People v. Guzman
| Decision Date | 17 February 1984 |
| Citation | 478 N.Y.S.2d 455,125 Misc.2d 457 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Herberto GUZMAN, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Caesar Cirigliano, Legal Aid Society, New York City (Oscar Finkel, New York City, of counsel), defendant.
Sterling Johnson, Sp. Narcotics Prosecutor, New York City (Asst. Dist. Atty. David Kellem, of counsel), for the People.
Defense Counsel moved to challenge Alec Naiman, a prospective juror, for cause on the grounds that his client will be denied a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, if Mr. Naiman is allowed to sit as a juror.
Defendant, Herberto Guzman, is charged with Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the third degree. He speaks no English and is assisted by a court appointed Spanish Language interpreter, who is herself blind.
The novel issue in this case arises under the newly enacted Juror Qualification statute of the Judiciary Law. 1
Alec Naiman appeared in this courtroom as part of a pool of potential jurors. He is 29 years old; he speaks, understands, reads, and writes English fluently; he is a United States citizen and a life long resident of New York City; he has never been convicted of a crime; he is a student of anthropology at New York University, and is sane, intelligent and articulate. Alec Naiman is also profoundly deaf.
Alec Naiman communicated with the court through a court appointed "sign language interpreter". For purposes of clarity in this case, the interpreter will be referred to as a signer, since she was not communicating with Mr. Naiman, nor he with her, in American Sign Language. American Sign Language (ASL) is a separate language from English with its own grammar and syntax. 2 The person who signs with a deaf person in ASL is, therefore, a translator or interpreter just as any foreign language interpreter serves that function in a court proceeding. Mr. Naiman spoke, however, in signed English, 3 which is not a separate language--it is English in a different form. Thus, the "interpreter" was not translating or interpreting but merely transmitting. When a person communicates in signed English, the exact words in English are transmitted from the speaker through the signer to the listener, but always in English. This is done by means of hand signals which represent each of the words in English, just as a group of characters typed on a page represents a word in English. The signer can be analogized to a modem, a device which allows one computer to "talk" to another over a transmission line. It allows for transmission between two things which otherwise could not communicate. The word itself is an acronym for modulator-demodulator. The modem transmits or receives a message and passes it on. It does not translate. Another way to look at the signer who uses signed English is as an input/output buffer. This device allows one electronic device to "talk" to another. It is called a buffer because one computer sends at a slightly different rate than the other receives. Again, it is the same language, merely a different form. It is clear that in order for a deaf person to meet the statutory language requirement for jury service that person must understand and communicate in English using either signed English, or lip reading, or finger-spelling or any combination thereof as the mode of communication. There are those in the deaf community who know only American Sign Language and do not know English. These people would not meet the statutory English requirement any more than would any other non-English speaking person. Alec Naiman, however, meets that requirement.
The court, the Assistant District Attorney, and defense counsel had an opportunity to question both Mr. Naiman and the court appointed interpreter. The interpreter was questioned and found qualified by the court, sworn and instructed as to her function in the proceedings. The District Attorney found no reason to challenge Mr. Naiman. However, defense counsel at the conclusion of his voir dire, moved to challenge him for cause.
The issue before the court is whether an otherwise qualified deaf person may be challenged for cause in a criminal trial solely on the basis of his deafness.
Section 510 of the Judiciary Law was enacted on September 1, 1983. Prior to that date the law read, in pertinent part, 4
The result, under that language, was the disqualification of the sensorally impaired. 5 The Legislature amended the statute to read: 6
The Legislature, in its memorandum, stated that the purpose of the proposed changes were
to remove the arbitrary prohibition against persons with physical infirmity from being impanelled for jury duty and, by so doing, to increase the number of people who would be available for jury duty, while at the same time, making New York's law accord with the regulations promulgated and proposed under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended. 7
The statute, it noted, was amended to abrogate the systematic exclusion of the handicapped
without regard to the individual's ability to perform the duties of a juror. This form of predetermination, based upon the presence of a handicapping condition contravenes federal regulations made under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, and in particular the regulations applicable to court systems made by the Department of Justice (28 CFR Part 42) ... the present law by systematically excluding disabled persons from jury panels can threaten the validity of our jury system and the convictions obtained. 8
The Legislature intended the proposed amendment to remedy the problems created by the old language "without impacting unfavorably on the jury system by shifting the emphasis from predetermination of the capacity of the individual to perform the duties of a juror in a reasonable manner ..." 9
Senator John E. Flynn, in a letter to the Governor's office, stated that prior to the enactment of the statute the provision which referred to "natural faculties" excluded "as jurors certain disabled individuals on the basis of their perceived inability to perform functions which have no effect on actual jury service." 10
A canon of statutory construction says that
As a general rule, the legislative intent with which statutes are enacted is to be collected from the context, from the occasion and necessity of the law, from the mischief felt, and from the objects and remedy in view ... and in passing upon matters of legislative intent and competence, the courts do not merely read the bare end product of the legislative labors, but rather they read the statute in light of the state of facts which were found by the legislature and which prompted the enactment. 11
The mischief which the Legislature sought to remedy was the predetermination of the incapacity of individuals with physical disabilities to serve as jurors. In order to advance the remedy the qualifications of the individual prospective juror, as they relate to an individual case, should be examined.
In any case when a prospective juror does not have a sufficient grasp of the English language, or is obviously biased in some way, or is, for any other statutory reason, incompetent to sit on a particular case, a challenge for cause will be granted. Thus, with respect to a disability, the court must determine whether the scope of a disabled person's impairment would preclude him from serving as a reasonable juror or would adversely effect the rights of the litigants. 12
There is certainly no question that deaf persons are as capable as anyone else of understanding legal jargon or any other technical jargon used by expert witnesses. 13 The deaf are found in many highly technical professions including medicine, engineering, and the law. 14
Defense counsel argues, in essence, that no deaf person can sit as a reasonable juror since we cannot be sure that the translation by the interpreter is accurate; and that the deaf person will lose words if more than one person speaks at a time; and that the deaf person cannot hear subtle nuances of vocal inflections which are crucial in determining the credibility of any witness; and that the sanctity of the jury deliberations will be violated by the presence of the interpreter; and that the presence of the interpreter will be too disruptive to both the trial and the deliberative process 15 and will shift the focus of the trial from the defendant to the deaf person.
Defense counsel's challenge is based on a lack of information. More than 100 years ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes broke the accepted view of how legal rules are formed. He encourages us to use, "place of sterile, deductive reasoning ... sensitive analysis and the weighing of competing policy consideration." 16 Holmes postulated that:
felt necessities of the time ... even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corolaries of a book of mathematics. 17
The blunt constraint that no deaf person can be qualified to sit as a juror is a passe conclusion which defies and has no connection with reality or common sense. The law is a reflection of life and its realities and as Holmes taught us "life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience." 18 It is imperative that we here...
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