People v. H.J.

• Decision Date: 27 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96SA376,96SA376
• Parties: 21 Colorado Journal 157 The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellant, v. In the Interest of H.J., Juvenile-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1177

931 P.2d 1177

21 Colorado Journal 157

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellant, v. In the Interest of H.J., Juvenile-Appellee.

No. 96SA376.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

Jan. 27, 1997.

A. William Ritter, Jr., District Attorney, Second Judicial District, Nathan B. Coats, Chief Appellate Deputy District Attorney, Denver, for Petitioner-Appellant.

No Appearance for Juvenile-Appellee.

Justice KOURLIS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The People initiated this interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 16-12-102(2), 8A C.R.S. (1996 Supp.), and C.A.R. 4.1 seeking review of an order of the Juvenile Court of the City and County of Denver suppressing certain statements made by the Juvenile-Defendant (Juvenile) and suppressing a gun found during a search of the vehicle in which the Juvenile was a passenger. The juvenile court concluded that the police officers who stopped the vehicle for traffic violations illegally detained the Juvenile by asking him for his name, and therefore granted the motions to suppress. We now reverse the juvenile court's order of suppression and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

The Juvenile was charged by petition in delinquency with illegal possession of a handgun by a juvenile pursuant to section 18-12-108.5(1)(a), (c)(I), 8B C.R.S. (1996 Supp.). The Juvenile filed pre-trial motions seeking to suppress the gun and two incriminating statements made by him. The juvenile court conducted a suppression hearing at which Officer Vince Lombardi testified for the prosecution and the Juvenile testified on his own behalf.

This case began as a routine traffic stop. On December 1, 1995, the Juvenile and two other adult males were riding in a Buick at approximately 10:30 at night. The Juvenile was in the back seat on the passenger side. Officers Lombardi and Rob Gray were patrolling the area and noticed that the license plate light on the Buick was out, and that the driver failed to signal before making a turn. The officers stopped the vehicle for those violations. ¹

Officer Lombardi testified that the driver could not produce valid vehicle registration or proof of insurance. Further, neither passenger claimed ownership of the vehicle. Thus, the officers suspected that the Buick was stolen. Officer Lombardi then asked both passengers for their names and dates of birth. According to Officer Lombardi, the Juvenile provided confusing information regarding his name. The officers requested that all three occupants of the vehicle exit the car and sit on the curb. They then hand-cuffed the Juvenile to investigate a possible false information charge.

After running a warrant check on the vehicle occupants, the officers discovered an outstanding arrest warrant for the front seat passenger. The officers took that passenger into custody and conducted a search of the Buick incident to arrest. They found a handgun in plain view on the back seat floor board behind the driver's seat. The officers then took the driver into custody and advised both adult males of their rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), while the Juvenile was present.

Immediately thereafter, the Juvenile declared that the gun was his. The testimony, however, is conflicting with regard to whether or not the Juvenile volunteered that statement. The Juvenile testified that he claimed ownership of the gun in response to the officers' questioning. Conversely, Officer Lombardi testified that he did not ask whose gun it was, but he could not remember whether his partner questioned the occupants.

The officers then arrested the Juvenile for possession of the handgun, and took him to the police station. Officer Lombardi testified that the Juvenile made another incriminating statement about the gun while inside a restroom at the police station. The Juvenile denies having made that statement.

The Juvenile filed a motion to suppress the handgun and a motion to suppress both the statement made at the site of the investigatory stop and the alleged statement made at the police station. Following the suppression hearing, the juvenile court found that the initial stop of the vehicle was valid and that the officers were justified in requesting that each occupant exit the car in order to conduct a pat-down search for weapons. However, the juvenile court further found that the officers illegally detained the Juvenile by asking him to state his name. The court explained that the officers had no reason to suspect the Juvenile of any wrongdoing because the stop involved traffic violations, and the Juvenile was merely a passenger in the stopped vehicle. Thus, the court granted both motions to suppress.

The prosecution then filed this interlocutory appeal to challenge the juvenile court's suppression order. We now hold that the officers properly asked the Juvenile for his name because they had a reasonable suspicion that the Juvenile had some involvement with a possible motor vehicle theft. We further hold that the officers seized the gun in the course of a valid search incident to the lawful arrest of the front seat passenger. Since the juvenile court did not reach the questions of custodial interrogation and voluntariness with respect to the Juvenile's statements, we remand for further proceedings on that issue. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the juvenile court, and remand the case.

II.

The sole issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the Juvenile's Fourth Amendment rights ² were violated, thus requiring suppression of the evidence.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution ³ proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures. "[I]t is a cardinal principle that 'searches [and seizures] conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment--subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' " Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (footnote omitted)) (emphasis in original).

One such exception relates to an investigatory stop. ⁴ The purpose of an investigatory stop is to permit a police officer to confirm or dispel suspicions of criminal activity through reasonable questioning. See United States v. Hickman, 523 F.2d 323, 327 (9th Cir.1975). Investigatory stops are limited seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and must be justified by a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879-83, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). ⁵

The question of reasonableness under Terry is twofold: "(1) whether the facts warranted the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment rights, and (2) whether the scope of the intrusion was reasonably related 'to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.' " United States v. Harflinger, 436 F.2d 928, 932 (8th Cir.1970) (quotation omitted). Furthermore, in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed, we must look to the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); People v. Garcia, 789 P.2d 190, 192 (Colo.1990). In so doing, "common sense" and "human experience" must govern. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985).

A.

An officer causing a vehicle in transit to pull over is usually conducting an investigatory stop. ⁶ The United States Supreme Court has concluded that several factors can differentiate an investigatory stop from a consensual encounter, such as the "threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." People v. Johnson, 865 P.2d 836, 841 (Colo.1994) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (Stewart, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.)); see also United States v. Ritchie, 35 F.3d 1477, 1481 (10th Cir.1994) (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877).

Since most of those factors are generally present during a traffic stop, the driver of a stopped vehicle therefore is not likely to feel free to terminate the police encounter. "[I]t strains credulity to imagine that any citizen, directly on the heels of having been pulled over to the side of the road by armed and uniformed police officers in marked patrol cars, would ever feel 'free to leave' or 'at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business[.]' " State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App.3d 586, 639 N.E.2d 498, 507 (1994) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2387, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991)).

Therefore, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the driver is violating the law in some way to conduct a traffic stop. See Nefzger v. Department of Revenue, 739 P.2d 224, 229 (Colo.1987). The officer may obtain identification and registration information from the driver in connection with that stop. ⁷

While the stopping of the vehicle in a practical sense impacts all of the occupants, the officer need not initially have a reasonable suspicion as to all occupants. See United States v. Martinez, 808 F.2d 1050, 1054-55 (5th Cir.1987). Generally, the detention of the passengers in a stopped vehicle is merely coincidental with the detention of the driver.

The issue in this case is whether the questioning of the passengers of the Buick was lawful under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the vehicle stop.

B.

Turning to the facts, we begin by noting that the initial traffic stop was proper. The vehicle's license plate light was out, in contravention of section...