People v. Hancock

• Decision Date: 24 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. 4–13–1069.,4–13–1069.
• Citation: 18 N.E.3d 941
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Petitioner–Appellee, v. Mark Lee HANCOCK, Respondent–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

18 N.E.3d 941

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Petitioner–Appellee

v.Mark Lee HANCOCK, Respondent–Appellant.

No. 4–13–1069.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Sept. 24, 2014.

John B. Hensley, of Hensley Law Office, of Champaign, for appellant.

Julia Rietz, State's Attorney, of Urbana (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Allison Paige Brooks, all of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Presiding Justice APPLETON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Since 2001, respondent, Mark Lee Hancock, has been in civil confinement as a sexually dangerous person. See 725 ILCS 205/8 (West 2012). In November 2010, he filed a recovery application (see 725 ILCS 205/ 9(a) (West 2012)), and in October 2013, a jury returned a verdict against him and in favor of the State, finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that he still was a sexually dangerous person (see 725 ILCS 205/9(b) (West 2012)).

¶ 2 Respondent appeals on four grounds.

¶ 3 First, he argues the trial court erred by denying paragraph 4 of his motion in limine, in which he sought to bar evidence that, in 2009, a previous recovery application by him was denied. We find no abuse of discretion in the ruling.

¶ 4 Second, he argues the trial court erred by declining to publish to the jury some purported judicial admissions by the State. In our de novo review of this issue, we find the purported judicial admissions to be nonexistent.

¶ 5 Third, he argues the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict. In our de novo review, however, when we look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we are unable to say the evidence so overwhelmingly favors respondent that a verdict against him is rationally indefensible.

¶ 6 Fourth, he argues the verdict against him is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We reject this argument for the same reason we reject his argument that he was entitled to a directed verdict. The record contains evidence to support each element of the State's prima facie case, and it was the sole province of the jury to decide what weight to give to that evidence.

¶ 7 Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

¶ 8 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 9 A. Respondent's Motion in Limine

¶ 10 Before the trial began, respondent filed a motion in limine to bar certain evidence. Paragraph 4 of the motion stated: “As to the procedural history, the State seeks to introduce that, on two previous occasions, [respondent] was found to remain a sexually dangerous person. The jury will infer that [respondent] filed two previous restoration petitions that were denied by juries. This is not probative but rather is prejudicial and irrelevant to current issues.” Thus, the motion requested the trial court to bar the State from eliciting evidence that, on two previous occasions, respondent was found to remain a sexually dangerous person.

¶ 11 The assistant State's Attorney responded that “the defense counsel's argument [might] be well-taken with respect to the 2005 recovery petition” but that the 2009 recovery petition was “significant for purposes of * * * narrowing * * * the jury's inquiry.” (When we refer to the recovery petitions, or applications, of 2005 and 2009, we do not mean that the petitions were filed in those years but, rather, that they were judicially denied in those years.) He reasoned:

“I—I point out the obvious, the defense is obviously going to speak about the passage of time since he was first adjudicated sexually dangerous. If he was, in fact, as a matter of law sexually dangerous in 2009, that argument becomes much more limited in scope, the jury's inquiry becomes much more limited in scope and the defense becomes, I believe, significantly weaker. And for that reason, I believe it is significant to the jury's inquiry whether they're determining whether he has recovered in the last four years or whether he's recovered in the last decade. That's why I wanted to have [sic ] submit the finding that he was found sexually dangerous in 2009.”

¶ 12 The trial court concluded it was the law of the case that on July 23, 2009, respondent was found to remain a sexually dangerous person. Therefore, the court denied paragraph 4 as to the recovery application of 2009.

¶ 13 B. Respondent's Request To Take Judicial Notice

¶ 14 During the trial, respondent requested the trial court to read to the jury the following purported judicial admissions by the State and to instruct the jury to “accept [them] as conclusive.” Ill. R. Evid. 201(g) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011):

“(a) Respondent has decided to change his desire for sex since his original commitment as a Sexually Dangerous Person.

(b) Respondent appears to have begun to develop an intervention system to reduce harmful ideation and action on his part.

(c) Respondent has participated in therapeutic groups designed to address his mental disorder and criminal propensities to commit sex offenses or molestation of children.

(d) Respondent has encouraged other sex offenders in their recovery.

(e) Respondent is more aware of his own behaviors and triggers and more sensitive to his effect on others than when he was originally committed as a [ ] [sexually dangerous person].”

¶ 15 Respondent represented to the trial court that the State had made these purported judicial admissions by admitting certain allegations in his recovery application. When the court, however, compared each purported judicial admission to what respondent identified as the corresponding paragraph of his application, the court found that the two did not match: in its language, the purported judicial admission significantly diverged from the corresponding paragraph in the application. Consequently, the court declined to publish paragraphs (b) to (e), quoted above. Given that ruling, respondent withdrew paragraph (a).

¶ 16 C. The Jury Trial (October 2013)

¶ 17 1. The Testimony of Dale Spitler

¶ 18 a. His Occupation and Qualifications

¶ 19 Dale Spitler testified he had a master's degree in social work and that he was a licensed clinical social worker.

¶ 20 His first job as a social worker, in the 1970s, was with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), investigating child abuse. Later, in the 1990s, he developed programs at DCFS for the treatment of children who had sexually offending behaviors.

¶ 21 He subsequently worked for the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC). Initially, he was a clinical supervisor at Centralia Correctional Center. There, he ran the sex offender groups during the times when a psychologist was unavailable. Then he became a healthcare administrator. His duties in that position included assessing and treating inmates with mental-health problems. The treatment of sex offenders was only part of his job as clinical supervisor and healthcare administrator at DOC.

¶ 22 In 2003, Spitler began working at the Community Resource Center, where the evaluation and treatment of sex offenders was his full-time occupation. He testified:

“A. My entire duties and responsibilities at Community Resource Center, I went there to set up their sex offender treatment program. And while I was there, I oversaw and provided all of the sex offender assessments and sex offender treatment for the Community Mental Health program.

Q. Roughly what percentage of your duties in that period involved the treatment or evaluation of sex offenders?

A. Probably 90%.

Q. Okay. And what would you estimate to be the total number of hours you spent assessing and treating sex offenders in that period from 2003 to 2010?

A. Probably was somewhere around ten thousand hours.

Q. Okay. Now, part of—could you—was part of your duties in assessing sex offenders, assessing the risk of reoffense?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. In—and why were you doing that? What role did that play in the program?

A. Primarily assessment and a community mental health, there were two things. Sometimes the local Courts would require an assessment prior to presentencing hearing, so that they would have some idea on whether or not they were going to advise probation or incarceration, or what have you.

The second and probably the most important to me, is the assessment was used to guide what we were going to focus on in the sex offender treatment.”

¶ 23 Since December 2011, he had worked at Wexford Health Sources, “perform [ing] evaluations for the sexually dangerous persons program at Big Muddy [Correctional Center (Big Muddy) ].” Thus far, at Wexford, he had performed 41 evaluations, in 6 of which he had recommended release. In his entire career as a social worker, he had testified probably 25 to 30 times regarding sex offender assessments.

¶ 24 The trial court found Spitler qualified to offer opinions in the fields of sex offender assessment and treatment.

¶ 25 b. Respondent's History of Sexual Offenses

¶ 26 On contract with DOC, Wexford assigned Spitler to perform an evaluation of respondent, to assess the risk that he would commit further sex offenses if he were released from civil confinement. In March 2013, for that purpose, Spitler went to Big Muddy and interviewed respondent. Two other evaluators attended the interview: a psychologist, Kristopher Klounch, and a psychiatrist, Jagannathan Sriunivasaraghavan (otherwise known as “Dr. Van”).

¶ 27 In addition to interviewing respondent, Spitler and Klounch reviewed treatment files, police reports, court documents, and the psychiatric reports for the commitment. Van likewise reviewed the psychiatric reports. Spitler reviewed the group therapy notes and found no “issues” therein.

¶ 28 Of these documentary materials, the assistant State's Attorney focused on the police reports, asking Spitler why it was important to review them. Spitler answered that the police reports helped him understand respondent's “pattern of offending,” including how he found his victims, what types of victims he targeted, and whether he had committed sex offenses while in treatment.

¶ 29 Actually, not only the police reports but...