People v. Hall
Decision Date | 05 February 1979 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 77-834 |
Citation | 276 N.W.2d 897,88 Mich.App. 324 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bobby William HALL, Defendant-Appellant. 88 Mich.App. 324, 276 N.W.2d 897 |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[88 MICHAPP 327] Fred K. Persons, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William F. Delhey, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before DANHOF, C. J., and BRONSON and CAVANAGH, JJ.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of delivery of heroin contrary to M.C.L. § 335.341(1)(a); M.S.A. § 18.1070(41)(1)(a). He now appeals as of right. Although defendant raises numerous issues, our disposition of one of them makes consideration of the remaining questions unnecessary.
At trial, the court admitted, over defendant's objection, a tape recording of a conversation between defendant and a police informant. No search warrant had been obtained authorizing the police to take the conversation.
In People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975), Cert. den., 423 U.S. 878, 96 S.Ct. 152, 46 L.Ed.2d 111 (1975), the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that participant monitoring 1 by police is a search and seizure which must comply with the warrant requirement. In People v. Livingston, 64 [88 MICHAPP 328] Mich.App. 247, 236 N.W.2d 63 (1975), this Court extended the search warrant requirement to instances where the informer/participant recorded the conversation instead of transmitting it.
The dissent disagrees with this latest extension and seeks to differentiate participant monitoring from participant recording by declaring that the former is more intrusive of privacy because the disclosure of the conversation is simultaneous with the conversation itself. It is true that there is no simultaneous disclosure in participant recording; however, there is a countervailing consideration which makes participant monitoring equally intrusive, and that is the fact that with participant recording a permanent record of the conversation is made. See Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring With the Consent of a Participant in a Conversation, 68 Col.L.Rev. 189, 225, fn. 180 (1968). One does not need to go back too far in the history of this country to find instances where an innocent or innocuous statement when made, takes on grave and sinister overtones 10 or 20 years later when the social climate has changed. The fact that a recording of a conversation could be permanently stored and then produced long after the participants or their monitors forgot about the conversation makes participant recording just as intrusive of privacy as participant monitoring, and subject to the same restrictions on its use.
[88 MICHAPP 330] How different life in this state would be if everyone had to expect that their every conversation, their every careless phrase or ill-advised statement could be captured and preserved for all time. Such a life-style is not what is expected nor desired by the members in a free society. A rule which would allow government officials to record, at their unbridled discretion, the conversations of all citizens with whom they or their informants come into contact would impermissibly invade the individual's right to privacy and constitute a violation of the Michigan Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Therefore, before the police may lawfully tape a conversation between an individual and a police informant, they must first obtain a search warrant authorizing the recording of the conversation.
The dissent seems to intimate that by requiring a search warrant we will be totally precluding the use of participant recording thus depriving the police of a valuable investigative tool. 3 This assessment is not accurate. Under the rule announced here the use of participant recording will not be precluded but merely limited to situations where the potential benefits to society in fighting crime outweigh the potential detriments to society from stifling free expression. The dissent would allow recording on the mere whim of any government official. It appears to sanction fishing expeditions [88 MICHAPP 331] based on no more than the hope that criminal activity can be found. This is unacceptable. Our Constitution protects our citizens from the excesses caused by misguided or overzealous government officials. The inconvenience caused by requiring government officials to submit reliable information to a neutral magistrate for a determination that there is probable cause to believe criminal activity is under way will be more than made up by the increased sense of security and freedom such a rule will provide for citizens of this state. As our Supreme Court stated in Beavers :
Beavers, 393 Mich. at 566, 227 N.W.2d at 515.
Since the police in this case did not obtain a search warrant authorizing the recording of the conversation, the recording was the result of an illegal search and seizure and the trial court erred in admitting it into evidence. 4 The defendant's conviction must be reversed.
[88 MICHAPP 332] Reversed.
On November 24, 1976, after a jury trial, defendant was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance, heroin, in contravention of M.C.L. § 335.341(1)(a); M.S.A. § 18.1070(41)(1)(a). Defendant was sentenced to a term of one year in prison and appeals as of right. This case arose out of an incident occurring on July 31, 1975, in which defendant allegedly sold heroin to a police informer at a pool hall. The transaction was recorded by a tape recorder which was hidden on the informer's person. At trial, the informer testified that defendant delivered heroin to him. The tape recording of the transaction was also introduced into evidence.
On appeal, defendant claims that the trial court erred in admitting this tape recording into evidence. He contends that the participant's recording of the conversation was an unreasonable search and seizure prohibited by Const.1963, art. 1, § 11, since there was no search warrant authorizing the recording or any exigent circumstances, see People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975). The prosecutor argues that no search warrant is required for a participant's recording of a conversation, see United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971), People v. Drielick, 400 Mich. 559, 255 N.W.2d 619 (1977).
As a matter of Federal constitutional law, U.S.Const., Am. IV, XIV, no search warrant is required for participant recording, Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 83 S.Ct. 1381, 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963), or participant monitoring, United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971). In Beavers, supra, the Michigan Supreme Court [88 MICHAPP 333] interpreted the Michigan constitutional provision governing searches and seizures, Const.1963, art. 1, § 11, to apply the search warrant requirement to participant monitoring. Participant monitoring was defined to mean the use of an electronic device by a participant to transmit the exchange to a third party. The opinion did not address the constitutionality of participant recordings, Beavers, supra, 393 Mich. at 562, fn. 2, 227 N.W.2d 511. The issue to be resolved in this case is whether to extend the constitutional rule announced in Beavers to participant recordings. 1 In Beavers, supra, the Court held that the Michigan constitution...
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