People v. Hall
| Decision Date | 01 December 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. S033749,S033749 |
| Citation | 883 P.2d 974,35 Cal.Rptr.2d 432,8 Cal.4th 950 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 883 P.2d 974 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Waymond Darnell HALL, Defendant and Appellant. |
George Bond, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Howard J. Specter and Jim Fahey, under appointments by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.
Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Wiliamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert R Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael J. Weinberger, Shirley A. Nelson, Suzanne M. Ambrose and Stan Cross, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.
Under the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976 (Pen.Code, § 1170, 1 et seq.), the Legislature has established an elaborate sentencing scheme that prescribes terms of imprisonment for enumerated offenses and sets forth sentencing "enhancements," which, under specified circumstances, increase the length of a defendant's incarceration. Certain enhancements specify a single term of imprisonment to be imposed upon all defendants subject to the enhancement, whereas, for other enhancements, the trial court is authorized to impose any one of three possible terms, designated as the lower, middle, or upper term. (§ 1170, subd. (b).)
The issue we address in the present case concerns the validity of California Rules of Court, rule 428(b) (), which limits the authority of a trial court in imposing additional punishment for such an enhancement by providing that "[t]he upper term may be imposed for an enhancement only when there are circumstances in aggravation that relate directly to the fact giving rise to the enhancement." (Italics added.) Relying upon rule 428(b), the Court of Appeal in the present case held that the trial court erred in basing its imposition of the upper term for a firearm-use enhancement upon the circumstance that defendant was on parole when he committed the offenses at issue. The Court of Appeal, further holding that this error was prejudicial, concluded that the punishment imposed for the firearm-use enhancement should be reduced to the middle term. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal rejected the People's contention that rule 428(b) conflicts with controlling statutory authority. We granted review to consider the validity of rule 428(b) and its application to the circumstances presented by this case.
As we shall explain, we hold that, insofar as rule 428(b) purports to afford a sentencing court less discretion in determining whether to impose an upper term for a sentencing enhancement than such a court traditionally has been permitted to exercise in deciding whether to impose an upper term for a substantive offense, the rule is inconsistent with the statutory scheme it was intended to implement and, for that reason, is invalid. Because a sentencing court long has been permitted to consider the circumstance that the defendant was on parole when he or she committed the offense, as an aggravating factor justifying imposition of the upper-term sentence for a substantive offense, we believe the Legislature similarly intended to permit a sentencing court to rely upon that same consideration--i.e., the defendant's parole status--in determining that the upper term should be imposed for an applicable sentence enhancement. Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of Appeal erred in upholding the validity of the portion of rule 428(b) challenged in the present case, and in ordering that the upper term for the firearm-use enhancement imposed upon defendant by the trial court be reduced to the middle term.
On November 11, 1990, at approximately 3 p.m., defendant and a codefendant, Timothy Taray Daniels, entered the Payless Shoe Source in Bakersfield, posing as customers. While a store employee waited upon Daniels, he grabbed her by the neck, pointed a gun at her side, and pushed her into the back portion of the store. Defendant pointed a gun at the store manager and ordered him and two customers to the rear, where Daniels ordered the customers, at gunpoint, to lie face down on the floor and to place their purses by their heads, then tied the customers' hands behind their backs and bound their ankles with duct tape. Daniels ordered the store manager to accompany defendant to the store safe and cash register. After complying, the manager was bound with duct tape, and defendant and Daniels fled.
Following defendant's commission of a robbery eight days later at a Bakersfield dry cleaning enterprise, One Hour Martinizing, defendant was arrested and charged by information with three counts of second degree robbery (§§ 664/212.5) and two counts of false imprisonment (§ 236). As to each of these offenses, it was alleged that defendant personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a). The information also charged defendant with two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)), with having suffered four prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a), and with having served three separate prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). Trial of the prior-felony-conviction and prior-prison-term enhancement allegations was bifurcated from trial on the various counts.
Defendant pleaded not guilty on all counts and denied the enhancement allegations. At the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief, the court granted defendant's motion for acquittal (§ 1118.1) on one of the robbery charges. Thereafter, a jury, rejecting defendant's alibi defense, found defendant guilty on all remaining counts and found true the remaining allegations. Subsequently, the prior-felony-conviction and prior-prison-term allegations were separately tried and found true by the jury.
Defendant was sentenced to a prison term of 34 years and 4 months for the robberies and the other offenses committed at the Payless Shoe Source and One-Hour Martinizing establishments, and to a consecutive term of 5 years and 4 months for other offenses (not relevant here) committed in Los Angeles County, for a total prison term of 39 years and 8 months. 2 Defendant's total prison term included a 5-year enhancement for personal use of a firearm, the upper term prescribed by former section 12022.5, subdivision (a), 3 the trial court selecting the upper term based upon the "circumstance in aggravation ... [that] the defendant was on parole" when the Payless Shoe Source robbery was committed (the court stating that it had not relied upon defendant's parole status as a factor in imposing the upper-term sentence on the Payless robbery count).
In the Court of Appeal, defendant challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, among them that the sentencing court erred in imposing the 5-year upper term for the firearm-use enhancement on the basis of defendant's parole status, because rule 428(b) provides, in pertinent part, that the upper term provided in a sentencing enhancement provision may be imposed for an enhancement only when there are "circumstances in aggravation that relate directly to the fact giving rise to the enhancement." Defendant contended that his having been on parole when he committed the robbery is not a fact relating directly to his use of a firearm and therefore cannot properly be the basis for imposition of the upper term under rule 428(b). In response, the People contended that rule 428(b) is inconsistent with the Legislature's intent in enacting the DSA and therefore is invalid.
The Court of Appeal, upholding the validity of rule 428(b), rejected the People's position and ordered the trial court to modify defendant's sentence by imposing the middle term for the firearm-use enhancement, thus reducing defendant's prison sentence by one year but otherwise affirming the judgment.
We granted the People's ensuing petition for review, which challenged the Court of Appeal's judgment insofar as it upheld the validity of rule 428(b) and reduced the term imposed upon defendant for the firearm-use enhancement.
The People challenge the decision rendered by the Court of Appeal reversing the trial court's imposition of the upper term for defendant's use of a firearm. The People contend that rule 428(b) represents an invalid exercise of the Judicial Council's authority to promulgate sentencing rules, because the rule improperly limits the discretion of the trial court, in imposing the upper term on an enhancement, to circumstances in aggravation "that relate directly to the fact giving rise to the enhancement."
Rule 428(b), one of the Sentencing Rules for the Superior Courts, was promulgated by the Judicial Council "pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.3, and pursuant to the authority granted to the Judicial Council by the Constitution, article VI, section 6, to adopt rules for court administration, practice and procedure." (Rule 401.) In pertinent part, section 1170.3 provides: (Italics added.)
The People do not challenge the Judicial Council's authority under section 1170.3 to adopt rules regarding the criteria that a trial court should consider at the time of sentencing in determining whether to impose an upper or lower term, nor do the People contest that the Judicial Council's authority under this statute extends to the adoption of rules that apply to imposition of upper or lower terms of imprisonment for sentence enhancements as well as for...
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