People v. Harner
Decision Date | 18 September 1989 |
Docket Number | No. A041708,A041708 |
Citation | 262 Cal.Rptr. 422,213 Cal.App.3d 1400 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Harry Carl HARNER, Defendant and Appellant. |
First District Appellate Project, San Francisco, Jay Ruskin, San Anselmo, for defendant and appellant.
John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., John H. Sugiyama, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Stan M. Helfman, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward P. O'Brien, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.
Harry Carl Harner appeals from an order denying his motion for discharge from outpatient status as a mentally disordered sex offender (MDSO) due to the failure of the court below to hold annual hearings to review his status. We conclude that the motion was properly denied and therefore affirm the order.
The record on appeal in this case is rather sparse. However, from the brief clerk's and reporter's transcripts and an augmentation to the record, 1 the following procedural history appears undisputed: On March 7, 1978, appellant entered a plea of guilty to one count of violation of Penal Code section 286, subdivision (b)(2) 2 (sodomy with a minor under 16 years of age), and to one count of violation of section 288a, subdivision (c) ( ). Both of these crimes were committed by appellant, who was then 27 years old, against an eight-year-old child. In April 1978, appellant was found to be an MDSO pursuant to former Welfare and Institutions Code section 6300 et seq. 3 On May 8, 1978, he was committed to Atascadero State Hospital for treatment, with a maximum confinement period of four years and eight months. He was placed on outpatient status, pursuant to sections 1600 and 1602, on December 9, 1981. No review of his outpatient status was made prior to the time he filed his motion for discharge from that status on December 21, 1987. 4
The superior court denied appellant's motion for discharge from outpatient status on January 12, 1988, and set the matter for a hearing to determine whether outpatient status should be extended. Notice of appeal from the court's order was filed on March 10, 1988. Thereafter on April 1, 1988, following review of a report from Community Mental Health, the court determined that appellant's outpatient status should be extended for one year. The matter was placed on the July 6, 1988 calendar for receipt of a quarterly report 5 and on the March 28, 1989 calendar for review of outpatient status.
Former Welfare and Institutions Code section 6300 defined an MDSO as follows: " '[M]entally disordered sex offender' means any person who by reason of mental defect, disease, or disorder, is predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses to such a degree that he is dangerous to the health and safety of others." Pursuant to section 1602, subdivision (a), a person committed as an MDSO may be placed on outpatient status if (1) the director of the treatment facility to which the person has been committed "advises the court that the defendant will not be a danger to the health and safety of others while on outpatient status, and will benefit from such outpatient status"; (2) the community program director or his designee "advises the court that the defendant will not be a danger to the health and safety of others while on outpatient status, will benefit from such status, and identifies an appropriate program of supervision and treatment "; and (3) after a hearing, the court "specifically approves the recommendation and plan for outpatient status." (Emphasis added.)
Section 1606 provides: 6
Appellant contends that the failure of the court to hold annual hearings to review his status invalidates any further attempt of the state to exercise control over him under the MDSO statutes and thus requires his discharge from outpatient status. In People v. McGee (1977) 19 Cal.3d 948, 140 Cal.Rptr. 657, 568 P.2d 382 Justice Tobriner, writing for a unanimous court, explained: "Traditionally, the question of whether a public official's failure to comply with a statutory procedure should have the effect of invalidating a subsequent governmental action has been characterized as a question of whether the statute should be accorded 'mandatory' or 'directory' effect. If the failure is determined to have an invalidating effect, the statute is said to be mandatory; if the failure is determined not to invalidate subsequent action, the statute is said to be directory. As we explain below, in evaluating whether a provision is to be accorded mandatory or directory effect, courts look to the purpose of the procedural requirement to determine whether invalidation is necessary to promote the statutory design.
(Id. at pp. 958-959, 136 Cal.Rptr. 251, 559 P.2d 606, brackets in original, emphasis added.) 7
(People v. McGee, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 959, 140 Cal.Rptr. 657, 568 P.2d 382, citing Morris v. County of Marin (1977) 18 Cal.3d 901, 908, fn. 4, 136 Cal.Rptr. 251, 559 P.2d 606.)
" (Morris v. County of Marin, supra, 18 Cal.3d 901, 909-910, 136 Cal.Rptr. 251, 559 P.2d 606, fn. omitted, brackets in original.) (Edwards v. Steele (1979) 25 Cal.3d 406, 410, 158 Cal.Rptr. 662, 599 P.2d 1365.)
Applying this framework, we hold that the annual review provisions of section 1606 are directory since the primary purpose of the statutory scheme is protection of society and a holding that the review provisions are mandatory would defeat that purpose by automatically releasing appellant, a child molester who was found mentally disordered, from any further supervision...
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