People v. Hallas

Decision Date02 March 1932
Docket NumberNo. 206.,206.
Citation257 Mich. 127,241 N.W. 193
PartiesPEOPLE v. HALLAS et al.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Recorder's Court of Detroit; John V. Brennan, Judge.

Frank Hallas and another were convicted of the crime of robbery, armed, and they appeal.

Reversed, and a new trial granted.

Argued before the Entire Bench.Herbert A. Denis and McClear & Canniff, all of Detroit, for appellants.

Paul W. Voorhies, Atty. Gen., and W. Gomer Krise, Acting Pros. Atty., and Edmund E. Shepherd, Asst. Pros. Atty., both of Detroit, for the People.

WIEST, J.

Defendants were convicted of the crime of robbery, armed, and sentenced to prison for life.

Three armed bandits, with faces partly covered, held up an automobile and robbed its occupants. At the preliminary examination defendant Janicke was identified as one of the robbers and defendant Hallas sufficiently identified to constitute the fact of his participation in the robbery a question for the jury. The motion in behalf of Hallas to quash the information for lack of evidence to hold him for trial was properly overruled.

At the preliminary examination Cecelia Stachura, one victim of the robbery, first testified that defendants were not the robbers, ‘it was some other guys,’ but later said that she so testified by reason of fear caused by an anonymous threatening letter. She then identified defendant Janicke as one of the robbers. At the trial she testified that Janicke was one of the robbers, and the prosecutor, over objection, was permitted to question her about her contradictory testimony at the examination and the reason therefor. This, it is contended, was error. It was no part of the issue unless and until brought out on cross-examination. The claim that its purpose was to refresh the recollection of the witness was specious for at the trial she positively identified Janicke.

Frank Hajman, the other person, robbed, was an unwilling witness at the trial and testified that he was not sure that defendants were the robbers. His recollection was quickened by reference to his testimony at the examination, to the point of identifying Hallas as one of the robbers. The examination was proper and produced substantive evidence.

Defendants had two counsel; one objected to a question put by the prosecutor and the other, very soon, also made an objection. The prosecutor then objected, stating: This case ought to be confined to one attorney.’ Mr. Sherman, one attorney for defendants stated: ‘No; the rule isn't that way. There is no limitation.’ The court ruled: ‘The court will set one.’ Examination of a witness may be limited to one counsel at a time, but objections may be made by several counsel. The court, in denying the motion for a new trial, recognized the rule and stated that the ruling at the trial was to avoid having two counsel on their feet at the same time. The trial was not restricted to one counsel.

The prosecutor, over repeated objections, succeeded in getting before the jury prejudicial, irrelevant, and hearsay testimony. In questioning Hajman he asked:

‘Q. Well, do you know whether or not Mr. Hallas' mother makes dresses for your mother or sister? A. Well, my mother told me before we used to live on Kirby and Dubois, a couple of years ago--

‘Q. What is that? A. We used to live on Kirby and Dubois about two years ago.

‘Q. Well, you may answer my question. A. What?

‘Q. Do you know whether your mother makes dresses-A. She said she did.

‘Q. Has your mother talked with you about this case? She has, hasn't she? A. Yes, sir.

‘Q. And your mother told you not to tell on Hallas, didn't she? A. She did not say that.

‘Mr. Willard: Just a moment. Your honor, how is that binding upon this defendant? This witness is not shown to be hostile. This is cross-examination, and an attempted impeachment, if the court please, of his own witness.

‘Mr. Kent: It is a refreshment of his own recollection.

‘Mr. Willard: It seems to me he is doing a lot of refreshing.

‘The Court: Go ahead.

‘Q. Mr. Hajman, when the officers came after you to take you to identify Mr. Hallas didn't your mother tell you, in Polish, not to tell on Frank Hallas? A. She didn't say to me nothing. She just told me to watch my step. * * *

‘Q. How did she come to tell you that? A. Because one woman was talking to her--

‘Mr. Willard: Just a moment. This is bringing hearsay into this case. You are covering a large territory here, and there should be a limit. * * * If the court please, I have made my objection. Did you sustain me?

‘The Court: I only got a portion of it. If you know, now, you may answer. Tell us about it. A. There was a woman told my mother there was a dangerous gang--

‘Mr. Willard: Just a moment, Mr. Hajman. If your honor please, that is dangerous. It is purely hearsay.

‘Mr. Kent: I didn't ask for that. That was not my question at all. What I am asking is: How did your mother come to tell you, in Polish, as you say, to watch your step?

‘Mr. Willard: Now, may it please the court, how in the wide world can he know how his mother came to say anything to him, that is unless he has different mental faculties from what I have?

‘Mr. Kent: He talked to his mother about it.

‘The Court: You may take the answer.

‘Mr. Willard: May I make one more objection, your honor. Just a moment, Mr. Hajman. Obviously, this is pure hearsay, and not binding upon these defendants. He is not a hostile witness. It has not been shown that he is a hostile witness. It is not a proper form of impeachment.

‘The Court: Take the answer. * * *

‘Q. Tell us how it is that your mother came to tell you to watch your step? A. That night, before the dicks came over to take me down, I was eating supper, and at that time she got scared and she said, ‘What is the matter?’ I told her I was held up, and I was supposed to identify the guys. She said the grocery woman told her it was a dangerous gang--

‘Mr. Willard: May it please the court, I object to that; it is purely hearsay.

‘The Court: I will sustain the objection.

‘Mr. Willard: I will ask that the jury be instructed to disregard what was said.

‘The Court: Disregard that, ladies and gentlemen.

‘Q. Listen. Go ahead and tell us now what you told me--

‘Mr. Willard: May it please the court, this is hearsay that is being offered here.

‘The Court: Take the answer.

‘A. She heard it was a dangerous gang.

‘Mr. Willard: I ask that what she heard be stricken.

‘The Court: That may be stricken.

‘A. So she told me to watch my step and not to say nothing, whether I know the guys or not. And I went there, and they showed me the guys, and I just said what I said about the guys, about the voice and the quiet like.’

No man on trial can meet such kind of testimony, nor, under our system, is he required to do so. It was highly prejudicial, without excuse and commands reversal. It gave the jury an impression that defendants were part of a dangerous gang, and striking out the answers could not operate to erase the impression.

There was also error in the prosecutor introducing a conversation had between Cecelia Stachura and another woman by the name of Krueger, in which Miss...

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4 cases
  • People v. Knox
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • November 30, 1961
    ...is permissible practice. People v. O'Neill, 107 Mich. 556, 65 N.W. 540; People v. Prevost, 219 Mich. 233, 189 N.W. 92; People v. Hallas, 257 Mich. 127, 241 N.W. 193.' See, also, Higdon v. Kelley, 339 Mich. 209, 63 N.W.2d 592, and prior decisions there cited. Appellant's claim that the metho......
  • Higdon v. Kelley
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • April 5, 1954
    ...is permissible practice. People v. O'Neill, 107 Mich. 556, 65 N.W. 540; People v. Prevost, 219 Mich. 233, 189 N.W. 92; People v. Hallas, 257 Mich. 127, 241 N.W. 193.' In Bresch v. Wolf, 243 Mich. 638, 220 N.W. 737, 739, Justice North 'Was the method of direct examination of the witness Haro......
  • People v. Nankervis
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • March 1, 1951
    ...is permissible practice. People v. O'Neill, 107 Mich. 556, 65 N.W. 540; People v. Prevost, 219 Mich. 233, 189 N.W. 92; People v. Hallas, 257 Mich. 127, 241 N.W. 193. There was no error in permitting testimony concerning serveral distinct transactions of the character charged against defenda......
  • People v. Hughes, Docket No. 7629
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • May 28, 1970
    ...witness, although it was not known by the complainant if the threat was in regard to the present defendant, and cites People v. Hallas (1932), 257 Mich. 127, 241 N.W. 193, in support thereof. In Hallas, the Court held it to be reversible error when the prosecution repeatedly made references......

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