People v. Hamilton

• Decision Date: 26 January 1979
• Docket Number: No. 50507,50507
• Parties: , 24 Ill.Dec. 849 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. George T. HAMILTON, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 53

386 N.E.2d 53

74 Ill.2d 457, 24 Ill.Dec. 849

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. George T. HAMILTON, Appellee.

No. 50507.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 26, 1979.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Chicago, and Thomas J. Difanis, State's Atty., Urbana (Donald B. Mackay, Melbourne A. Noel, Jr., Thomas C. Crooks, and David Cassorla, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, and James E. Hinterlong, of State's Attys. App. Service Commission, Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.

Robert B. McGee, Chicago, for appellee.

RYAN, Justice:

This case involves a motion to suppress evidence as being the fruit of an unreasonable search. The circuit court of Champaign County denied the motion to suppress, and the defendant was convicted at a bench trial of possession of heroin, in violation of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 561/2, par. 1402(a)). The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence should have been suppressed (56 Ill.App.3d 196, 14 Ill.Dec. 181, 371 N.E.2d 1234). The issue before this court is whether the heroin, which was found in the defendant's closed briefcase, should have been suppressed. We hold that the evidence was obtained in violation of the defendant's fourth amendment rights and affirm the holding of the appellate court.

The defendant, George Hamilton, was injured when his motor vehicle (a van) left the highway late at night and rolled down an embankment. Hamilton received cuts and bruises but remained conscious. Officer Clark of the State Police arrived at the scene of the accident and summoned an ambulance. When the ambulance arrived, Hamilton was taken to the hospital; a briefcase that had been found on the front floor of the van was also taken to the hospital. Officer Clark then began an examination of the wrecked vehicle and its contents. During the course of his examination he found three .38-caliber bullets but found no gun. A wrecker subsequently towed the wrecked vehicle to a storage area at a gasoline station.

When Hamilton arrived at the hospital, his clothing was removed and placed in storage bags. Hospital procedure required that an inventory of the patient's property be made, which was done in this instance. No police officer suggested or participated in this inventory. The nurse and orderly attending Hamilton found numerous keys, a watch, some rings, a wallet, $1,200 in cash, several bullets and, also, the locked briefcase. Curious because of the large amount of cash and the bullets, the orderly unlocked the briefcase with one of the keys found in Hamilton's possession. He sifted through the papers in the briefcase and found a brown bag wrapped with a string or a rubber band. He opened the bag and, after briefly examining its contents, told the nurse that he thought it contained heroin. He then rewrapped the bag and put it back in the briefcase. Both he and the nurse testified that after doing so he again locked the briefcase. The keys, the valuables, and the wallet were put in a storage locker. The briefcase, apparently because it was too large for the locker, was left on a counter at the foot of the defendant's bed or cot in the emergency room.

Later, Officer Clark arrived at the hospital to interview Hamilton and to complete his accident report. When he arrived, Hamilton was being X-rayed. The officer talked with the nurse outside of the emergency room and was told about the hospital procedure for safekeeping valuables. In response to a statement by Clark concerning bullets, the nurse told him that some bullets had been found in the defendant's clothing. She also told him about the money and other valuables. Later, Clark spoke to the defendant in the emergency room in order to complete the accident report. He told the defendant that his briefcase would be returned to the van and that his property would be inventoried. Hamilton was not told that his briefcase would be opened. He made no response to the officer's statement, nor did he consent to the opening of his briefcase. The wallet and other valuables which had been brought to the emergency room from the locker were to remain at the hospital. At one point the nurse stated to the officer, "You better check the briefcase," but said nothing specific about its contents. Also, she did not tell the officer that the briefcase had been opened. The officer testified that shortly before leaving the emergency room, he opened the briefcase, noticed a small plastic envelope containing what he thought was marijuana, and then examined the contents of the brown bag in the briefcase. He said nothing to the defendant about his suspicions but left the room with the briefcase, went to the gasoline station where the wrecked van had been taken, completed the inventory of the van, and later gave the brown bag to a detective who confirmed that the substance it contained was heroin.

The testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress sharply conflicted as to whether the briefcase was locked or unlocked when the officer opened it. The officer stated that he merely opened the unlocked case in order to sweep the keys off of the counter into it. Both the nurse and the orderly testified that the orderly used one of the keys found on the defendant to unlock the briefcase before inspecting it, and that the orderly again locked the briefcase. The nurse testified that the officer unlocked the briefcase before he opened it. Officer Clark's testimony also varied as to the circumstances surrounding the opening of the briefcase. Although at one point he stated that he opened the unlocked case to sweep the keys off of the counter into it, at another time he stated, "After talking to Mr. Hamilton and finishing my business there, I picked up the case, opened it and noticed the contents of the case." At other times, he referred to "looking into the briefcase." When he was being questioned as to whether discovering the bullets caused him to look for a gun in the case when he opened it, he replied, "Oh yes, I looked for a gun in there." When the question was again stated, "You did look for a gun?" The officer answered, "Yes, sir, I looked for anything."

In this court the State contends that (1) the heroin was legally seized during an inventory of defendant's possessions following a traffic accident, or (2) alternatively, the heroin was discovered during a private search to which the requirements of the fourth amendment do not apply.

There are several exceptions to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment: these include the discovery of evidence as a result of a search by a private person (People v. Heflin (1978), 71 Ill.2d 525, 17 Ill.Dec. 786, 376 N.E.2d 1367), and evidence seized which was in "plain view" (People v. Berg (1977), 67 Ill.2d 65, 7 Ill.Dec. 539, 364 N.E.2d 880). Another exception to the warrant requirement involves the discovery of evidence as a result of an inventory, a procedure which has not been conclusively established by the courts to constitute a search (People v. Clark (1976), 65 Ill.2d 169, 2 Ill.Dec. 578, 357 N.E.2d 798). See generally Sikma, Collateral Search: A Survey of Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement, 21 S.D.L.Rev. 254 (1976).

In considering the first contention which the State urges in this court, that the heroin was found pursuant to an "inventory," we need not determine whether the officer had probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed, or that the briefcase contained evidence of a crime, because an inventory is not the same as an "automobile exception" search. An established exception to the warrant requirement permits the search of an automobile under circumstances which would not render permissible the warrantless search of a home. It has been established that the expectation of privacy in an automobile is significantly less than the traditional expectations of privacy existing at the home. However, under the automobile exception, a warrantless search is not justified unless the officer has probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains articles which the officer in entitled to seize. (Chambers v. Maroney (1970), 399 U.S. 42, 26 L.Ed.2d 419, 90 S.Ct. 1975; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976), 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116.) Also, under proper circumstances, an automobile may be searched without a warrant as incident to a lawful arrest. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564.

Unlike the "automobile exception," an inventory of a person's automobile need not be based on any belief of probable cause by the officer, nor is it necessary that it be made in conjunction with a lawful arrest. An inventory does not in the true sense constitute a search for evidence, but is a mere listing of items of property which have come into the possession of the officer.

In South Dakota v. Opperman (1976), 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000, the court upheld the seizure of evidence discovered in a motor vehicle during an inventory of its contents after it had been impounded. The court noted, first, that the State courts have overwhelmingly concluded that, whether or not an inventory is characterized as a search, the intrusion is constitutionally permissible by applying the fourth amendment standard of reasonableness, and, second, that the majority of the Federal courts of appeal have likewise sustained inventory procedures as reasonable police intrusions. (428 U.S. 364, 370-72, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3097-99, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000, 1005-07.) In People v. Clark (1976), 65 Ill.2d 169, 2 Ill.Dec. 578, 357 N.E.2d 798, relying on Opperman, this court held that evidence was properly seized following its discovery during a routine inventory of a vehicle that had been towed from the street. The justification for such a warrantless intrusion into the automobile was stated in Opperman and in Clark to be threefold: protection of police officers from potential...