People v. Hamm

• Decision Date: 09 June 1992
• Docket Number: 72035 and 72036,Nos. 72034,s. 72034
• Citation: 172 Ill.Dec. 179,149 Ill.2d 201,595 N.E.2d 540
• Parties: , 172 Ill.Dec. 179 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Brian Keith HAMM, Appellee. The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Robert A. SWAN, Appellee. The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Arnold W. DeVORE, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 540

595 N.E.2d 540

149 Ill.2d 201, 172 Ill.Dec. 179

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Brian Keith HAMM, Appellee.

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Robert A. SWAN, Appellee.

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Arnold W. DeVORE, Appellee.

Nos. 72034, 72035 and 72036.

Supreme Court of Illinois June 9, 1992.

Roland W. Burris, Atty. Gen., Springfield (Rosalyn Kaplan, Sol. Gen. and Terence M. Madsen and Nathan P. Maddox, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel), for the People.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and Jeffrey D. Foust, Asst. Defender, of the office of the State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for appellees.

State Appellate Defender Springfield, Fourth Judicial Dist., Springfield, for Robert A. Swan and Arnold W. DeVore.

Justice CUNNINGHAM delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a direct appeal (134 Ill.2d R. 302(a)) from the circuit court of Schuyler County declaring unconstitutional section 2.4(a) of the Fish Code of 1971, as amended (Code) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 56, par. 2.4(a)). The three cases involved, People v. Hamm, No. 72034, People v. Swan, No. 72035, and People v. DeVore, No. 72036, were consolidated on August 19, 1991, pursuant to the State's motion.

The State filed amended complaints against the defendants on May 4, 1989, charging each with two felony counts of violating section 2.4(a) of the Code. Section 2.4(a) of the Code provides in part:

"Any person who, for profit or commercial purposes, knowingly captures or kills, [or] possesses, * * * any of the species protected by this Act, contrary to the provisions of the Act, and such aquatic life, in whole or in part, are valued in excess of a total of $300, as per specie value specified in subsection (c) of this Section, commits a Class 3 felony." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 56, par. 2.4(a).)

The charges against all three defendants alleged that on March 3, 1989, each defendant knowingly possessed (count I) and captured or killed (count II) aquatic life of species protected by the Code having a value in excess of $300, for commercial purposes, contrary to the provisions of the Code. The specific provisions of the Code defendants were charged with violating for the purposes of section 2.4(a) are: (1) section 1.5 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 56, par. 1.5; 17 Ill.Adm.Code § 830.40(b)(2) (1991)), use of a commercial fishing device, a seine, in restricted waters; (2) section 2.2b (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 56, par. 2.2b), taking aquatic life within waters other than public waters of the State without obtaining consent of the owner or occupant of the premises; (3) section 4.22 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 56, par. 4.22), illegal length and mesh size of seine; and (4) section 5.20 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 56, par. 5.20), failure to have commercial fishing licenses in their possession for immediate presentation for inspection to authorized personnel. Defendant Swan's information further alleged that he violated section 5.11 of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 56, par. 5.11) in failing to have his seine properly tagged.

On April 10, 1991, defendants filed motions to dismiss the felony counts and argued the Code: (1) is impermissibly vague; (2) denies equal protection of the law; (3) provides a penalty disproportionate to the crimes enumerated or the acts the legislature intended to curtail; and (4) provides a dollar amount value for species of fish that have no relevance to market or ethical value as a wild species. The motion to dismiss was heard on May 1, 1991. After hearing arguments from defense counsel and the State's Attorney, the trial court ruled from the bench that the Code was not constitutionally vague. However, the trial court did find that the Code violated equal protection because it treats a person fishing for profit or commercially fishing differently than a person fishing for his own use. The court also found the Code unconstitutional because it ascribes a value to the fish when there is an objective form for determining value, market value.

The trial court also entered the following written order on May 1, 1991:

"Arguments heard on Defendant's challenge to the felony charges only, on constitutional grounds. Court rules statute violates equal protection of law and is additionally unconstitutional because value is a critical aspect of the law and the legislature cannot proscribe [sic ] a value to an item which has a market value readily available.

Accordingly, it is ordered that the felony charges against the Defendants are dismissed and the remaining cases shall proceed [to] trial to be set by agreement at a later date."

The State filed notice of appeal and the cause was transferred to this court pursuant to our Rule 302(a) (134 Ill.2d R. 302(a)). Five issues are presented for review, the first two of which have been briefed by both the State and defendants: (1) whether section 2.4 of the Code violates defendants' right to equal protection under the Illinois Constitution of 1970 and the United States Constitution; and (2) whether section 2.4(c) of the Code, which ascribes a value to certain species of fish, renders section 2.4 unconstitutional. Three additional issues are advanced by defendants but not addressed by the State: (1) whether section 2.4(a) of the Code violates due process in that the penalty provided does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative interest; (2) whether the penalty provision in section 2.4(a) of the Code violates the proportionate penalties provision of the Illinois Constitution; and (3) whether the Code violates due process as being unconstitutionally vague.

We first address the argument that section 2.4 of the Code violates the equal protection clauses of the Illinois and United States Constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2). The trial court did not indicate which constitution section 2.4 violated. Our analysis of the issue will apply to both the United States and Illinois Constitutions.

We begin our analysis with the presumption that all statutes are constitutional. (People v. Bales (1985), 108 Ill.2d 182, 192-93, 91 Ill.Dec. 171, 483 N.E.2d 517.) Because of this presumption, the party challenging the statute in question has the burden of clearly establishing the alleged constitutional violations. (Bales, 108 Ill.2d at 188, 91 Ill.Dec. 171, 483 N.E.2d 517.) "It is our duty to construe acts of the legislature so as to affirm their constitutionality and validity, if it can reasonably be done, and further if their construction is doubtful, the doubt will be decided in favor of the validity of the law challenged. [Citation.]" Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm'n (1969), 42 Ill.2d 385, 389, 251 N.E.2d 253.

The equal protection clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions do not deny the States the power to treat different classes of persons in different ways. (Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), 405 U.S. 438, 446-47, 31 L.Ed.2d 349, 358, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 1035; People v. Coleman (1986), 111 Ill.2d 87, 95, 94 Ill.Dec. 762, 488 N.E.2d 1009.) However, a rational basis must exist for distinguishing the class to which the law applies from the class to which the statute is inapplicable. (People v. McCabe (1971), 49 Ill.2d 338, 341, 275 N.E.2d 407.) As the Supreme Court stated in Rinaldi v. Yeager (1966), 384 U.S. 305, 308-09, 16 L.Ed.2d 577, 580, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 1499-1500:

"The Equal Protection Clause * * * imposes a requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class singled out. To be sure, the constitutional demand is not a demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to all persons. 'The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact ... to be treated in law as though they were the same.' Tigner v. Texas [ (1940) ] 310 U.S. 141, 147 [60 S.Ct. 879, 882, 84 L.Ed. 1124]. Hence, legislation may impose special burdens upon defined classes in order to achieve permissible ends. But the Equal Protection Clause does require that, in defining a class subject to legislation, the distinctions that are drawn have 'some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made.' [Citations.]"

Section 2.4(a) of the Code provides a Class 3 felony for any person who knowingly captures, kills, or possesses aquatic life, valued over $300, in violation of any provision of the Code, when done for profit or commercial purposes. Defendants argue, and the trial court agreed, that section 2.4(a) violates equal protection because any person, such as a sport fisherman, who commits the same act, knowingly killing or possessing aquatic life valued over $300 in violation of any provision of the Code, but not for profit or commercial purposes, is guilty only of a misdemeanor. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 56, par. 5.7.) Defendants believe that section 2.4(a) " 'lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense.' " (People v. Bradley (1980), 79 Ill.2d 410, 416, 38 Ill.Dec. 575, 403 N.E.2d 1029, quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942), 316 U.S. 535, 541, 86 L.Ed. 1655, 1660, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113.) That is to say, defendants argue there is no rational basis for punishing a commercial fisherman as a Class 3 felon for engaging in illegal fishing practices when a sport fisherman engaging in the same conduct is punished as a misdemeanant. We find however, a rational basis for such distinction: the monetary incentive in commercial fishing and fishing for profit, and the capability of commercial fishermen to remove large amounts of fish from Illinois waters.

In finding this rational basis, we note that this court addressed a similar issue in Chicago Real Estate Board v. City of Chicago (1967), 36 Ill.2d 530, 224 N.E.2d 793. The issue involved there was whether the Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution for prohibiting real estate brokers, but not individuals...