People v. Haran

• Decision Date: 01 February 1963
• Docket Number: No. 37317,37317
• Citation: 27 Ill.2d 229,188 N.E.2d 707
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. John HARAN, Plaintiff in Error.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 707

188 N.E.2d 707

27 Ill.2d 229

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. John HARAN, Plaintiff in Error.

No. 37317.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 1, 1963.

Rehearing Denied March 27, 1963.

Sydney B. and Morris J. Wexler, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach and E. Michael O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Edward J. Hladis and Edwin J. Belz, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for defendant in error.

KLINGBIEL, Justice.

The defendant, John Haran, together with John Moore and John Connolly, was indicted by the grand jury of the criminal court of Cook County for rape and in another indictment these parties were charged with the crime against nature against the same person on the same date. Moore and Connolly were convicted on the rape charge and on the defendant's trial before a jury he was acquitted of this crime. About 14 months later the defendant was tried and convicted under the indictment charging him with the crime against nature and a writ of error has been issued to review this conviction.

In the view we take of this case, we do not find it necessary to discuss all of the evidence, but a brief summary of the testimony of the complaining witness is necessary for a proper understanding of the principal issue. She testified that she was 15 years of age at the time of the acts in question. As she was walking down the street a car pulled up beside her and one of the men in the car, whom she identified as Connolly, grabbed her and pulled her into the back seat of the car. The defendant was driving and Moore was seated next to him in the front. After driving around town for some time the defendant stopped the car and got into the back seat with the witness and Connolly drove the car. A little while later the defendant told the witness to get in the front seat with Connolly and Moore. As they were driving around, the defendant made a remark indicating that he intended to have intercourse with the witness, who then tried unsuccessfully to jump out of the window. The defendant pulled her into the back seat, forcibly removed her clothing and forced her to submit to an act of intercourse. The witness testified that after this act by the defendant, Moore got into the back seat and committed one of the acts involved in the present indictment. Connolly then got into the back seat and forced the witness to submit to an act against nature and an act of intercourse. The defendant was driving the car while Moore and Connolly were performing these acts. The witness testified that shortly thereafter she escaped and jumped out of the window of the car.

The principal contention advanced on this writ of error is that the trial court erred in permitting the State to prove that the defendant had intercourse with the complaining witness. If it were not for the fact that the defendant had been acquitted on the rape charge there would be little question as to the admissibility of evidence of the act of intercourse upon the trial for the crime against nature. Since both acts occurred at about the same time and place, the act of intercourse could properly be said to constitute a part of the res gestae and evidence thereof would be admissible as an exception to the general rule prohibiting the introduction of evidence of other crimes. However, in view of the defendant's prior acquittal on the rape charge there is a serious question as to whether the court should have permitted the State to introduce any evidence of that offense upon the trial of the crime-against-nature indictment. The problem here is not one of double jeopardy. It is clear that the State was entitled to bring the defendant to trial on the second indictment since the acts in question constituted different crimes. (People v. Allen, 368 Ill. 368, 14 N.E.2d 397.) The question here is whether the doctrine of estoppel by verdict precluded the State from introducing any evidence of the act of intercourse at the second trial. This doctrine has been well defined in Hoffman v. Hoffman, 330 Ill. 413, 417, 161 N.E. 723, 725, as follows: 'Where some controlling fact or question material to the determination of both causes has been adjudicated in the former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction and the same fact or question is again at issue between he same parties, its adjudication in the first cause will, if properly presented, be conclusive of the same question in the later suit, irrespective of the question whether the cause of action is the same in both suits or not. This is sometimes denominated as an 'estoppel by verdict.' Public Utilities Com. v. Smith, 298 Ill. 151, 131 N.E. 371. The rule in respect to the conclusiveness of the verdict and former trial between the same parties, when the judgment is used in pleading as a technical estoppel or is relied on by way of evidence as conclusive per se, is that it must appear by the record of the prior suit that the particular controversy sought to be construed was necessarily tried and determined-that is, if the record of the former trial shows that the verdict could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all further actions between the parties; and further, in cases where the record does not show that the matter was necessarily and directly found by the jury, evidence aliunde consistent with the record may be received to prove the fact. But even there it appears from the intrinsic evidence that the matter was properly within the issue controverted in the present suit, if it be not shown that the verdict and judgment necessarily involved its consideration and determination, it will not be concluded.'

While this doctrine is more frequently invoked in civil cases, there is no doubt but that it applies equally in criminal cases. (Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 68 S.Ct. 237, 92 L.Ed. 180; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 35 S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969.) The State does not contend that the doctrine may never be applied in criminal cases but counsel has referred us to several of our decisions in which the doctrine has been held inapplicable. In Nagel v. People, 229 Ill. 598, 82 N.E. 315, the defendant was tried and acquitted on a robbery indictment. He was later tried upon an indictment charging him with the burglary arising out of the same facts, and was found guilty. The defendant contended on his writ of error that the trial court erred in permitting any evidence to be heard in the burglary trial as to any facts which were settled by the verdict in the former case. We stated without discussion and without the citation of authority that the State was not estopped from proving any of the facts connected with the crime of burglary even though much or all of this evidence had been introduced at the former trial.

In People v. Stephens, 297 Ill. 91, 130 N.E. 459, the defendant was tried and acquitted under an indictment charging him with the murder of a police officer. Thereafter, he was tried and convicted for assault with intent to kill another officer. The evidence showed that the killing and the assault took place at about the same time and place, and at the trial on the assault charge the State introduced evidence tending to prove that the defendant had killed the first officer. At the second trial the defendant offered in evidence the record of his acquittal in the murder case but this evidence was not admitted. On the writ of error the defendant argued that the acquittal on the murder charge operated as a bar to prosecution on the assault charge and we held that this contention could not be sustained. It was also argued that the record of the former acquittal should have been admitted in order to show that if the defendant was not guilty of killing the officer he could not be guilty of assault with intent to kill the other officer, and we held that this argument was without force.

In peop...