People v. Hardman
| Decision Date | 30 November 2017 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 121453 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Antoine HARDMAN, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Mysza, Deputy Defender, and Tonya Joy Reedy, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Garson Fischer, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 Following a bench trial, defendant, Antoine Hardman, was convicted of one count of possessing between 1 and 15 grams of heroin with intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a school. See 720 ILCS 570/401(c)(1), 407(b)(1) (West 2012). At a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a public defender fee of $500. See 725 ILCS 5/113–3.1(a) (West 2012). Hardman appealed, arguing that the State failed to prove that he committed the offense within 1000 feet of a school, that the public defender fee was imposed without a proper hearing, and that the mittimus should be amended to reflect the correct name of the offense. The appellate court affirmed Hardman's conviction and sentence, vacated the public defender fee, remanded for a new hearing on whether the public defender fee was appropriate, and amended the mittimus. 2016 IL App (1st) 140913-U, 2016 WL 4919945. We allowed Hardman's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Mar. 15, 2016).
¶ 3 With respect to Hardman's conviction, Hardman only challenges whether the evidence established that the building at issue was a school. See 720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1) (West 2012). For that reason, we confine the factual background to the evidence presented about the building purported to be a school, 646 North Lawndale Avenue.
¶ 4 The State charged Hardman with one count of possessing between 1 and 15 grams of heroin with intent to deliver within 1000 feet of "any school * * * to wit: Ryerson Elementary School," a Class X offense. See 720 ILCS 570/401(c)(1), 407(b)(1) (West 2012). At Hardman's arraignment, the court appointed a public defender, and the State filed a motion for reimbursement for the cost of the public defender. See 725 ILCS 5/113–3.1(a) (West 2012).
¶ 5 Before trial, the State sought leave to amend the information. The information referred to "Ryerson Elementary School," but in pictures taken in the winter of 2014, a sign in front of the school listed the name as "Laura Ward." The State indicated that, on July 22, 2013, at the time of the offense, it believed that the building was called Ryerson Elementary School. However, when the court asked for the date of the school name change, the State responded that it believed that it was "this school year" that the name changed to Laura Ward. The State asserted that the school year "should have started in September." The court denied the State's motion to amend the information, finding that the State could explain the school name discrepancy at trial.
¶ 6 At trial, three witnesses testified about the location of the drug transactions. Officer Harmon of the Chicago police department testified that, on the date of the offense, he was on duty from 7 a.m. until 4 p.m. as an enforcement officer. Officer Harmon assisted in detaining Hardman. The State questioned Officer Harmon as to his familiarity with the area:
¶ 7 Officer Ruggiero, a Chicago police officer, testified that at about 10 a.m. on July 22, 2013, he was conducting surveillance of the alley at 634 North Ridgeway Avenue. Officer Ruggiero assisted in detaining Hardman. Officer Ruggiero testified that, in July 2013, he was part of the "Area North Saturation Team," assigned to the eleventh district. Officer Ruggiero testified that he had been an officer in the eleventh district for seven years by that time. The State questioned Officer Ruggiero as to his familiarity with the area:
¶ 8 On cross-examination, Officer Ruggiero acknowledged that, as a patrol officer, it was his responsibility to try to keep the streets safe in the area of Ridgeway Avenue. When asked whether the area within the vicinity of 634 North Ridgeway Avenue was residential, Officer Ruggiero responded, Officer Ruggiero was asked whether "[p]eople were coming and going, taking their kids to school, parents" and answered,
¶ 9 Christopher Lappe, an investigator with the Cook County State's Attorney's office, testified that he measured the distance from 634 North Ridgeway Avenue to and determined that the distance was 88 feet. Investigator Lappe testified that the end point for his measurement was "[t]he parking lot for the Laura Ward." Investigator Lappe also testified that the school was "formerly called Ryerson Elementary School."
¶ 10 Hardman was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a school, a Class X felony. 720 ILCS 570/401(c), 407(b)(1) (West 2012). At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Hardman to eight years in the Department of Corrections. The trial court admonished Hardman of his right to appeal and then asked the State whether it had any other motions. The State reminded the trial court of its motion for reimbursement of public defender fees. The following exchange occurred between the trial court and the assistant public defender:
¶ 11 On appeal, Hardman argued (1) that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the building at issue was operating as a school on the date of the offense because the evidence showed that the building was in flux or in transition around the time of the offense and (2) that the trial court erred in assessing the $500 public defender reimbursement fee without considering Hardman's ability to pay and, since "no hearing" was held within the statutory time limit on his ability to pay, that the fee should be vacated outright without remand. Although not relevant here, Hardman also sought to have the mittimus amended to reflect the correct name of the offense of which he was convicted.
¶ 12 The appellate court affirmed Hardman's conviction, concluding that the officers' testimony was sufficient for the trier of fact to conclude that the building located near the offense was a school. 2016 IL App (1st) 140913-U, ¶ 18. The appellate court agreed that the trial court erroneously assessed the $500 fee; however, it determined that the proper remedy was to remand the case to the trial court to hold a proper hearing to consider Hardman's ability to pay. Id. ¶ 23.
¶ 14 Hardman asserts that the State failed to prove that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a school. Specifically, Hardman acknowledges that he was proven guilty of the underlying possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver charge. See 720 ILCS 570/401(c)(1) (West 2012). He disputes, however, that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove him guilty of the enhancement provision, which elevates the penalty where an underlying offense occurs within 1000 feet of the real property comprising a school. See 720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1) (West 2012).
¶ 15 Second, Hardman contends that, because the trial court imposed a public defender fee without first inquiring into his financial circumstances, in accordance with section 113–3.1(a)'s requirements, "no hearing" took place. Thus, according to Hardman, the proper remedy is to vacate the fee outright instead of remanding for a proper hearing. We begin by addressing Hardman's argument that the State must demonstrate, for purposes of section 407(b)(1), that a building is an active or operational school on the date of the offense.
¶ 17 Section 407(b)(1) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act provides that the offense of delivery of a controlled substance is a Class X felony when committed within...
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