People v. Hall
Decision Date | 18 October 2021 |
Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 20SC142 |
Citation | 496 P.3d 804 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner v. Levi Derek HALL, Respondent. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Attorneys for Petitioner: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Frank R. Lawson, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender, Chelsea E. Mowrer, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado
En Banc
¶1 Can a trial court judge invite argument concerning properly admitted evidence before it renders a verdict in a bench trial? We answer this question in connection with our review of People v. Hall , No. 17CA0982, 2020 WL 435387 (Jan. 9, 2020), a split decision from a division of the court of appeals. There, the majority concluded that the trial court deprived the defendant, Levi Derek Hall, of his right to a fair trial because the trial court crossed the line from impartial judge to partisan advocate when it requested additional argument after closing arguments. We conclude that a trial court presiding over a bench trial acts within its discretion and does not abandon its role as a neutral arbiter when it asks both parties for additional argument about properly admitted evidence before rendering a verdict. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the division below and remand the case back to the division to consider Hall's claim regarding the trial court's proportionality review, which the division declined to address because it reversed his convictions.
¶2 Between April and July 2014, a man nicknamed the "Good Grammar Bandit" robbed seven banks. Each time, he wore large-framed sunglasses. In some of the robberies, the Good Grammar Bandit wore a dark blue jacket and a hat with ear flaps, while in others, he wore a hooded sweatshirt with the hood pulled over his head. Otherwise, his face was unobscured. He robbed each bank by handing the bank teller a note demanding cash and fleeing on foot after the teller complied.
¶3 Law enforcement officials, having no suspect, offered a $2,000 reward for information about the robberies. After seeing news reports about the robberies and the reward, J.B., Hall's ex-boyfriend, called the Crime Stoppers Hotline and identified Hall as the Good Grammar Bandit, stating that he recognized the perpetrator's physical characteristics, unusual hat, large-framed sunglasses, and dark blue jacket worn in the first four robberies.
¶4 The Good Grammar Bandit struck for the eighth time, on August 12, 2014, after J.B. had contacted authorities. Shortly thereafter, police began surveilling Hall, pulled him over for a traffic violation, and impounded his car because he was driving with a revoked license. The police subsequently performed an inventory search of the car and discovered large-framed sunglasses and $512 in cash. They arrested Hall and charged him with eight counts of robbery. He waived his right to a jury, and the case proceeded to a bench trial.
¶5 The key issue during trial was the identity of the robber. In support of its theory that Hall was the robber, the prosecution presented, as pertinent here, the following:
¶6 Both photographs taken of Hall when he was pulled over for speeding show him wearing a large, diamond-like, studded earring in his left ear. The bank employees who witnessed the robberies testified that the robber wore a big hat or hood and that they could not see or remember anything conspicuous about his ears. The bank surveillance footage also seemed to corroborate their testimony, showing that the Good Grammar Bandit's ears were not visible during the robberies. Instead, the robber's ears appeared to be covered up either by the hood or ear flaps.
¶7 During closing argument, defense counsel argued, among other things, that Hall was not the same person as the robber shown in the bank surveillance videos. Specifically, Hall's counsel noted the differences between Hall's appearance in the speeding ticket photographs and the appearance of the robber in the surveillance footage, including the fact that there were no visible earrings in the bank footage.
¶8 During the prosecution's rebuttal closing argument, the trial court interjected and asked the prosecutor, "[In w]hich exhibits do we actually get to see the earrings ... during the robbery?" In response, the prosecutor explained:
We don't see earrings during the robbery. We see earrings in the traffic stop. ... You never see his ears in the robbery. That's done on purpose. Whether he's wearing an earring that day or not, we don't know, but you cover up as much as you can. You never see his ears. So the earring, I just don't believe [it has] any relevance because you can't see it in the robbery.
¶9 After the prosecutor concluded his rebuttal closing argument, the trial court immediately stated, It then requested that the prosecution replay video from the first three robberies, including a frame-by-frame viewing of the footage from the third robbery. During this viewing, the trial court pointed out something no one else had noticed: light flashing or reflecting in the vicinity of the robber's ear. The trial court then engaged in the following exchange with the prosecutors and defense counsel:
¶10 The trial court subsequently made oral findings of fact and found Hall guilty of all eight counts of robbery. It also adjudicated Hall a habitual criminal and sentenced him to twenty-four years in the Department of Corrections.
¶11 Hall appealed, and a split division of the court of appeals reversed his convictions. The majority concluded that the trial court violated Hall's right to a fair trial when it asked the prosecutors whether they saw an earring in the surveillance footage. Hall , ¶ 20. Specifically, the majority held that by asking the question, the trial court crossed the line from neutral arbiter to advocate in three ways: (1) the prosecution had expressly declined to pursue that line of argument, and thus it was inappropriate for the trial court to raise it; (2) the form of the question treated the prosecutors like witnesses by asking for their personal opinions; and (3) the question was asked during deliberations because the prosecution had rested its case and closing arguments had concluded, which deprived defense counsel of a meaningful opportunity to respond. Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.
¶12 Justice Martinez, sitting by assignment,1 dissented. In his view, the trial court's request for both parties to present argument about admitted evidence did not constitute an abuse of discretion or an abandonment of the trial court's role as a neutral arbiter, id. at ¶ 28 (Martinez, J., dissenting), particularly in light of its "duty to see that the issues [were] not obscured and that the testimony [was] not misunderstood," id. at ¶ 26 (quoting United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931, 933 (6th Cir. 1979) ). He also concluded that there was nothing inappropriate about the timing of the trial court's actions, noting that the judge gave defense counsel the same opportunity as the prosecutors to present argument about the flashes of light in the surveillance footage. Id. at ¶ 33.
¶13 The People petitioned for certiorari review, which we granted.2
¶14 We begin by outlining the standard of review. Next, we detail the constitutional provisions that guarantee every criminal defendant the right to a fair trial and an impartial judge. We then explore the interplay between those constitutional protections, the wide discretion afforded to trial courts to conduct trials in an...
To continue reading
Request your trial