People v. Harper

Citation198 N.E.2d 825,31 Ill.2d 51
Decision Date20 May 1964
Docket NumberNo. 37390,37390
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. James HARPER, Plaintiff in Error.
CourtSupreme Court of Illinois

John F. Hechinger, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach and E. Michael O'Brien, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Elmer C. Kissane and William J. Martin, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for defendant in error.

KLINGBIEL, Chief Justice.

The defendant, James Harper, was tried in the criminal court of Cook County by the court, without a jury, convicted of the crime of assault with intent to commit murder, and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of not less than 5 nor more than 15 years. We have issued a writ of error to review the judgment of conviction.

The defendant's first contention is that the trial court violated the defendant's right to due process of law by failing to conduct a hearing to determine the mental capacity of the defendant to stand trial. The record shows that the defendant and one James Reed were indicted on May 5, 1961 for an offense allegedly committed on April 2, 1961. On May 12 the court appointed the public defender to represent the defendant and the case was continued until May 22. After three other continuances the case came on for trial on June 16. At that time counsel for the defendant stated that he could not go to trial until he had investigated certain matters which he believed were absolutely necessary to go into. He asked the court for a continuance and stated that there was a question as to the mental capacity of the defendant 'at certain times' which he had to clear up and that it was necessary to check certain records. The prosecutor inquired whether, counsel had any information that the defendant had been in a mental institution and counsel replied that he had not made that representation, but said that he thought that the defendant might have been in the psychiatric section of the county hospital shortly after the time of his arrest. The judge stated that he would subpoena the county hospital records himself and that in the meantime they would go ahead with the case. The judge said that if he found out that there was any question about the defendant's mental capacity he would call a halt and if there was no such question, they would finish the case. The case then proceeded to trial.

At the close of the direct testimony of the first witness for the prosecution, the court advised defense counsel that it had received information that the defendant had been admitted to the hospital on April 3 with a stab wound of the arm and that he had been given a tetanus shot and discharged on April 4. Defense counsel stated that he understood that the defendant had been there the following day and the court said that it would call the hospital to see if they had a record of the defendant being there on the 5th or 6th of April. A short time later the judge advised counsel that the hospital had advised him that they had checked all of the branches of the hospital and found no record of the defendant's admittance except the record of his treatment on April 3. On the afternoon of the same day, after the conclusion of the cross-examination of the first prosecution witness, counsel for the defendant made a motion for a behavior clinic examination of the defendant and renewed his motion for a continuance so that he could determine the question of the defendant's mental capacity. He stated that there were certain facts which he wanted to bring to the court's attention, and he was given leave to introduce the testimony of a police officer who testified that on April 6 the defendant was taken to the county hospital because he was suffering with delirium tremens. The hospital would not keep him and he was sent to the mental health clinic where he remained from approximately 2 A.M. on April 6 until 8:30 A.M. At the conclusion of this testimony counsel stated that he was not prepared to go into 'certain facets' of the case unless the cause was continued and unless a behavior clinic examination was ordered to see whether or not the defendant was able to co-operate with counsel. The attorney stated that he could not give the defendant the type of defense he should have unless he had further information and he stated that he needed time to talk to the doctors. The court stated that it would call Dr. Haines of the behavior clinic and ask him to examine the defendant and said that if it should develop from Dr. Haines's examination that there was something wrong with the defendant, it would cross that bridge when it came to it, but until that time they would proceed with the case.

After more testimony had been heard, Dr. Haines appeared and the trial was recessed so that Dr. Haines could examine the defendant. After the recess the court asked the doctor the results of his examination and Dr. Haines replied that in talking with the defendant he found him cooperative and that in his opinion the defendant knew the nature of the charge and was able to co-operate with his counsel. Defense counsel stated that he had asked Dr. Haines his opinion as to whether the defendant's condition at the time he was admitted to the hospital might have affected anything that the defendant might have said or done at that time and that Dr. Haines had told him that further examination of the hospital records should be made and the doctors should be questioned to determine whether or not the defendant could have made any statement with full mental capacity on April 6. The court again inquired whether the doctor was of the opinion that the defendant could cooperate with his counsel and stand trial and the doctor replied that in his opinion the defendant was able to stand trial. Defense counsel made another motion for a continuance but the court stated that it would not grant the motion and pointed out that the defendant would have the week-end available for investigation. After further discussion between the court and counsel the case was adjourned from Friday until the following Tuesday, and t...

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15 cases
  • People v. Murphy
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • 6 d5 Outubro d5 1978
    ...... People v. Harper (1964), 31 Ill.2d 51, 56, 198 N.E.2d 825; People v. Slaughter (1970), 46 Ill.2d 114, 119, 262 N.E.2d 904; People v. Burson (1957), 11 Ill.2d 360, 368-69, 143 N.E.2d 239. .         The Unified Code of Corrections expressly provides for this: . "(b) * * * (T)he question of fitness may be ......
  • People v. Jackson
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 8 d1 Dezembro d1 1980
    ...... (People v. Murphy; People v. Slaughter (1970), 46 Ill.2d 114, 262 N.E.2d 904; People v. Harper (1964), 31 Ill.2d 51, 198 N.E.2d 825.) Whether a bona fide doubt of fitness exists rests within the discretion of the trial court. (People v. Murphy; People v. Skorusa (1973), 55 Ill.2d 577, 304 N.E.2d 630; People v. Franklin (1971), 48 Ill.2d 254, 269 N.E.2d 479.) A trial court's finding of ......
  • People v. McLain
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • 29 d3 Março d3 1967
    ......People, 23 Ill.2d 131, 177 N.E.2d 203. The only fact relied on by the defendant to establish his mental incapacity was that he had been placed in the phychiatric division of the penitentiary immediately upon his confinement.         In People v. Harper", 31 Ill.2d 51, 198 N.E.2d 825, there was no adjudication of incompetency and the only evidence submitted to establish incompetence was the defendant's admission to a hospital about two months prior to trial for delirium tremens. He was, however, apparently treated and released the same day.    \xC2"......
  • US ex rel. Blackwell v. Franzen
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 7 d4 Janeiro d4 1982
    ......Illinois law is well summed up in People v. Bryant, 101 Ill.App.2d 314, 318-19, 243 N.E.2d 354, 356 (1st Dist. 1968): . In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 ...Scott, 106 Ill.App.2d 98, 245 N.E.2d 490 (1st Dist. 1969); People v. Taylor, 33 Ill.2d 417, 211 N.E.2d 673 (1965); People v. Harper, 31 Ill.2d 51, 198 N.E.2d 825 (1964). .         In fact Illinois courts have been flexible in holding the right to a voluntariness hearing ......
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