People v. Hadley
| Decision Date | 13 April 1979 |
| Citation | 415 N.Y.S.2d 719,67 A.D.2d 259 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Steve HADLEY, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Robert M. Weldon, Watertown, for appellant.
Lee Clary, Dist. Atty., Watertown, for respondent (Roscoe A. Eisenhauer, Asst. Dist. Atty., Watertown, of counsel).
Before DILLON, P. J., and CARDAMONE, SIMONS, DOERR and MOULE, JJ.
Defendant has been convicted of criminal possession of stolen property removed from the Anchor Motor Freight Terminal on Wellesly Island in the Thousand Islands. Tractor trailers loaded with new cars were stored in the terminal and the thefts involved equipment removed from these vehicles.
On September 18, 1977 defendant was the boss of a crew employed to steam clean the stored vehicles. He and his three helpers arrived at the terminal in the late morning driving a van and a truck equipped with the cleaning machines. Earlier, state and local police officers had been alerted by Anchor because of prior thefts that summer. On the day of the crime the officers were hidden in the woods near the terminal and they observed defendant and his companions as they worked at cleaning the trucks. During the morning one of the men, Lizana, removed a battery and some floor mats from vehicles stored at the terminal and placed them in the equipment truck. At about 4:00 p. m. Lizana took two tires and placed them in the van. He then transferred the stolen battery from the equipment truck to the van and covered all the items with a tarpaulin. Defendant and co-defendant Brown were in the general area while all this was going on and at one point, when Lizana was rolling one of the stolen tires to the van, defendant and Brown stood 10 to 15 feet away looking in Lizana's direction. The officers testified that defendant apparently said something to Lizana as he rolled the tire by him and the three men laughed. The floor mats were left in the truck. At about 5:00 p. m. the men left, Brown driving the van with defendant seated beside him, and Lizana driving the equipment truck. The police officers radioed ahead to State Police at the Wellesly Island toll barrier and when the truck approached in the lead, the Troopers stationed there stopped it, discovered the floor mats and arrested Lizana. The Troopers then pulled the van over to the side of the road, searched it and discovered the contraband, and placed defendant and Brown under arrest.
Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish guilt and that the Trial Court erred in permitting the prosecution to introduce evidence of prior criminal acts and in refusing to suppress the stolen articles seized at the toll barrier. We affirm.
A person is guilty of criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree when he knowingly possesses it with the intention of benefitting himself or a person other than the true owner (Penal Law, § 165.45).
Defendant's first contention is that he is not guilty of unlawful possession under this statute because he never "possessed" the stolen property; he was merely a passenger in the van in which it was found. Section 10.00(8) of the Penal Law, however, defines "possess" as having "physical possession or otherwise . . . exercis(ing) dominion or control over tangible property." Thus, possession may be constructive and if defendant exercised dominion or control over the stolen property, he may be guilty of unlawfully possessing the contents of the van although he was not driving it (see People v. Peters, 43 A.D.2d 599, 348 N.Y.S.2d 786; People v. Howard, 37 A.D.2d 178, 180, 323 N.Y.S.2d 119, 121). Defendant was the foreman of this crew and supervised their activities. As foreman, he also was responsible for the use of his employer's van and the fact that he directed or permitted another employee to drive it is not a circumstance which may be used to exonerate him. This evidence was sufficient to take the case to the jury on the issue of possession.
Defendant also contends that even if he did "possess" the stolen property, it was concealed in the van and he did not "knowingly" possess it. Knowledge, like any other fact, may be proved circumstantially by the conduct of the defendant. Generally, possession by itself is sufficient to permit the inference that the possessor knows what he possesses, particularly if it is in his hands, on his person, in his vehicle, or on his premises (see People v. Reisman, 29 N.Y.2d 278, 285, 327 N.Y.S.2d 342, 346, 277 N.E.2d 396). To overcome any weakness in the inference which might arise because of the circumstances of this case, the People introduced testimony from Lizana that he told defendant on the way to work that he was going to steal some equipment, he told defendant later that day that he had done so, and he also testified that on two prior occasions he had stolen equipment while working at the terminal and turned it over to defendant. Added to this was the testimony by the surveilling police officers that Lizana removed the stolen battery and tires from the truck and placed them in the van while defendant was near the van, and on one occasion Lizana passed within 15 feet of defendant rolling a stolen tire while defendant and Brown looked in his direction and joked with him. Common experience would lead a reasonable man to conclude from these facts that defendant knowingly exercised dominion and control over the stolen items (see People v. Benzinger, 36 N.Y.2d 29, 32, 364 N.Y.S.2d 855, 857, 324 N.E.2d 334,...
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