People v. Hangsleben

Decision Date06 November 1978
Docket NumberDocket No. 77-3165
Citation273 N.W.2d 539,86 Mich.App. 718
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bradley Lee HANGSLEBEN, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Daniel R. Connell by Robert B. Currie, Saginaw, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Robert L. Kaczmarek, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before DANHOF, C. J., and V. J. BRENNAN and CAMPBELL, * JJ.

DANHOF, Chief Judge.

This case arises from the June 1, 1976, slaying of two young girls at their home in Buena Vista Township, Saginaw County. Defendant, a teenage boy who lived across the street from the victims' home, was charged with the murders on June 17, 1976. From the time of the murders until the time he was charged, defendant had repeated contacts with police, primarily with Detective William Browne of the Buena Vista Police Department, the chief investigator of the girls' murder. Browne interviewed defendant at various times and locations, ultimately procuring several incriminating admissions. 1 Tapes of these interviews were played at trial. To the jury defendant denied killing the girls. He testified that he was in their home the night of the murders, but that a third person had committed the crimes. He claimed he did not remember what had happened when he spoke to police, but did recall the actual events at trial. The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of second-degree murder, as defined by M.C.L. § 750.317; M.S.A. § 28.549. The trial judge sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of life in prison.

On appeal as of right, defendant raises a host of alleged errors by the trial court. Our research and analysis reveals that only three of his arguments merit a nonsummary response: (1) whether any admissions used against defendant were the products of "inherently coercive" interrogations, in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1965); (2) whether any admissions used against defendant at trial were involuntarily made; and (3) whether any evidence obtained by or references to an examination of defendant while under hypnosis were admissible at trial. We decide all three issues in favor of the people.

I

The Admissibility of Defendant's Statements to Police.

As an admissions problem, the instant case is factually complex and is complicated by the defense's imprecise presentation of the issues.

Defendant claims he made incriminating statements during at least nine separate contacts with police, some before he was warned of his constitutional rights, some after. Rather than informing the trial court precisely what incriminating statements were made during this series of interviews, and explaining how they could be used at trial to establish his guilt or could have been used before trial to obtain other incriminating statements, defendant generally sought to suppress all statements by him, during any meeting with police from June 1 to June 10. His theory is that all were obtained either involuntarily, through a scheme to harass, badger and mislead, or in violation of Miranda, either directly as part of a primary illegality or indirectly as "fruits of a poisonous tree." After a Walker 2 hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion.

It is undisputed that Officer Browne interviewed defendant twice, along with other neighbors, at the scene of the crime on June 1, and once again at the Buena Vista Police Department on June 4, before warning defendant of his constitutional rights. The nature of the questions each time was similar: Browne inquired where defendant had been the night of the murders and what he had seen, heard, or knew of the killings.

Defendant alleged a fourth similar meeting without Miranda warnings on June 5, at a police field station set up in the Buena Vista Red Roof Inn. 3 Contrary to his testimony at the Walker hearing, defendant averred at trial that Officer Browne, in the Red Roof Inn meeting, accused defendant of discrepancies in his prior statements. Officer Browne acknowledged the field station at the Red Roof Inn, but denied the interview with defendant there on June 5.

At noon, on June 8, Officer Browne took defendant to the Buena Vista Police Station for fingerprinting, but did not detain him. That evening defendant met with Officer Browne at a second field station in the Buena Vista Holiday Inn. Prior to interviewing defendant there, Officer Browne gave the Miranda warnings. At that meeting, Officer Browne told defendant that his fingerprints had been found in the victims' home, that defendant had been lying, and, for the first time, that defendant was in trouble. Browne taped the interview and also took hair and fingerprint samples. Although defendant was not arrested, at that point, he no doubt had become a primary suspect.

The following evening, June 9, Officer Browne drove defendant to the Bay City State Police Post for a lie detector examination. Before administering the test, the polygraph operator read defendant his constitutional rights. After the examination the operator and his supervisor questioned defendant further, obtaining defendant's admission that he was in the house the night of the murders. The supervisor claimed that he readvised defendant of his constitutional rights, which claim defendant denies. There is also conflicting testimony whether defendant at that time called for Officer Browne and told him he killed the girls. It is certain that sometime after the polygraph examination, either at the State Police Post or during the return trip to Buena Vista, defendant described the clothes he was wearing the night of June 1 and said they were spotted with blood. The police obtained a warrant and defendant's consent to search his parent's home for this evidence. While Officer Browne and other investigators executed the warrant, defendant remained at the police station. When the investigators returned, they took defendant to the Holiday Inn field station, where they recorded his statements during a three hour interview, which lasted until 4 a. m., June 10. Both sides agreed that Officer Browne adequately warned defendant of his rights prior to this last interview.

A. The Miranda Issue.

The present debate of whether the entitlement to Miranda warnings in Michigan rests on focus or custody, compare People v. Martin, 78 Mich.App. 518, 260 N.W.2d 869 (1977), with People v. Robinson, 79 Mich.App. 145, 261 N.W.2d 544 (1977), 4 is not now before us. That issue was not briefed and its resolution is unnecessary to our decision, as we find that Miranda warnings were excused during the initial encounters between defendant and police under either test.

" Custody" does not necessarily entail police house confinement; it rests primarily on a finding that defendant was not free to go after questioning. Kamisar, "Custodial Interrogation" within the Meaning of Miranda, Crim. Law & the Constitution, 335, 362 (Reed, Et al., eds., 1968). 5 The "focus" inquiry is interrelated with the inquiry of probable cause for arrest. See People v. Ridley, 396 Mich. 603, 608, 242 N.W.2d 402, 405 (1976), Kamisar, supra. The evidentiary bases for both findings may overlap. 6

Collectively the following facts indicate that, until the June 8 interview at the Holiday Inn, the Buena Vista police were engaged only in preliminary exploration and defendant remained free to go. Police never handcuffed or otherwise physically restrained defendant. They did not detain, threaten to detain or have probable cause to detain him at that time. Defendant was asked general investigatory questions, consistent with his being a witness as well as a suspect. Others were questioned with him at the scene of the crime and, according to defendant, at the Red Roof Inn. The June 4 interview at police headquarters was prompted by defendant's own phone call, he travelled there by his own means. Defendant did not believe he was under arrest until the morning of June 10.

Finding no primary illegality, it is unnecessary to determine whether any statements taken from these initial interviews were used at trial or whether defendant's later admissions were fruits of the earlier ones.

The trial court declined to enter an order as to the alleged June 5 meeting at the Red Roof Inn, reasoning that since the prosecutor denied the interview, he could not introduce any evidence of it at trial. Although the so-called "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine casts a shadow upon this logic, see People v. Robinson, 48 Mich.App. 253, 210 N.W.2d 372 (1973), but see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974), we find no reversible error in the court's conclusion, as the meeting on the above facts would also have to be considered part of a preliminary investigation. Even defendant's testimony at trial that Officer Browne there accused him of lying does not make out a case of focus or custody. At the preliminary exploration stage the police must be expected to check on witnesses' stories and requestion those whose stories have been contradicted, in an effort to ascertain the true facts. A witness does not automatically become a suspect if there is a discrepancy in any part of his story. Nothing on the record shows that the parts of defendant's story, which supposedly did not check out, necessarily had implicated him in the crime.

B. The Voluntariness Issue.

In accord with People v. McGillen # 1, 392 Mich. 251, 220 N.W.2d 677 (1974), we have reviewed the entire transcript of defendant's Walker hearing, and have independently assessed the voluntariness of defendant's statements. An attempt has been made to ascertain the defendant's state of mind when he spoke to police, accord, People v. Summers, 15 Mich.App. 346, 166 N.W.2d 672 (1968), to determine whether his statements were products of a free and unconstrained choice, accord, United States v. Brown, ...

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  • People v. Shirley
    • United States
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    ...being capable of definite and certain interpretation." (Id. at p. 1326.) Again, the Michigan court so held in People v. Hangsleben (1978) 86 Mich.App. 718, 273 N.W.2d 539, 543-544, declaring that the defendant's attempt to prove the reliability of statements made in hypnosis by showing the ......
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