People v. Hall
| Decision Date | 17 October 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 60167,60167 |
| Citation | 102 Ill.Dec. 322,114 Ill.2d 376,499 N.E.2d 1335 |
| Parties | , 102 Ill.Dec. 322 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Anthony HALL, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Anthony Hall, Menard, pro se.
Charles M. Schiedel, Deputy Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Supreme Court Unit, Springfield, James E. Chadd, Asst. Defender, for defendant-appellant.
Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Roma J. Stewart, Sol. Gen., Mark L. Rotert, Sally L. Dilgart, Scott Graham, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago and Donald D. Bernardi, State's Atty., Pontiac, for plaintiff-appellee.
The defendant, Anthony Hall, while an inmate at the Pontiac correctional institution, was charged by indictment in the circuit court of Livingston County with the murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 9-1) of Frieda King. Following a change of venue to McLean County, the defendant was found guilty of murder in a bench trial in the circuit court. A hearing was held on the State's motion to determine if the defendant was subject to the death penalty. The court found a statutory aggravating factor to exist, in that the victim was an employee of an institution of the Department of Corrections killed in the course of performing official duties (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(2)), and the court determined there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death sentence. The defendant was sentenced to death, but the sentence was stayed pending a direct appeal to this court under section 4(b) of article VI of the Constitution of Illinois (Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, sec. 4(b)) and Supreme Court Rule 603 (87 Ill.2d R. 603).
At approximately 6:30 p.m. on February 8, 1983, the body of Frieda King, who worked as a civilian supervisor in the inmate kitchen at the Pontiac Correctional Center, was found in a locked closet near the cold-storage area of the kitchen facilities. The autopsy performed by Dr. Edward Shalgos revealed that King died from severe blood loss resulting from stab wounds in the upper portion of her back and chest. The victim's lungs, aorta and liver were lacerated, and at least one of the wounds was inflicted by a left-handed assailant. There was evidence of hemorrhage within the muscle tissue of her neck, suggesting to Dr. Shalgos that King had been manually strangled. There also were cuts on her hands.
The focus of the investigation into King's death turned to the defendant, who worked as a clerk in the inmate kitchen on February 8. On February 14, 1983, Livingston County State's Attorney Donald D. Bernardi filed a criminal information in the circuit court charging Hall with the murder. (The criminal information was later superseded by an indictment.) At his arraignment on February 23, the defendant requested a preliminary hearing and informed the court that he did not wish to be represented by the public defender.
At two subsequent hearings the defendant told the court that he had been unable to engage a lawyer. On March 8, the court appointed Livingston County Public Defender David Ahlemeyer. The next day, Ahlemeyer filed a jury demand and the defendant's affidavit to his indigency.
Then followed correspondence between the defendant and Judge William T. Caisley in which the defendant expressed, without explanation, his dissatisfaction with Ahlemeyer and requested that the court appoint counsel other than the public defender. Generally, the defendant complained that he was unable to establish a "rapport" with Ahlemeyer, apparently out of fear that the public defender's ties to the community and "political concerns" would weaken his representation of the defendant. The court, in a letter responding to each of the defendant's letters, explained that the right to representation included the right to counsel of choice if the defendant was able to afford private counsel, the right to have the public defender appointed in the event he could not retain private counsel, and the right also to represent himself. The court instructed Hall that it would appoint counsel other than the public defender only upon a showing that a conflict of interest would prevent the public defender from representing him. The court also cautioned Hall as to the seriousness of the charges against him and encouraged him to cooperate with Ahlemeyer in preparing a defense.
On May 5, the court allowed the defendant's motion for a change of venue, and the case was assigned to the circuit court of McLean County.
In a letter postmarked June 20, the defendant again complained to Judge Caisley about Ahlemeyer's representation. He wrote that the court "had the factors in front of you, conflict of interest [would be an] understatement, etc [sic ]." He also supplied the names of two attorneys with whom he claimed to have been in contact and asked the court to appoint one as his counsel. The court replied that, if there was a factual basis to the defendant's contention of a conflict of interest, he should make a motion to have Ahlemeyer withdraw and the court would conduct a hearing on the motion. The prosecution was given notice of this correspondence between the court and the defendant.
On August 17, the defendant filed a "motion to discharge" the public defender. Ahlemeyer, in turn, filed a motion to withdraw. At the hearing on both motions, Ahlemeyer told the court that the defendant refused to cooperate with him and recounted an incident in June when he was at the Pontiac institution when the defendant refused to leave his cell and meet Ahlemeyer. The defendant was allowed to address the court. He stated that he personally did not dislike Ahlemeyer, but that he did not believe the public defender would act in his best interest because Ahlemeyer "was in reliance" with the State's Attorney. Ahlemeyer assured the court that he had no animosity toward the defendant and that there was not a conflict of interest which would affect his representation. The court denied the defendant's motion to discharge the public defender, and denied Ahlemeyer's motion to withdraw.
At the same hearing, the court allowed defense counsel's request that a psychiatric examination be given Hall to determine his fitness to stand trial.
On October 4, the court conducted a hearing on the defendant's fitness to stand trial. Ahlemeyer was allowed to testify as to his representation of the defendant, stating that Hall again refused to see him and that it would be necessary for Hall to revise his behavior of noncooperation. The defendant testified that his refusal to cooperate with Ahlemeyer was not a reflection of any unfitness to stand trial, but was a "deliberate * * * rational act." He then told the court: The court found the defendant fit to stand trial and continued the matter until November 1.
On that day, Ahlemeyer asked that the defendant be shackled while he was in the courtroom. The court, after reading a letter addressed to the court in which the defendant substantially repeated the threat made earlier, ordered the defendant shackled. The court then heard argument on the defendant's renewed motion to discharge Ahlemeyer. The public defender again stated that he felt able to represent the defendant. The court again found that no grounds existed to release Ahlemeyer from Hall's representation, but he offered to appoint the McLean County public defender to assist Ahlemeyer at trial. The defendant refused the offer, informing the court that attorney Shelly Bannister had corresponded with him and agreed to represent him if the court would order her appointment. The court declined to appoint private counsel.
On December 5, the defendant asked the court to appoint McLean County Public Defender Steven Skelton to assist Ahlemeyer. The court granted the request. On February 21, 1984, at a hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress statements made by inmate Juan McGee, the court ordered the defendant unshackled.
Following three days of jury selection, a dispute between the defendant and his attorneys was brought to the attention of the court. The defendant wanted certain witnesses to testify at trial, but both counsel believed that their testimony would be extremely detrimental to his defense. Hall told the court that he wanted to proceed pro se. The court urged the defendant to consider the matter overnight and held the proceedings until the next day.
The following day the defendant again stated that he wished to proceed pro se and asked for a continuance to prepare his defense. The court brought the defendant, defense counsel and a court reporter into a conference room adjoining the courtroom to discuss the defendant's representation. The court advised the defendant of the unwisdom of proceeding unrepresented in a capital case. The defendant suggested that defense counsel be present and available to make objections on his behalf, but that the defendant be allowed to examine the witnesses. Ahlemeyer objected to the proposal, pointing out that Hall's dissatisfaction with defense counsel at that point was not with their ability to examine witnesses, but rather with the decision not to call certain witnesses. Ahlemeyer contended that it would constitute incompetence to stand by and allow the defendant to introduce highly prejudicial testimony. The court asked Hall who the witnesses were that he wished to call, but before Hall could answer Ahlemeyer objected because he believed it possible that a jury trial might still be waived and that the court would then be the trier of fact. There followed an interruption in the record, after which the court stated:
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