People v. Hardin

• Docket Number: S277487
• Decision Date: 04 March 2024
• Citation: 318 Cal.Rptr.3d 513,543 P.3d 960
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Tony HARDIN, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Supreme Court

318 Cal.Rptr.3d 513

543 P.3d 960

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Tony HARDIN, Defendant and Appellant.

S277487

Supreme Court of California.

March 4, 2024

West Codenotes

Negative Treatment Reconsidered

Cal. Penal Code § 3051(h)

Second Appellate District, Division Seven, B315434, Los Angeles County Superior Court, A893110, Juan Carlos Dominguez, Judge

William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal; Munger, Tolles & Olson, William D. Temko, Sara A. McDermott, Adeel Mohammadi, Los Angeles; USC Post-Conviction Justice Project, Heidi Rummel, Michael Parente, Los Angeles, and Danielle A. Wilkins for Defendant and Appellant.

Complex Appellate Litigation Group and Greg Wolff for Human Rights Watch, State SenatorLoni Hancock(Ret.), the Anti-Recidivism Coalition, the LWOP Alliance Group at Calipatria State Prison and the National Life Without Parole Leadership Council as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Law Office of B.C. McComas, Brian C. McComas, San Francisco; and Eric Weaver, Albany, for the Santa Clara County Independent Defense Counsel Office as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Cooley, Kathleen R. Hartnett, Darina Shtrakhman, Prianka Misra, Ariana E. Bustos, Adam S. Gershenson, Matt K. Nguyen; and Marsha L. Levick for Neuroscience, Psychology and Juvenile Justice Scholars, Juvenile Law Center, the American Academy of Pediatric Neuropsychology, the Pacific Juvenile Defender Center and the Sentencing Project as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Kim Saltz; Avram Frey; Summer Lacey, Los Angeles; and Diana Garrido for The ACLU, The ACLU of Northern California, The ACLU of Southern California, The California Public Defenders Association and The Contra Costa Public Defender Office as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Law Office of Michael Laurence and Michael Laurence for Catherine M. Grosso as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Michael J. Mongan, State Solicitor General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Helen H. Hong, DeputyState Solicitor General, Noah P. Hill, Idan Ivri and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Jason Anderson, District Attorney(San Bernardino), and Brent J. Schultze, Deputy District Attorney, for the Distinct Attorney of San Bernardino County as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

Kent S. Scheidegger and Kymberlee C. Stapleton for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

Jeffrey F. Rosen, District Attorney(Santa Clara), and David R. Boyd, Deputy District Attorney, for the District Attorney of Santa Clara County as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Eric D. Vandevelde, Los Angeles, Jamila D. MacEbong, Patrick J. Fuster, Los Angeles, Benjamin W. Holston, Jenna Bernard, Maya M. Halthore and Allison P. Miller for Prosecutors Alliance of California as Amicus Curiae.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

California’s youth offender parole statute offers opportunities for early release to certain persons who are incarcerated for crimes they committed at a young age.(Pen. Code, §§ 3051,4801.)When it was first enacted in 2013, the statute applied only to individuals who committed their crimes before the age of 18; the purpose of the statute was to align California law with then-recent court decisions identifying Eighth Amendment limitations on life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders.In more recent years, however, the Legislature has expanded the statute to include certain young adult offenders as well.Under the current version of the statute, most persons incarcerated for a crime committed between ages 18 and 25 are entitled to a parole hearing during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of their incarceration, (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (b).)But not all youthful offenders are eligible for parole hearings.The statute excludes, among others, offenders who are serving sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole for a crime committed after the age of 18.(Id.,subd. (h).)

AppellantTony Hardin is currently serving a life without parole sentence for a special circumstance murder he committed at age 25.He contends that the youth offender parole statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee by irrationally discriminating against young adult offenders sentenced to life without parole — including, in particular, those sentenced to life without parole for special circumstance murder.Agreeing with Hardin and disagreeing with other appellate decisions to address the issue, the Court of Appeal held the life without parole exclusion invalid for lack of a rational basis.

We now reverse.The standard we apply here, rational basis review, is necessarily deferential.The law recognizes that "[i]t is both the prerogative and the duty of the Legislature to define degrees of culpability and punishment, and to distinguish between crimes in this regard."(People v. Turnage(2012)55 Cal.4th 62, 74, 144 Cal. Rptr.3d 489, 281 P.3d 464.)Respect for the Legislature’s proper role — and ours — means that we may not strike down its enactment under a rational basis standard unless the challengers demonstrate that "there is no ‘rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.’ "(Ibid.)

Without foreclosing the possibility of other as-applied challenges to the statute, we conclude that Hardin has not demonstrated that Penal Code section 3051’s exclusion of young adult offenders sentenced to life without parole is constitutionally invalid under a rational basis standard, either on its face or as applied to Hardin and other individuals who are serving life without parole sentences for special circumstance murder.Under California law, special circumstance murder is a uniquely serious offense, punishable only by death or life without possibility of parole.When it was considering whether to expand the youth offender parole system to include not only juvenile offenders but also certain young adults, the Legislature could rationally balance the seriousness of the offender’s crimes against the capacity of all young adults for growth, and determine that young adults who have committed certain very serious crimes should remain ineligible for release from prison.Hardin has not demonstrated that the Legislature acted irrationally in declining to grant the possibility of parole to young adult offenders convicted of special circumstance murder, even as it has granted youth offender hearings to young adults convicted of other offenses.

This conclusion does not turn on this court’s judgments about what constitutes sound sentencing policy.It turns on the deference we owe to the policy choices made through the democratic process by the people of California and their elected representatives.The legislative branch may continue to consider the appropriate reach of the youth offender parole statute in light of the recognized capacity of young persons for growth and change.Hardin has not, however, established that the legislative policy choices reflected in current law are irrational and therefore impermissible as a matter of equal protection.

I.

In 1989, Hardin robbed and killed an elderly neighbor.Hardin was then 25 years old.A jury convicted Hardin of first degree murder, among other offenses.The jury also found true a special circumstance allegation that Hardin murdered the victim during the commission of a robbery.Hardin’s conviction for first degree murder with special circumstances carried a mandatory sentence of either death or life in prison without the possibility of parole.(Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a);id.,subd. (a)(17)(A).)Although the prosecution had sought the death penalty, the penalty phase jury declined to return a death verdict.The trial court imposed a sentence of life in prison without parole for the murder and stayed the sentences for the other convictions.

Decades later, Hardin filed a postjudgment motion to develop and preserve evidence for later use in a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051(section 3051).(SeePeople v. Franklin(2016)63 Cal.4th 261, 283–284, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496, 370 P.3d 1053(Franklin)[an offender who will later become eligible for a youth offender parole hearing is entitled to an interim court proceeding to develop and preserve evidence of youth-related characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense];In re Cook(2019)7 Cal.5th 439, 458–459, 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 669, 441 P.3d 912[an offender whose sentence is otherwise final may obtain a Franklinhearing by filing a postjudgment motion in superior court].)In his motion, Hardin acknowledged that, as an offender sentenced to life without parole for a crime committed as a young adult, he is not eligible for a youth offender parole hearing.(§ 3051, subd. (h).)He contended, however, that his exclusion violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.The superior court rejected the contention and denied Hardin’s motion.The Court of Appeal, however, reversed.(People v. Hardin(2022)84 Cal.App.5th 273, 291, 300 Cal. Rptr.3d 243(Hardin).)

On appeal, Hardin raised two equal protection arguments.He first argued that section 3051 violates equal protection by excluding young adult offenders sentenced to life without parole while including juvenile offenders (that is, offenders younger than 18 at the time of the offense) sentenced to life without parole.The Court of Appeal rejected this argument.It explained that the Legislature had a rational basis for distinguishing between juvenile offenders and young adult offenders, since a unique set of constitutional rules restricts sentencing children to life without parole.(Hardin, supra...