People v. Hancasky

• Decision Date: 21 September 1951
• Docket Number: No. 32008,32008
• Citation: People v. Hancasky, 410 Ill. 148, 101 N.E.2d 575 (Ill. 1951)
• Parties: PEOPLE v. HANCASKY.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 575

101 N.E.2d 575

410 Ill. 148

PEOPLE v.HANCASKY.

No. 32008.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 21, 1951.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 19, 1951.

John A. McIntyre, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

Ivan A. Elliott, Atty. Gen. and John Irving Pearce, State's Atty., of Joliet (Harry L. Pate, of Tuscola, of counsel), for the People.

DAILY, Chief Justice.

An indictment returned to the September term. 1949, of the circuit court of Will County, jointly charged Robert J. Hancasky, Francis Ventura, Michael Sinchak, and John Koutras with the crime of forcible rape.On arraignment they pleaded not guilty and, after motions of the latter three for severance were denied, the cause came on for hearing October 10, 1949, with each of the defendants being represented by counsel of his own choice.Before a jury was completely chosen, each of the defendants changed his plea of not guilty to one of guilty.The court then heard evidence in aggravation and mitigation, following which Hancasky was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of twenty years and the other three defendants for terms of fifteen years.Hancasky, to whom we shall hereafter refer as plaintiff in error, has sued out this writ of error to review his judgment of conviction.

Plaintiff in error contends he was denied due process of law for two reasons: First, that he was prevented from having a trial by jury on the merits because the State's Attorney induced him by promises, impliedly acquiesced in by the court but later ignored, to forego presenting a valid lagal defense and to enter a plea of guilty; and that he was precluded from subsequently challenging the judgment entered on his plea because of his speedy removal to the penitentiary, so that the court was divested of jurisdiction of his person and of the right to entertain an application for relief; second, that the recording of his plea of guilty and the entry of judgment therein in chambers, after a secret session, was in violation of our constitution and Criminal Code, in that it denied him a public trial in open court.

The record discloses that, when the cause came on for hearing on October 10, the examination of jurors on their voir dire was commenced, and thereafter, when it was reported that the regular panel would be exhausted, the court ordered the clerk to draw a panel of fifty persons for immediate service, and continued the cause to the following day.On October 11, the court announced to the jurors and panel members present that there was a matter to take up in the case apart from the jury, and continued: 'I am going to ask you parties in this proceeding to go to the little courtroom and all of you prospective jurors remain in this room.'Outside the presence of those in the main courtroom, the judge stated that he had been informed that the defendant Hancasky had some motion to present.The latter's attorney then stated that plaintiff in error desired to enter a plea of guilty and added: 'I don't know if there should be anything on the State's Attorney's part at this time.'The judge replied: 'If there is, it should be the recommendation on the part of the State's Attorney; that should come at a later date.I understand that the State's Attorney will make certain recommendations; if he fails to make them, that is ground to withdraw a plea of guilty.'

The court then asked plaintiff in error if he had heard the motion made by his counsel relative to entering a plea of guilty to the crime of rape as charged in the indictment, and asked if it conformed to his wishes.Following this, the court read the indictment and asked plaintiff in error if he understood it; defined the crime of rape and the penalty authorized by law upon conviction; advised plaintiff in error of his right to jury trial and to counsel; and informed him that in the event the court accepted the motion to withdraw the plea of not guilty and to enter a plea of guilty, the penalty provided by law was imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not less than one year and that it may extend to life.Following this detailed recital the court asked the plaintiff in error if he still desired to enter a plea of guilty, and received an affirmative answer.The plea of not guilty was ordered withdrawn and a plea of guilty recorded, following which the court found the age of plaintiff in error to be twenty-eight years and ordered judgment entered on the plea of guilty to the crime of rape as charged.

The State's Attorney then recommended a sentence of five years, and the cause was continued to October 21, 1949, for the purpose of hearing evidence in aggravation and mitigation.At the hearing, the complaining witness and her husband both testified that while they were seated in their parked automobile on Zarley Road near its intersection of U. S. Route 66A, the plaintiff in error and his three codefendants forcibly took the husband from the automobile, and while two of defendants held him, plaintiff on error and another of the defendant whom they were unable to identify positively, forced the complaining witness to have illicit relations with them.The testimony of plaintiff in error and his codefendants was substantially the same, although each of them denied that any force was used and testified that the complaining witness consented to relations with the plaintiff in error, in return for a promise that only he would molest her.After hearing many character witnesses, the court observed that, in his judgment, the sentence of five years recommended by the State's Attorney was inadequate, and stated that he did not intend to be bound by the recommendation.After asking each of the defendants if there was any reason why sentence should not be imposed, and having received a negative reply from each, the court sentenced the defendants as previously related.

The tenor of plaintiff in error's first contention is that a combination of erroneous circumstances denied him a trial by jury.They, are, first, that the was influenced by the State's Attorney and the court to change his plea of not guilty to one of guilty and to thus forsake a valid legal defense; second, that he was removed from the jurisdiction of the court, before he could make a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, with such dispatch that he was denied due process of law; and, third, that, having heard his defense in the hearing on mitigation and aggravation, the court should have withdrawn the plea of guilty sua sponte.The specific rule of law and procedure advanced by plaintiff in error in support of his contentions is best summarized in People v. Jameson, 387 Ill. 367, 56 N.E.2d 790, 793, as follows: 'The rule has often been announced in this State that permission to change a plea of guilty to one of not guilty is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and this discretion will not ordinarily be disturbed unless it appears that the plea of guilty was entered on a misapprehension of the facts or of law, or in consequence of misrepresentation by counsel or the State's Attorney or someone else in authority, or the case in one where there is doubt of the guilt of the accused, or where the accused has a defense worthy of consideration by the jury and the ends of justice will be better served by submitting the case to a jury.'See also: Krolage v. People, 224 Ill. 456, 79 N.E. 570;People v. Kurant, 331 Ill. 470, 163 N.E. 411.The rule is based on the favor the law shows...