People v. Guertin

• Decision Date: 18 December 1930
• Docket Number: No. 20150.,20150.
• Citation: 173 N.E. 824,342 Ill. 99
• Parties: PEOPLE v. GUERTIN.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

342 Ill. 99

173 N.E. 824

PEOPLE

v.GUERTIN.

No. 20150.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 18, 1930.

Error to Circuit Court, Kankakee County; Arthur W. De Selm, Judge.

George Guertin was convicted of rape, and he brings error.

Affirmed.Frank J. Burns and James T. Burns, both of Kankakee, for plaintiff in error.

Oscar E. Carlstrom, Atty. Gen., T. R. Johnston, State's Atty., of Kankakee, and Roy D. Johnson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the People.

DUNN, C. J.

The plaintiff in error, George Guertin, was tried and convicted in the circuit court of Kankakee county upon an indictment which charged him, being a male person above the age of seventeen years, with having carnal knowledge of a female person under the age of sixteen years, not his wife. He was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for two years and has sued out a writ of error.

It is argued that it was error to admit in evidence People's Exhibit 1, to refuse two instructions which were asked by the defendant, and to deny his motion for a new trial.

The girl upon whom the offense is charged to have been committed was fifteen years old and the defendant was twenty-two. They were of a rather low degree of intelligence. The defendant could not read. He had gone to school a short time, but did not get beyond the third grade. The girl's father worked on the railroad, conducted a grocery store at the corner of Evergreen avenue and Birch street, in Kankakee, and lived with his wife and their two daughters, the complaining witness and her sister, four years older, in a house on the same lot as the store. The store was twenty feet wide and about forty feet long, facing west on Evergreen avenue. The store front was of glass, and across the east end of the room was a meat counter about three or four feet high. The complaining witness testified that on Thursday or Friday before the fair began on Monday, August 15, 1929, about 10 o'clock in the morning, she was in the store taking care of it. Her mother had gone up town and her sister was working. The defendant, who lived just across the street, came into the store and wanted an ice cream cone. While she was getting the ice cream cone he caught her and brought her back to the counter, where he did the acts which were the basis of the charge in the indictment. If her testimony is believed, the charge was proved. She said nothing about the occurrence until two months later, when she went with her mother to Chicago to a doctor, who took her to the Cook County Hospital, were she remained about three weeks and where she told her mother. Soon after, on November 4, 1929, the defendant was arrested. He was taken to the state's attorney's office where he was questioned by the state's attorney and an investigator for the state's attorney. He answered questions without hesitation and willingly signed a statement written by the state's attorney and read to the defendant. It stated that about a year before he had sexual intercourse with the complaining witness in the store at 606 North Evergreen avenue, in Kankakee; that she told him she was sixteen years old. This statement (People's Exhibit 1) was objected to as being improper and immaterial, and its admission in evidence is one of the errors assigned and relied upon as a reason for reversal. There was no objection that it was not freely and voluntarily made, and it is not contended now that it was not so made. The document was not improper or immaterial and was properly admitted in evidence. The weight to be given to it was for the determination of the jury. The defendant went on the witness stand and testified that he signed it before he saw his attorney; that it was not explained to him but was read to him by the state's attorney; that he did not know at the time he testified what sexual intercourse meant; that the state's attorney asked him to sign and he signed willingly; that said term was not explained to him nor any other terms used in the statement, and he stated that he never had sexual relations with the complaining witness. He went to the store for an ice cream cone, had been there before to buy ice cream cones, and played with her before the same as he played with her on that day. Both testified as to what occurred between them on that occasion. They were both standing. Their testimony differs in details as to their relative position and their acts, and it is argued that there is no sufficient proof that there was sexual intercourse. There is no doubt, without any regard to the written statement signed by the defendant, that he engaged in taking indecent liberties with the girl. The only point upon which it can be argued that there is a failure of full proof, disregarding entirely the testimony of the complaining witness and relying entirely on that of the defendant, is the question of the actual penetration of her body. His testimony leaves it doubtful. He testified in chief that he did not penetrate her body and did not try to. On cross-examination he answered that when interrogated at the state's attorney's office on this question he said he did not know. ‘I think now I did not. I don't know whether I did or not. I don't know whether I might have had it there or not.’ The testimony of the prosecutrix on this question is positive. It is argued that from the testimony, considering the difference in stature of the prosecutrix and the defendant and their...