People v. Gulyas
| Decision Date | 24 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 19CA0342 |
| Citation | 512 P.3d 1049,2022 COA 34 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Natalie Nicole GULYAS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brittany L. Limes, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jessica A. Pitts, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
¶ 1 After defendant, Natalie Nicole Gulyas, became involved in a sexual relationship with her teenage tutee, she was charged with sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust, sexual exploitation of a child, and internet sexual exploitation of a child. A jury convicted her as charged, and the trial court sentenced her under the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act (SOLSA) to an indeterminate term of ten years to life in prison and a consecutive term of probation.
¶ 2 On appeal, Gulyas contends that the trial court erred by denying a challenge for cause to a deliberating juror who had acknowledged a bias in favor of child witnesses and by excluding, under the rape shield statute, evidence that Gulyas was previously sexually assaulted.1
¶ 3 We agree that the trial court erred by denying the challenge for cause, so we reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial. And because the applicability of the rape shield statute is likely to arise on remand, we consider that issue and conclude that the statute does not apply when the defendant seeks to introduce evidence of her own prior sexual history. Under those circumstances, the evidence is admissible in accordance with ordinary principles of relevancy and prejudice.
¶ 4 Gulyas met T.B. and his family at church when T.B. was nine or ten years old. A couple of years later, she began tutoring him in math and violin. In January 2017, when T.B. was fourteen years old and Gulyas was thirty-five, Gulyas moved in with T.B.’s family to tutor him full-time.
¶ 5 By February, T.B.’s parents had become suspicious of Gulyas's relationship with T.B., and they installed an application on T.B.’s phone to monitor his text messages. They discovered sexually explicit messages between Gulyas and T.B. and, at around the same time, T.B.’s mother saw Gulyas and T.B. kissing in the kitchen.
¶ 6 The parents reported Gulyas's conduct to the police. In a subsequent interview with a detective, Gulyas admitted that she had engaged in intimate touching with T.B. and that she knew the relationship was "inappropriate."
¶ 7 The People charged Gulyas with sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust as part of a pattern of abuse, sexual exploitation of a child, and internet sexual exploitation of a child.
¶ 8 At trial, it was uncontested that Gulyas and T.B. had engaged in some intimate contact. But from there, the prosecution and Gulyas presented sharply conflicting versions of events.
¶ 9 According to the prosecution's evidence, Gulyas initiated the sexual relationship in early February by writing a letter to T.B. in which she expressed romantic feelings for him. Over the next few weeks, T.B. and Gulyas exchanged sexual and romantic text messages and explicit photographs of themselves and engaged in intimate contact at T.B.’s home and in the family's van. On Valentine's Day, T.B. proposed marriage and, after that, the two referred to one another as "fiancé." T.B. testified that their relationship was mutual. At times he initiated intimate contact with Gulyas, while at other times she was the initiator.
¶ 10 Gulyas, on the other hand, testified that T.B. was the instigator and had pressured her into a sexual relationship. According to Gulyas, T.B. made unwanted sexual advances and, in response, she froze and submitted to the contact. Then, he threatened to tell his parents about their sexual encounters, so she continued to acquiesce to his advances. She admitted at trial that she sent T.B. romantic text messages and sexually explicit photographs, told him she loved him, and accepted his marriage proposal. But she explained that she did so in part because of T.B.’s threats and her own vulnerable position in the family's home and in part because she liked the "non-abusive" aspects of her relationship with T.B. and the attention she received from him.
¶ 11 To support her version of events and, more specifically, to explain why she froze in response to T.B.’s sexual advances, Gulyas sought to introduce evidence that, as a teenager, she had been the victim of a sexual assault. The trial court ruled that the rape shield statute, which generally prohibits the admission of evidence concerning a "victim's or a witness's" prior sexual conduct, barred that evidence. § 18-3-407(1), C.R.S. 2021. The court reasoned that Gulyas was a "witness" for purposes of the statute, she had failed to comply with the statute's notice requirement, and the evidence was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.
¶ 12 The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts.
¶ 13 Gulyas contends that the trial court should have excused Juror R because he acknowledged that he was more likely to believe a child witness than an adult witness. We agree.
¶ 14 During voir dire, defense counsel questioned some prospective jurors about their own experiences with sexual assault. One juror conceded that, as a child victim of sexual assault, she might not be "completely impartial" and "might give [a] child [victim] more credibility." Following that exchange, Juror R offered his own views on the subject:
¶ 15 At the conclusion of voir dire, defense counsel challenged Juror R for cause based on a bias in favor of child witnesses. The prosecutor objected, arguing that Juror R had not specifically said he could not be impartial and had merely "mentioned having children and thinking of them." Still, the prosecutor suggested that the court "do some follow-up questioning with [Juror R] and explain that there's a credibility instruction and ask whether he's agreeing to follow that instruction."
¶ 16 The court denied the for-cause challenge without questioning Juror R.
¶ 17 Juror R ultimately served on the jury.
¶ 18 Every criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. See U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV ; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16 ; see also People v. Clemens , 2017 CO 89, ¶ 15, 401 P.3d 525. To protect this right, section 16-10-103(1)(j), C.R.S. 2021, and Crim. P. 24(b)(1)(X) require disqualification of a juror who indicates a bias in favor of or against either side, unless the court is satisfied that the juror will render an impartial verdict that is based solely upon the evidence and instructions of the court. See People v. Wilson , 2014 COA 114, ¶ 8, 356 P.3d 956.
¶ 19 A prospective juror's indication that he or she has a preconceived belief as to some aspect of the case does not, however, mandate exclusion of that juror for cause.
Marko v. People , 2018 CO 97, ¶ 21, 432 P.3d 607. If, after further examination, the court is convinced that the juror will follow the law and be impartial — in other words, if "rehabilitative efforts" prove successful — the juror should not be removed. Clemens , ¶ 16. But when a prospective juror's statements compel the inference that he or she cannot decide the issues fairly, and no rehabilitation...
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