People v. Guillermo

• Decision Date: 20 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 1–15–1799.,1–15–1799.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Mario GUILLERMO, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

54 N.E.3d 974

403 Ill.Dec. 833

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Mario GUILLERMO, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–15–1799.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Sixth Division.

May 20, 2016.

Matthew M. Saffar, of Palatine, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Noah Montague, and Matthew Connors, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The defendant, Mario Guillermo, appeals the circuit court's order denying his petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driving privileges filed pursuant to section 2–118.1(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/2–118.1(b) (West 2014)). On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the court erred by holding a hearing on his petition to rescind because the matter was not ripe for adjudication; and (3) the hearing on his petition to rescind was untimely because it took place more than 30 days after he filed the petition. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶ 2 The facts relevant to resolving this appeal are as follows. On January 3, 2015, the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11–501(a)(2) (West 2014)). According to the arresting officer's sworn report, the defendant was served with “immediate Notice of Summary Suspension/Revocation of driving privileges” because he “refused to submit to or failed to complete testing.” In bold print, the notice stated that the defendant's driving privileges would be summarily suspended “on the 46th day following issuance of this notice” and that he had a right to a hearing to contest the suspension. The notice also stated that, if the defendant wished to contest the suspension, he had to file a petition to rescind the suspension within 90 days after the officer served him with the notice.

¶ 3 At the first scheduled court hearing, on January 15, 2015, the defendant filed a petition to rescind the suspension of his driving privileges. On February 6, the defendant and the State agreed to continue the matter to February 13. On February 13, the court continued the matter because the Secretary of State had not filed a confirmation of suspension with the court as required under section 11–501.1(h) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11–501.1(h) (West 2014)).

¶ 4 At the next scheduled hearing date of February 18, 2015, both the State and the defendant appeared and answered ready. However, before any witnesses were sworn, the defendant moved to rescind the suspension, arguing that he had not been afforded a hearing within the 30–day period as set forth in section 2–118.1(b) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/2–118.1(b) (West 2014)). The defendant asserted that his petition was filed 33 days earlier, on January 15, 2015. The court denied the motion, noting that the defendant agreed to continue the matter from February 6 to February 13, and any delay in holding the hearing was, therefore, attributable to him.

¶ 5 After the circuit court denied the defendant's motion, the defendant pointed out that the Secretary of State had not filed a confirmation of suspension with the court. He asserted that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hold a hearing on his petition because, without a confirmation from the Secretary of State, there was no suspension for the court to rescind and the matter was not ripe for adjudication. The court disagreed, and the matter proceeded to a hearing. Following the presentation of witnesses and arguments by counsel, the defendant's petition to rescind was denied.

¶ 6 Thereafter, the Secretary of State filed with the court a “confirmation of statutory summary suspension” which confirmed that the defendant's “Illinois driver's license * * * and [his] privilege to operate a motor vehicle or to obtain a driver's license in Illinois are suspended on the date shown above.” The date shown above states: “12:01 a.m. on 02–18–15.” The confirmation letter is undated and contains no file stamp.

¶ 7 On March 20, 2015, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider the denial of his petition to rescind, which the circuit court denied. This appeal followed.

¶ 8 We first address the defendant's contention that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of a court “to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding in question belongs. [Citations].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 12, 398 Ill.Dec. 22, 43 N.E.3d 932. Generally speaking,

“[t]o invoke a circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction, a petition or complaint need only ‘alleg[e] the existence of a justiciable matter.’ [Citation.] Indeed, even a defectively stated claim is sufficient to invoke the court's subject matter jurisdiction, as ‘[s]ubject matter jurisdiction does not depend upon the legal sufficiency of the pleadings.’ [Citation.] In other words, the only consideration is whether the alleged claim falls within the general class of cases that the court has the inherent power to hear and determine. If it does, then subject matter jurisdiction is present.” (Emphasis in original.) In re Luis R., 239 Ill.2d 295, 301, 346 Ill.Dec. 578, 941 N.E.2d 136 (2010).

¶ 9 Here, the defendant filed a petition pursuant to section 2–118.1(b) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/2–118.1(b) (West 2014)), seeking to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driving privileges. The defendant's petition clearly alleged the existence of a justiciable matter and the circuit court had inherent power to hear and determine whether the defendant was entitled to rescind the summary suspension of his driving privileges. See People v. Keegan, 334 Ill.App.3d 1061, 1065, 269 Ill.Dec. 50, 779 N.E.2d 904 (2002) (a petition to rescind presents a justiciable matter over which the circuit court has original subject matter jurisdiction). Thus, the defendant's claim that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction is without merit.

¶ 10 The defendant next contends that the circuit court erred in holding a hearing on his petition to rescind because the matter was not ripe for adjudication. He asserts that, under section 11–501.1(h) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11–501.1(h) (West 2014)), the Secretary of State was required to confirm the effective date of the summary suspension of his driving privileges by mailing a notice to the court of venue. He maintains that, prior to the confirmation of suspension, the Secretary of State had done nothing to restrict his driving privileges and, as a result, there was no suspension for the court to rescind.

¶ 11 Before we begin our analysis, we will provide, as background, a short explanation of the statutory scheme that pertains to those who are arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicants. In Illinois, when a motorist is arrested for DUI, the arresting officer may request that he submit to a chemical test. 625 ILCS 5/11–501.1(a) (West 2014). If the defendant refuses to submit to chemical testing, tests above the legal alcohol concentration limit, or tests positive for an intoxicating substance, the officer must give the motorist a notice of summary suspension. 625 ILCS 5/11–501.1(d), (f) (West 2014). The officer must also submit a sworn report, detailing the results of the test or the motorist's refusal to take it, to both the Secretary of State and the circuit court of venue. 625 ILCS 5/11–501.1(d) (West 2014). The summary suspension of the motorist's driving privileges automatically takes effect on the 46th day after the officer serves the motorist with notice of the suspension. 625 ILCS 5/11–501.1(g) (West 2014); People v. Eidel, 319 Ill.App.3d 496, 503, 253 Ill.Dec. 613, 745 N.E.2d 736 (2001) (“section 11–501.1(g) is a self-executing provision”).

¶ 12 Section 11–501.1(h) of the Code provides that:

“Upon receipt of the sworn report from the law enforcement officer, the Secretary of State shall confirm the statutory summary suspension or revocation by mailing a notice of the effective date of the suspension or revocation to the [defendant] and the court of venue. * * * However, should the sworn report be defective by not containing sufficient information or be completed in error, the confirmation of the statutory summary suspension or revocation shall not be mailed to the person or entered to the record; instead, the sworn report shall be forwarded to the court of venue with a copy returned to the issuing agency identifying any defect.” 625 ILCS 5/11–501.1(h) (West 2014).

¶ 13 Although motorists arrested for DUI are immediately subject to the statutory summary suspension of their drivers' licenses, they are not left without recourse. Section 2–118.1(b) sets forth a comprehensive procedure for motorists who seek a rescission of the summary suspension of their drivers' licenses. 625 ILCS 5/2–118.1(b) (West 2014). Section 2–118.1(b) provides:

“Within 90 days after the notice of statutory summary suspension or revocation served under Section 11–501.1, the person may make a written request for a judicial hearing in the circuit court of venue. The request to the circuit court shall state the grounds upon which the person seeks to have the statutory summary suspension or revocation rescinded. Within 30 days after receipt of the written request * * *, the hearing shall be conducted by the circuit court having jurisdiction. This judicial hearing, request, or process shall not stay or delay the statutory summary suspension or revocation. The hearings shall proceed in the court in the same manner as in other civil proceedings.” 625 ILCS 5/2–118.1(b) (West 2014).

¶ 14 Because section 2–118.1(b) mandates that the circuit court conduct a hearing within 30 days after a petition to rescind is filed, and because the actual suspension of driving privileges does not take effect until 46 days after...