People v. Hall
| Decision Date | 12 July 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 62728,62728 |
| Citation | 40 Ill.App.3d 332,352 N.E.2d 334 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Delores Estell HALL, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Zedrick T. Braden, Chicago, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen. , for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendant, Delores Estell Hall, was found guilty on each of 18 counts of violating Illinois Revised Statutes (1973), chapter 120, paragraph 452, in that as a 'person engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail' she failed to file the Retailers' Occupation Tax returns required by paragraph 442. The 18 counts covered the 18 months from June, 1973 to November, 1974. Also, defendant was found not guilty of violating paragraph 452 on the charge of engaging in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail after her Certificate of Registration had, in accordance with paragraph 441b, been revoked on October 1, 1974.
Defendant raises four issues on appeal. First, she claims the wording of the section of the statute under which she was convicted, which was also used verbatim in the complaint, was indefinite because it failed to define 'person engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail.' The State construes this argument to mean that defendant is contesting the sufficiency of the charge and claims the issue has been waived because it is raised for the first time in this court and, if not waived, the charges were specific enough to enable defendant to prepare a defense and allow a conviction on the charge to be pleaded in bar of subsequent prosecutions for the same offense.
Addressing the issue as we believe defendant has presented it, the statute is not invalid because of vagueness. The words 'person' and 'sale at retail' as used in paragraphs 452 and 442 are clearly defined in paragraph 440 of the same chapter. These sections are part of the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act and are to be read together. The legislature need not repeat the definition of a term, once defined, each and every time that term is used in an act. To require otherwise would be illogical, needless repetition.
Defendant's specific objection to the wording of the section is that it is not clear whether one isolated sale of personal property would require the filing of a return. This somewhat frivolous argument is negated by the words 'business of selling' and by the title of the Act, 'Retailers' Occupation Tax Act.' One isolated sale is not a 'business' nor an 'occupation' as those words are commonly understood. Paragraph 440 specifically provides that 'The isolated or occasional sale of tangible personal property at retail by a person who does not hold himself out as being engaged (or who does not habitually engage) in selling such tangible personal property at retail . . . does not constitute engaging in a business of selling such tangible personal property at retail within the meaning of this Act' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 120, par. 440).
Whether the charges were stated sufficiently in the complaint is a separate question. It was not waived by defendant as the State claims. The State relies on chapter 38, paragraph 114--1(b) of the 1973 Illinois Revised Statutes:
Subsection (a)(8), nor quoted or referred to by the State, reads: 'The charge does not state an offense;'. Under subsection (a)(8), defendant's claim that the complaint, by using the words of the statute, ambiguously describes the charge against defendant, is not waived.
But defendant's failure to raise the question below requires the sufficiency of the complaint to be judged by a different standard.
People v. Pujoue (1975), 61 Ill.2d 335, at 339, 335 N.E.2d 437, at 440. See also People v. Gilmore (1976), 63 Ill.2d 23, 344 N.E.2d 456.
The record clearly shows that the wording of the complaint did not hinder defense counsel in preparing a defense. Throughout the pretrial motions to suppress, the trial itself and the post-trial motion for a new trial, defendant and defense counsel treated the complaint as charging defendant with failure to file Retailers' Occupation Tax returns. The ambiguity in the statute that defendant complains of here was never made an issue at trial. No claim was made by defendant that she only made one sale. Her defense impliedly admitted otherwise. She only claimed she did not run the business any longer. A complaint
'. . . which charges an offense in the language of the statute is deemed sufficient when the words of the statute so far particularize the offense that by their use alone an accused is apprised with reasonable certainty of the precise offense with which he or she is charged.' People v. Patrick (1967), 38 Ill.2d 255, at 258, 230 N.E.2d 843, at 845.
The complaint was also sufficient to be pled in bar to any future prosecution. Each count covered a specific month, which was clearly stated. This and the record of the evidence at the trial are sufficient to bar any future attempt to prosecute for the same offenses. People v. Gilmore (1976), 63 Ill.2d 23, 344 N.E.2d 456.
Defendant's second and third issues are that the trial court erred when it refused to suppress the identity of the defendant and any information given by defendant to the Illinois Department of Revenue. Defendant claims these items should have been...
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Distaola v. Department of Registration and Ed.
...is otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 2 Myers was subsequently followed in People v. Hall (1st Dist. 1976), 40 Ill.App.3d 332, 352 N.E.2d 334. In Hall the court held that an identification of defendant and information given by defendant to the Illinois Depar......