People v. Hamilton, 63605

• Decision Date: 05 October 1987
• Docket Number: No. 63605,63605
• Citation: People v. Hamilton, 514 N.E.2d 965, 118 Ill.2d 153, 113 Ill.Dec. 53 (Ill. 1987)
• Parties: , 113 Ill.Dec. 53 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellants, v. John R. HAMILTON, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 965

514 N.E.2d 965

118 Ill.2d 153, 113 Ill.Dec. 53

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellants, v. John R. HAMILTON, Appellee.

No. 63605.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 5, 1987.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Roma Jones Stewart, Solicitor General, Chicago, for plaintiffs-appellants; Patricia Rosen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, of counsel.

Robert S. White, Decatur, for appellee.

Justice RYAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The State brings this direct appeal from a decision of the circuit court of Williamson County which invalidated a portion of Illinois' driver's license statutory summary suspension procedure. Specifically, the circuit court held that section 2-118.1(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 2-118.1(b)), insofar as it purports to limit the issues which may be raised at a driver's license summary suspension rescission hearing, violates due process and that the procedure also violates the doctrine of separation of powers.

On February 21, 1986, the defendant's automobile was stopped by a police officer in the city of Herrin, Illinois. The officer noticed the odor of alcohol, and the defendant admitted he had been drinking. The defendant then was given and failed three field sobriety tests. He was then arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI). He was taken to the police station, where the officer administered a chemical breath test which disclosed that the defendant had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.11. Section 11-501(a) of the Vehicle Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501(a)) provides that a person shall not drive or operate any vehicle while the alcohol concentration in such person's blood or breath is 0.10 or more. Accordingly, the defendant's driving privileges were summarily suspended pursuant to section 11-501.1 of the Vehicle Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501.1).

Subsequently, the defendant filed a petition for a hearing to seek rescission of his statutory summary suspension, pursuant to section 2-118.1(b) of the Vehicle Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 2-118.1(b)). He also filed a motion to dismiss the criminal DUI charge, contending, inter alia, that the hearing provided for under section 2-118.1(b) did not comport with due process, and that the overall statutory hearing scheme violated the separation of powers doctrine.

The circuit court granted the defendant's motion and held section 2-118.1(b) invalid on both due process and separation of powers grounds. The court's order only affected the summary suspension of the defendant's driving privileges; the underlying criminal proceeding for the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol remained pending in the circuit court. The State then appealed directly to this court under Rule 302(a) (94 Ill.2d R. 302(a)).

This case involves the interplay of a number of related statutes. Thus, in order to adequately address the issue presented, it is necessary to briefly summarize the driver's license statutory summary suspension process.

Section 11-501.1 is the foundation of the so-called "implied consent" concept. That section provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this State shall be deemed to have given consent * * * to a chemical test or tests of blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol, other drug, or combination thereof content of such person's blood * * *." Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501.1(a).

Section 6-208.1 specifies the time periods of such summary suspension under section 11-501.1. Refusal to submit to testing will result in a suspension of six months from the effective date of such refusal. A test which discloses an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more will result in a three-month suspension. Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-208.1.

Against this backdrop, we turn to the provisions which are the focus of this appeal. Section 2-118.1 of the Vehicle Code provides that a person whose driving privileges are to be summarily suspended may request a hearing in the circuit court to seek rescission of the suspension. That section further states:

"The scope of the hearing shall be limited to the issues of:

1. Whether the person was placed under arrest for an offense as defined in Section 11-501, or a similar provision of a local ordinance, as evidenced by the issuance of a Uniform Traffic Ticket; and

2. Whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that such person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, other drug, or combination thereof; and

3. Whether such person, after being advised by the arresting officer that the privilege to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended if the person refused to submit to and complete the test or tests, did refuse to submit to or complete such test or tests to determine the person's alcohol or drug concentration; or

4. Whether the person, after being advised by the arresting officer that the privilege to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended if the person submits to a chemical test, or tests, and such test discloses an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, and such person did submit to and complete such test or tests which determined an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more." Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 2-118.1(b).

The circuit court struck down this provision, finding that the attempt to limit the issues which may be raised at the rescission hearing was a denial of due process. The circuit court reasoned that the hearing provided for in section 2-118.1(b) fails to afford due process because it absolutely forecloses certain defenses from being raised by the licensee in support of his request for rescission of summary suspension. For example, among the issues enumerated in section 2-118.1(b) are whether the licensee submitted to a chemical test, and whether that test disclosed an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 2-118.1(b)(4).) The circuit court interpreted this provision as permitting no more than a "yes or no" inquiry as to that question. Either the test result was 0.10 or more, in which case summary suspension would continue, or it was not, in which case rescission would result.

Under this view then, a licensee seeking rescission would be prohibited from challenging the validity of the 0.10 test result. Facts which might call that result into question--equipment malfunction, operator certification, etc.--could not be introduced because they are not among the "issues" enumerated in section 2-118.1(b). Thus, because foreclosure of such issues creates an intolerable risk of erroneous deprivation of the privilege to drive, section 2-118.1(b) denies individuals due process of law.

The court also held that section 2-118.1(b) violates the doctrine of separation of powers. According to the court, the legislatively imposed restrictions on issues which may be raised have the effect of declaring any other matters irrelevant and inadmissible, thereby infringing on the role of the judiciary. Also, the court found that the rescinding of driving privileges has been declared by statute to be an executive function vested in the Secretary of State. Thus, granting the judiciary the power to rescind the statutory suspension violates the doctrine of separation of powers.

We disagree with the circuit court's determination and reverse. As to the due process issue, we base our decision on statutory rather than constitutional grounds. As stated above, the essence of the court's ruling was that absolute preclusion of challenges to test validity violates due process. Because we find that as a matter of statutory interpretation such challenges are not absolutely foreclosed, we do not reach the question of whether such limitations could be constitutionally imposed.

Section 11-501.1, the implied-consent statute upon which summary suspension is based, provides in pertinent part:

"Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this State shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to the provisions of Section 11-501.2, to a chemical test or tests of blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol, other drug, or combination thereof content of such person's blood if arrested, as evidenced by the issuance of a Uniform Traffic Ticket, for any offense as defined in Section 11-501 or a similar provision of a local ordinance." (Emphasis added.) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501.1(a).)

Section 11-501.2 provides in part:

"Sec. 11-501.2. Chemical and other tests. (a) Upon the trial of any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of an arrest for an offense as defined in Section 11-501 or a similar local ordinance, evidence of the concentration of alcohol, other drug or combination thereof in a person's blood or breath at the time alleged, as determined by analysis of the person's blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance, shall be admissible. Where such test is made the following provisions shall apply:

1. Chemical analyses of the person's blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance to be considered valid under the provisions of this Section shall have been performed according to standards promulgated by the Department of Public Health in consultation with the Department of State Police by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by that Department for this purpose. The Director of the Department of Public Health in consultation with the Department of State Police is authorized to approve satisfactory techniques or methods, to ascertain the qualifications and competence of individuals to conduct such analyses, to issue permits which shall be subject to termination or revocation at the discretion of that Department and to...