People v. Hamby
| Decision Date | 22 March 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 35581,35581 |
| Citation | 190 N.E.2d 289,27 Ill.2d 493 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Carl HAMBY, Plaintiff in Error. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Bernard J. Hennessy, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, States Atty., Chicago , for defendant in error
Defendant, Carl Hamby, was found guilty of armed robbery after a jury trial in the criminal court of Cook County and was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 25 years to life. He prosecutes this writ of error contending that he was not afforded a timely or speedy trial, thereby depriving him of both statutory and constitutional rights and entitling him to discharge.
So far as we can ascertain from the record presented, defendant was arrested on or prior to October 1, 1954, and committed to jail. On that date he was arraigned under indictment No. 54-2022 and entered a plea of not guilty but, on January 19, 1955, withdrew his plea and moved to quash the indictment on the principal ground that count 2 thereof, and habitual criminal count, alleged a 1926 conviction which was later determined to be void. By the express agreement of both sides the hearing on this motion was continued until February 18, 1955, at which time defendant's counsel was granted a further continuance to March 23. Thereafter on March 22, 1955, indictment No. 55-736 was returned against defendant alleging substantially the same charges as the earlier indictment but omitting any reference to the 1926 conviction. Again by agreement of the parties, the cause was continued to April 1, 1955, at which time indictment No. 54-2022 was dismissed upon the People's motion.
On April 1, 1955, defendant also moved to quash the second indictment and the cause was continued by agreement of both sides until May 20, 1955. When the latter date was reached defendant filed a petition requesting discharge for the failure of the People to prosecute within the four-months statutory period, but the petition was denied and the cause continued by agreement until June 8, 1955. It is the denial of this petition which forms in part the basis for the contentions made on this appeal. Subsequent events show that the People dismissed count 2 of the second indictment on June 8, 1955; that defendant moved to suppress an alleged confession from evidence on September 15, 1955; and that after many continuances, most of which were by agreement of the parties, defendant's trial commenced on May 21, 1956.
Section 9 of article II of our constitution, S.H.A. guarantees to the criminally accused a right to a speedy public trial, and section 18 of division XIII of the Criminal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 38, par. 748), designed to implement the constitutional guarantee, provides in substance that where an accused has not been admitted to bail, he must be tried or discharged within four months from the date of his commitment, unless he caused the delay. Where, however, the accused has sought and obtained a continuance, or agrees to a continuance, or in any manner causes delay in trial by his own action, the four-months period is renewed and starts to run again from the date the delay occurred, or to which the cause was continued. People v. Stahl, 26 Ill.2d 403, 186 N.E.2d 349; People v. Rankins. 18 Ill.2d 260, 163 N.E.2d 814.
As noted before, the delay relied upon by defendant is that occurring between January 19, 1955, when he filed a motion to quash the first indictment, and May 20, 1955, when his petition for discharge was denied. And although defendant recognizes that this period of delay was caused by his own motions to...
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People v. Exson
...right to a speedy trial is subject to waiver. See People v. Taylor, 32 Ill.2d 165, 168, 204 N.E.2d 734 (1965); People v. Hamby, 27 Ill.2d 493, 497, 190 N.E.2d 289 (1963). Also, statutorily based speedy trial claims are not constitutional in scope and, for this reason, are inappropriate for ......
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...to an accused by the constitution is protection only against delay that is arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, (People v. Hamby, 27 Ill.2d 493, 190 N.E.2d 289; People v. Stillman, 391 Ill. 227, 62 N.E.2d 698,) and, as we recently observed in People v. Love, 39 Ill.2d 436, 442, 235 N.E.2......
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...period does not continue to run, but rather is renewed and begins to run again from the date of such delay. (People v. Hamby (1963), 27 Ill.2d 493, 190 N.E.2d 289, cert. denied, 372 U.S. 980, 83 S.Ct. 1116, 10 L.Ed.2d 145; People v. Wilson (1974), 19 Ill.App.3d 466, 311 N.E.2d 759.) In the ......
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