entered it on the night of April 10th, saw him talk to the defendant, after which the defendant went to the rear of the store, returned a minute or two later, and handed Cromartie a small package.

The defendant was taken to the police station about 7:30 on the night of his arrest. About 1:40 a. m. that night, after being informed of his constitutional rights, he was questioned by the assistant state's attorney who tried the case, and the questions and the defendant's answers were taken down by a stenographer. Without objection to its competency the stenographer read from the transcript of her shorthand notes portions of the defendant's statement, to the effect that the defendant said he had always refused to sell to Cromartie before the 10th; that about 6 or 6:30 that day he sold him twenty-four grains for $3, with the understanding that Cromartie would fix his car; that on the 12th Cromartie had taken the doctor's car to his place, returned later, and the doctor then, because Cromartie said he could not purchase morphine from his regular man, sold him eight more quarter-grain-tablets for $1; that the defendant knew Cromartie did not have a prescription, and he made no examination of him because he said the drug was for his wife.

Dr. John W. Fonner, a chemist, testified he had examined the tablets in question; that they contained pure morphine crystals; that each tablet weighed aboue one-half grain and each contained one-quarter grain of morphine.

The defendant testified in his own behalf; denied that he knew Cromartie prior to April 10th or had sold him any morphine prior to that date; stated that Cromartie came to his office that day complaining of illness, saying he had had the flu, was restless, could not sleep at night, asked the doctor if he could not do something for him; that he examined him in his private office, examined his pulse and heart, looked at his eyes and throat, listened to his heart with a stethoscope, and found that Cromartie had a murmur in the mitral valve; that the pulse was hard, explaining why Cromartie could not sleep; that he had a cough, was restless and shaky, complained during the examination that he had pains and aches all over; that the defendant then prepared twelve sedative tablets for him and informed him the examination would be $2 and the tablets $1; that Cromartie said he would return later; that he returned that night with the money and the doctor handed him the vial containing the tablets. On the evening of April 12th Cromartie came in, stated he had lost the tablets, wanted a few more to make up for what he had lost, and that the defendant sold them to him without any further examination. He denied that Cromartie said the tablets were for his wife. Fifteen physicians testified to the good reputation of the defendant as a lawabiding citizen.

Cromartie, although contradicted in many particulars by the defendant, is corroborated in the essential details by the Officers Phelan and Johnson. The statement made by the defendant on the night of his arrest was a virtual admission of his guilt. This court will reverse a conviction on the evidence only when it is able to say, after careful consideration of the whole testimony, that there is clearly a reasonable and well-founded doubt of the guilt of the accused. Where the record discloses sufficient credible testimony and the verdict is not palpably contrary to the weight of the evidence this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury, who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses testify and were thus in a better position to determine the weight of the testimony and the credibility of the witnesses. People v. Fortino, 356 Ill. 415, 190 N.E. 688;People v. Bolger, 359 Ill. 58, 194 N.E. 225;People v. Fitzpatrick, 359 Ill. 363, 194 N.E. 545.

It is urged by the defendant that paragraph 3 of section 6 of the Narcotic Drug Control Law (Smith-Hurd Ann.St. c. 38, § 192f, par. 3; Cahill's Rev.St.1933, c. 91, par. 139, p. 1825), under which the defendant was tried, is unconstitutional, in that the act provides that ‘a physician, in good faith and in the course of his professional practice only, may prescribe, administer, or dispense habit forming drugs'; that the words ‘good faith’ have no common or generally accepted meaning, and therefore the act creates an offense in ambiguous and uncertain language. The words complained against have been defined in many cases in many jurisdictions. In Crouch v. First Nat. Bank, 156 Ill. 342, 40 N.E. 974, 979, we said that ‘good faith’ means ‘honest, lawful intent,’ and in McConnel v. Street, 17...

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