People v. Hampton

Decision Date30 November 1987
Docket NumberNo. 86SC254,86SC254
Citation746 P.2d 947
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Russell Millard HAMPTON, Respondent.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Curt P. Kriksciun, Asst. Atty. Gen., Appellate Section, Denver, for petitioner.

Mary G. Allen, Tegtmeier & Sears, P.C., Colorado Springs, for respondent.

MULLARKEY, Justice.

The defendant was convicted of first degree sexual assault and two habitual criminal counts. At trial, certain evidence was admitted concerning rape trauma syndrome. The court of appeals held that rape trauma syndrome evidence is per se inadmissible in sexual assault trials and reversed the defendant's conviction, remanding for a new trial. We granted certiorari and now decide that the testimony in question was admissible. We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals.

I.

At trial the victim testified that she met the defendant at the bank where she was employed and he was a regular customer and that she agreed to go out on a date with him. After several drinks at a bar, the victim and the defendant returned to the victim's apartment. When the victim refused the defendant's sexual advances, he forced her onto her bed, punched her twice, striking her throat and her chin, and sexually assaulted her. After the defendant left, the victim immediately called her cousin and told her that the defendant had hurt her. Her cousin testified that the victim was hysterical on the evening of the assault, as well as when she saw her on the next morning, and that bruises and lumps were visible on her throat. The victim mentioned the incident to several other people without explicitly stating that she was raped.

The defendant continued to frequent the bank at which the victim worked for the next two to three months. A police officer who worked as a security guard at the bank noticed a change in the victim's personality and questioned the victim about it; in response, she told him she had been in a car accident. About this time, the defendant discontinued his trips to the bank. Upon further prodding during the next few weeks, the victim confided in the security guard that she had been raped. The security guard convinced her to report the crime and she did so that evening, 89 days after the assault.

Subsequent to the testimony of the victim and defense counsel's cross-examination of her, the People called Patricia Wyka, head of the Victim Services Unit of the Colorado Springs Police Department. She was qualified and accepted by the trial court as an expert in victimology. Wyka testified that she had bachelor's and master's degrees in psychology and had attended seminars and workshops regarding victimology and sexual assault. She further stated that she had worked with several hundred adult victims of sexual assaults and 700 to 800 child victims of sexual abuse over a nine year period. Wyka testified as to the different stages of emotional adjustment involved in rape trauma syndrome. She observed that rape victims' reactions to men usually change, that most rape victims wish to avoid or escape from the scene of a sexual assault and that a rape victim is less likely to report a rape when the assailant is someone with whom she is acquainted rather than a stranger. Wyka never examined the victim. Other witnesses called by the People testified concerning aspects of the victim's behavior after the assault which were consistent with the rape trauma syndrome symptoms described by Wyka.

Defense counsel challenged the testimony of Wyka prior to trial. The trial court ruled that because defense counsel had represented that the complainant's delay in reporting the assault would be the subject of serious attack at trial, expert testimony explaining why such a delay might occur was admissible. 1 The trial court also dismissed defense counsel's arguments that the remainder of Wyka's testimony was unduly prejudicial.

Defense counsel originally indicated to the district attorney and the trial court that the only witness who would testify at trial in connection with an alibi defense would be the defendant, if he chose to take the stand. Following the conclusion of the People's case-in-chief, the defense notified the court and the People that it would be presenting several alibi witnesses other than the defendant. Several witnesses then testified that they were with the defendant on the evening in question. 2

II.

The term "rape trauma syndrome" is used to describe a recurring pattern of emotional distress in rape victims. Burgess and Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131 Am.J.Psychiatry 981 (1974). The syndrome usually consists of a two-phase reaction: an acute phase, followed by a long term process of reorganization. Typical symptoms of the acute phase are a fear of physical violence and death and feelings ranging from humiliation and embarrassment to anger, revenge and self-blame. The second phase is characterized by a disorganization in lifestyle, a change in residence, dreams about violent acts, nightmares and other sleep disturbances, the development of fears and phobias related to the specific circumstances of the attack and sexual dysfunction. Id. In 1980, the psychiatric profession recognized post-traumatic stress disorder as an anxiety disorder in the basic text relied upon by the profession for diagnostic purposes. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 236, 308.30, 309.81 (3d ed. 1980); McCord, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony Regarding Rape Trauma Syndrome in Rape Prosecutions, 26 B.C.L.Rev. 1143, 1151-53 (1985). Rape trauma syndrome is regarded as the quintessential example of post-traumatic stress disorder. McCord, supra, at 1152; see also H. Kaplan & B. Sadock, Modern Synopsis of Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry/IV 335-36, 470 (1980) (many rape victims experience the symptoms of a post-traumatic stress disorder); American Psychiatric Association, supra (post-traumatic stress disorder may be caused by rape). Although other examples of post-traumatic stress disorder exist, the symptoms associated with rape trauma syndrome, e.g., sexual dysfunction and rape-related fears, are distinguishable from the general symptoms related to post-traumatic stress disorder. McCord, supra, at 1152-53.

III.

Although this is a case of first impression in Colorado, other states have confronted the issue. The highest court of one state has ruled that rape trauma syndrome testimony is inadmissible in criminal trials. See State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn.1982) (rape trauma syndrome testimony is of no help to the jury and produces extreme danger of unfair prejudice).

Other states have held that rape trauma syndrome testimony is admissible. See State v. McQuillen, 236 Kan. 161, 689 P.2d 822 (1984) (when consent is the defense in a prosecution for rape, qualified expert psychiatric testimony regarding the existence of rape trauma syndrome is relevant and admissible); 3 State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982) (rape trauma syndrome is generally accepted in the psychiatric community to be a common reaction to sexual assault, is relevant when the defendant claims that the victim consented and does not invade the province of the jury); State v. Liddell, 685 P.2d 918 (Mont.1984) (quoting Marks approvingly in holding such evidence admissible when consent is a defense); State v. Huey, 145 Ariz. 59, 699 P.2d 1290 (1985) (although the evidence in question was not rape trauma syndrome evidence, testimony concerning rape trauma syndrome is admissible when the defendant claims consent as a defense); see also State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 517 A.2d 741 (1986) (post-traumatic stress disorder testimony is admissible in a sexual assault trial); Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 353 Pa.Super. 426, 510 A.2d 735 (1986) (rape trauma syndrome testimony is admissible to explain why the complainant was able to identify the defendant four years after the assault, although she had been unable to do so only two weeks after the assault).

Still other states have decided the issue with unclear results. See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal.3d 236, 203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291 (1984) (rape trauma syndrome testimony is inadmissible to prove that a rape occurred but evidence of emotional and psychological trauma after an alleged rape may be admissible); People v. Pullins, 145 Mich.App. 414, 378 N.W.2d 502 (1985) (testimony concerning rape trauma syndrome is not admissible to prove that a rape occurred and evidence of such a trauma is relevant but should not be presented with an aura of scientific reliability unless the Frye 4 test is met; the court, however, gives no opinion as to the propriety of rape trauma syndrome evidence when consent is raised as a defense); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo.1984) (expert testimony that the complaining witness suffered from rape trauma syndrome and had been raped is inadmissible although expert could legitimately testify that the victim's symptoms are consistent with a traumatic experience or a stressful sexual experience); State v. Ogle, 668 S.W.2d 138 (Mo.App.) (expert testimony regarding the reactions of rape victims admissible where the expert did not state that the victim suffered from rape trauma syndrome or that she had been raped), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 154, 83 L.Ed.2d 91 (1984).

In the instant case, the court of appeals held in People v. Hampton, 728 P.2d 345 (Colo.App.1986), that evidence of rape trauma syndrome does not meet the test for admission of expert scientific testimony developed in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). 5 The court reasoned that such evidence is inadmissible because rape trauma syndrome was developed for treatment rather than proof purposes and because the symptoms of rape trauma syndrome could result...

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23 books & journal articles
  • Commonly Used Experts
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Qualifying & Attacking Expert Witnesses - 2016 Contents
    • August 4, 2016
    ...trauma syndrome has not reached the level of reliability that surpasses a common sense evaluation by the jury. Cases People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1987) involved a conviction of rape in which the court held that the tes-timony of an expert in “victimology” should have been admitted......
  • Table of Cases
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    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Qualifying & Attacking Expert Witnesses - 2015 Contents
    • August 4, 2015
    ...§603.7 People v. Geier, 41 Cal. 4th 555 (2007), §603 People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E. 2d 727, 810 NYD 119 (2005), §593 People v. Hampton , 746 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1987), §603.2 People v. Herring , 20 Cal. App. 4th 1066, 1072 (1993), §424.7 People v. Hood, 53 Cal. App. 4th 965, 968, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2......
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    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Qualifying & Attacking Expert Witnesses - 2019 Contents
    • August 4, 2019
    ...trauma syndrome has not reached the level of reliability that surpasses a common sense evaluation by the jury. CASES People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1987) involved a conviction of rape in which the court held that the testimony of an expert in “victimology” should have been admitted.......
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Qualifying & Attacking Expert Witnesses - 2016 Contents
    • August 4, 2016
    ...§603.7 People v. Geier, 41 Cal. 4th 555 (2007), §603 People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E. 2d 727, 810 NYD 119 (2005), §593 People v. Hampton , 746 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1987), §603.2 People v. Herring , 20 Cal. App. 4th 1066, 1072 (1993), §424.7 People v. Hood, 53 Cal. App. 4th 965, 968, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2......
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