People v. Harding

• Decision Date: 24 March 1966
• Docket Number: No. 39730M,39730M
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Laverne HARDING, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 147

216 N.E.2d 147

34 Ill.2d 475

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Laverne HARDING, Appellee.

No. 39730M.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 24, 1966.

Rehearing Denied May 18, 1966.

William B. Petty, State's Atty., Mt. Carroll, for appellant.

Melvin Finer, Mt. Carroll, for appellee.

SCHAEFER, Justice.

The defendant, Laverne Harding, was arrested on November 6, 1965, and charged with reckless driving. On Monday, November 8, he appeared in court in the custody of the sheriff and pleaded guilty. The plea of guilty was accepted and entered of record, and the matter was continued for sentencing. On November 15, he was fined $200 and costs and sentenced to imprisonment at the Illinois State Farm for a period of ninety days. The record recites that thereafter, on the same day, the defendant requested the appointment of an attorney, and that the court ascertained his indigence and appointed an attorney to represent him. Thereafter, also on November 15, his appointed attorney filed a written motion to vacate the judgment and in arrest of judgment. The motions were allowed, the complaint was quashed, and the defendant was discharged. Questions arising under the constitutions of the United States and of this state are involved, and the People have appealed directly to this court.

The complaint upon which the defendant was charged was an 'Illinois Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint' in the form referred to in the Rule of this court which relates to 'Procedures in traffic cases, quasi-criminal cases and certain misdemeanors.' (S.H.A. chap. 110, par. 102.1ff; see Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 16, pars. 81--85.) The preface to that rule recites that it 'has been prepared by the Conference of Chief Circuit Judges, and, at the request of the Conference, is adopted by the Supreme Court of Illinois, effective February 15, 1964.' Paragraph C of the Rule is as follows: 'The form of the traffic ticket and complaint to be used shall be uniform in counties of the first and second class and shall be in the form presently designated as, 'Illinois Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint Jan. 1964 Rev.', adopted and in use by the Department of Public Safety--Division of State Highway Police, and as the same may be hereafter revised. The uniform traffic ticket and complaint shall be adapted by appropriate designation to the municipality using the same.' 28 Ill.2d xxxviii.

The defendant's motion to vacate or arrest the judgment attacked the constitutional sufficiency of the traffic ticket-complaint which was referred to in the rule adopted by this court, as well as the validity of the rule. That attack is renewed in this court. The defendant asserts that the constitutions of the United States and of Illinois require that a complaint which charges a criminal offense for which a jail sentence may be imposed must be verified. The Illinois Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint, referred to in the rule adopted by this court does not contemplate verification, and the traffic ticket-complaint filed in this case was not verified. The defendant therefore argues that the rule is invalid, that the trial court was without jurisdiction and that the judgment was therefore properly vacated. Additional constitutional objections, going to the adequacy of the complaint to inform the defendant of the specific conduct with which he was charged, to an alleged violation of the equal protection clause and to other matters, were advanced by the defendant; but in the view we take of the case it is not necessary to consider them.

It is the defendant's contention that the 4th amendment to the constitution of the United States and section 6 of article II of the constitution of Illinois, S.H.A. both require that in all cases a complaint which charges criminal conduct must be verified. As it bears upon this point the language of the federal and state constitutions is identical. The 4th amendment provides: 'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'

So far as they are pertinent to this case, the terms of the constitutional provisions apply only to the issuance of a warrant authorizing a seizure of the person--an arrest. While they require a sworn complaint as a prerequisite to the issuance of an arrest warrant, they do not purport to lay down any jurisdictional prerequisites governing the institution of a criminal prosecution. In the federal courts a sworn complaint is apparently required only when it serves as a basis for the issuance of an arrest warrant. 'If the fourth amendment makes it necessary that, under all circumstances, an information must be verified or supported by an affidavit showing probable cause, then proceedings had in the prosecution of the defendant cannot be sustained. But the right secured to the individual by the fourth amendment, as we understand it, is not a right to have the information, by which he is accused of crime, verified by the oath of the prosecuting officer of the government or to have it supported by the affidavit of some third person. His right is to be protected against the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, except 'upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,' and naming the person against whom it is to issue. If the application for the warrant is made to the court upon the strength of the information, then the information should be verified or supported by an affidavit showing probable cause to believe that the party against whom it is issued has committed the crime with which he is charged. But, if no warrant has issued, no arrest been made, and the person has voluntarily appeared, pleaded to the information, been tried, convicted, and fined, we fail to discover wherein any right secured to him by the fourth amendment has been infringed.' Weeks v. United States, (2d cir.,) 216 F. 292, 302. This view was apparently approved in Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 47 S.Ct. 250, 71 L.Ed. 505.

The decisions of this court have consistently required a sworn information or complaint, or an indictment, as a prerequisite to the issuance of an arrest warrant. Sometimes, however, the language of the opinions has gone further and appears to have laid down an additional requirement that a sworn complaint or an indictment is essential to the prosecution of a criminal case. What was said in People ex rel. Bain v. Meyering, 347 Ill. 344, 346--347, 179 N.E. 896, 897, is illustrative: 'Section 6 of article 2 of the Constitution of this state provides in part: 'No warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit.' This section of the Constitution has been many times construed by this court, and it has been uniformly held that no person may be arrested and held to answer a charge of crime other than on a sworn complaint before a judge or justice of the peace, or an indictment returned by a grand jury duly sworn and impaneled, or by presentment of not less than two members of such grand jury, or by verified information of the state's attorney or Attorney General in certain cases. People ex rel. v. Leinecke, 290 Ill. 560, 125 N.E. 513; People v. Clark, 280 Ill. 160, 117 N.E. 432; Housh v. People, 75 Ill. 487; also, Smith-Hurd Rev.St.1931, c. 38, §§ 662, 664, 711, 721. The only exceptions to these requirements arise in cases where the arrest or seizure is made by an officer in whose presence the crime is committed or who has reasonable ground for believing that the person arrested was implicated in the commission of a crime. (People v. Caruso, 339 Ill. 258, 171 N.E. 128; People v. Swift, 319 Ill. 359, 150 N.E. 263; Lynn v. People, 170 Ill. 527, 48 N.E. 964; North v. People, 139 Ill. 81, 28 N.E. 966), And even then a sworn complaint or indictment must follow before the court can take jurisdiction.' (Emphasis supplied.)

No authority is cited for the italicized statement. A similar remark appears in People v. Clark, 280 Ill. 160, 117 N.E. 432. There the court held invalid a provision of the County Court Act which, with respect to offenses cognizable in county courts, had authorized an unsworn information by the State's Attorney or the Attorney General. The tenor of the opinion...