People v. Hardnett

• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: Before LESINSKI; LESINSKI
• Citation: People v. Hardnett, 45 Mich.App. 247, 206 N.W.2d 470 (Mich. App. 1973)
• Decision Date: 23 February 1973
• Docket Number: Docket No. 13613,No. 1,1
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Frank HARDNETT, Defendant-Appellant

Page 470

206 N.W.2d 470

45 Mich.App. 247

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Frank HARDNETT, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 13613.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 1.

Feb. 23, 1973.

Released for Publication April 26, 1973.

Paul V. Rahaley, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, App. Div., Detroit, Thomas M. Khalil, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before LESINSKI, C.J., and T. M. BURNS and O'HARA, ^* JJ.

LESINSKI, Chief Judge.

Defendant was convicted by jury verdict of murder in the first degree. M.C.L.A. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548. From this conviction he appeals, raising two allegations of error.

Defendant alleges that his constitutional rights were violated because the trial court refused to grant an adjournment on the day of trial to allow him either to secure other counsel or to prepare to defend himself, or to obtain witnesses. It is well settled that the grant or refusal of an adjournment is within the sound discretion of the trial court. People v. Raider, 256 Mich. 131, 239 N.W. 387 (1931).

On the day of trial defendant asked the court to grant an adjournment due to the fact that he wished to discharge his retained counsel and to either defend himself or to obtain the services of another attorney. Defendant's retained counsel had been on the case for a period of six months prior to the date set for trial. Defense counsel stated that he had conferred with the accused on several occasions. The record is silent as to any evidence of dissatisfaction with retained counsel prior to the date set for trial. In People v. McClain, 25 Mich.App. 691, 692--693, 181 N.W.2d 589, 589--590 (1970), it was held:

'It is not a denial of defendant's constitutional rights or an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge to deny adjournment where 'the defendant fails to request an adjournment prior to the day of trial, particularly where he had same 2 1/2 months to obtain counsel'. People v. Clark, 9 Mich.App. 602, 157 N.W.2d 798 (1968). See People v. Stinson, 6 Mich.App. 648, 150 N.W.2d 171 (1967); People v. Gibbs, 21 Mich.App. 137, 175 N.W.2d 36 (1970). No error or abuse of discretion is found where the defendant, as in the instant case, was dissatisfied with his appointed counsel and sought his dismissal at the outset of the trial and the request was denied. People v. Edwards, 18 Mich.App. 526, 171 N.W.2d 592 (1969); People v. Miller, 21 Mich.App. 113, 174 N.W.2d 868 (1970).'

Here on the day set for trial defendant sought the dismissal of his retained counsel. There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.

Defendant also charges that the trial court's refusal to grant the requested adjournment denied him an opportunity to obtain other counsel or indeed to defend himself. However, the following colloquy took place between the court and the defendant:

'The Court: I want to clear up one point. Will the defendant step up?

'So there is no misunderstanding, Mr. Hardnett, you indicated previously that you were dissatisfied with your attorney, and you wanted to retain another lawyer, that you wanted an adjournment and I denied that motion for an adjournment. You indicated that you wanted possibly to try the case yourself.

'In view of the fact that I did not grant the adjournment, it's my understanding you did want Mr. Considine to proceed at this time, is that right?

'The Defendant: That's right.

'The Court: All right, I just wanted to clear that up on the record. That's what was explained to me and it wasn't on the record.'

Thus there is an on-the-record statement by the defendant that he wished to proceed with his originally retained counsel.

Defendant also claims that the trial court committed reversible error in permitting the jury to hear the testimony of two police officers concerning some fingerprints. By introducing the testimony of these two witnesses, the prosecutor was attempting to connect the fingerprints taken at the scene of the crime with those of William Frank Thompson, which name the prosecution believed to be merely an alias for that of the defendant William Frank Hardnett. The first police officer to testify was...