People v. Harris
| Decision Date | 09 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1-19-2509 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Javion HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Andrew Thomas Moore (Joseph Crawford, law student), of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique Abraham, Matthew Connors, and Noah Montague, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 After a jury trial, defendant Javion Harris was convicted of the first degree murder of Yvonne Nelson and the attempted murder of James Clark. Defendant, who was 15 years old at the time of the offense, was sentenced to 29 years for the murder and 6 years for the attempted murder, for a total of 35 years with the Illinois Department of Corrections. The convictions stemmed from a shooting on May 20, 2016, shortly before 4 p.m., on South State Street in Chicago, in which the shooter was shooting at Clark while Nelson, a bystander, had just exited a nearby Starbucks.
¶ 2 On this direct appeal, defendant claims (1) that the juvenile court erred in transferring his case to adult criminal court, (2) that the trial court committed plain error where the evidence in the case was closely balanced and the court failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012), and (3) that the trial court erred in admitting certain hearsay statements under the course-of-investigation exception to the hearsay rule. The State concedes that the trial court failed to comply with Rule 431(b) but argues that the evidence in the case was not closely balanced and the claimed error was forfeited.
¶ 3 For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 5 The State's evidence at trial established that, on May 20, 2016, at 3:53 p.m., a shooter opened fire on South State Street. Clark testified that the shooter was shooting at him. Although wounded, Clark survived, but Nelson, a bystander, did not. Nelson died shortly after the shooting from a single gunshot wound to the chest.
¶ 6 Videos obtained from street surveillance cameras recorded the shooting, as well as the shooter's flight from the scene. Video footage established that the shooter wore a black hooded sweatshirt and entered a nearby apartment building less than a minute after the shooting. Teon Spencer,1 a resident of the apartment building, testified that defendant was a friend of his and visited Teon that afternoon.
The police later retrieved a black hooded sweatshirt from Teon's bedroom and submitted it for forensic testing. The tests revealed that the cuffs of the sweatshirt contained gunshot residue and that the inside collar contained DNA that matched defendant's DNA. Although the cuffs, collar, and front pocket of the sweatshirt contained DNA mixtures belonging to at least three to five individuals, only one major profile was suitable for comparison, and it belonged to defendant.
¶ 7 Teon testified that he and defendant subsequently exited Teon's building, and video footage depicted Teon and defendant exiting the building at 5 p.m., with defendant wearing a blue hooded sweatshirt. Teon identified defendant as the person in the blue hooded sweatshirt who exited with him.
¶ 8 Earlier footage established that Teon had entered the building at 3:48 p.m., shortly before the shooting and did not exit until after it.
¶ 9 Teon testified that he did not place the black hooded sweatshirt on his bed. Teon unlocked the apartment door to let defendant inside after defendant knocked and then Teon immediately went downstairs to talk to his mother. As a result, Teon did not observe defendant until Teon subsequently entered his bedroom, where defendant was already waiting. Teon never observed defendant wearing a black hooded sweatshirt that day and never observed defendant changing clothes. However, according to Teon's testimony, defendant was initially alone in Teon's bedroom for 5 or 10 minutes while Teon spoke with his mother.
¶ 10 Clark, the subject of the shooting, could not identify the shooter. Video footage showed that the shooter had the hood of his sweatshirt pulled tightly over his head and that the hood formed a large, odd shape, indicating a lot of hair underneath. The video that depicted defendant and Teon exiting the apartment building also showed defendant with a hood drawn tight, forming a similar odd shape.
¶ 11 Using still photographs obtained from the video footage, detectives showed images of the shooter to individuals familiar with defendant. The head of security at defendant's school recognized the shooter as a student who had the nickname of "Lenny Kravitz," due to his "afro" hairstyle. When the head of security asked the dean of students to pull up a picture of "Lenny Kravitz," the dean provided defendant's school photo. Unlike the head of security, the dean was unsure whether the photo of the shooter was a photo of defendant. Defendant's physics teacher, who had defendant in class daily, could not identify the photo of the shooter as a photo of defendant.
¶ 12 Prior to trial, Daniel Mitchell provided a recorded statement in which he stated that he ran a taxi service, that he transported defendant to 35th Place near South State Street, that defendant paid his fare and began running toward State Street, and that Mitchell then heard gunshots but did not observe the shooting. Mitchell identified an image of the shooter taken prior to the shooting as defendant. However, when shown an image of the shooter taken after the shooting, Mitchell stated that he was "not a hundred percent sure" whether it was a photo of defendant. At trial, Mitchell testified that he could not recall the day of the shooting or recall providing a recorded statement. Over defendant's objection, the recorded statement was admitted as substantive evidence at trial and published to the jury.
¶ 13 After considering the evidence, the parties’ arguments and the jury instructions, the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and attempted murder.
The trial court denied his posttrial motion for a new trial, and defendant was sentenced on June 20, 2019, to a total of 35 years. The trial court denied his motion to reconsider sentence on November 7, 2019, and a notice of appeal was filed the same day. This timely appeal followed.
¶ 16 Defendant's first claim is that the juvenile court erred by transferring his case to adult criminal court. In Illinois, a minor who is 13 years old or older may be prosecuted as an adult under the laws of this state (1) if the State files a transfer motion and (2) if the juvenile court "finds that there is probable cause to believe that the allegations in the motion are true and that it is not in the best interests of the public to proceed under" the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) ( 705 ILCS 405/5-805(3)(a) (West 2016)).
¶ 18 While defendant concedes that reviewing courts normally review a juvenile court's transfer decision only for an abuse of discretion, he argues that a de novo standard should apply to this particular case because all the evidence at the transfer hearing was in the form of exhibits and proffers. Since there were no live witnesses at the transfer hearing, defendant argues that this court is in the same position as the juvenile court was and, therefore, this court should owe no deference to the juvenile court. People v. Anderson , 2021 IL App (1st) 200040, ¶ 41, 458 Ill.Dec. 302, 196 N.E.3d 606 ().
¶ 19 De novo review means that the reviewing court performs the same analysis that a trial judge would perform and owes no deference to the trial court. Anderson , 2021 IL App (1st) 200040, ¶¶ 40-41, 458 Ill.Dec. 302, 196 N.E.3d 606. In contrast, an abuse of discretion is found only where the trial court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable or where no person would take the view adopted by the trial court. People v. Khan , 2021 IL App (1st) 190679, ¶ 55, 452 Ill.Dec. 707, 186 N.E.3d 431.
¶ 20 In response, the State argues that the title of the statutory provision at issue is "[d]iscretionary." 705 ILCS 405/5-805(3) (West 2016). Defendant was transferred to adult criminal court pursuant to the "[d]iscretionary transfer" provision. 705 ILCS 405/5-805(3) (West 2016). This section provides that, if the juvenile court finds (1) probable cause to believe the State's allegations and (2) that a juvenile proceeding is not in the public's best interest, "the court may enter an order permitting prosecution" in adult criminal court. (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-805(3)(a) (West 2016). "Except in very unusual circumstances affecting the public interest, the legislature's use of the word ‘may’ indicates that the statute is permissive as opposed to mandatory." Canel v. Topinka , 212 Ill. 2d 311, 326, 288 Ill.Dec. 623, 818 N.E.2d 311 (2004).
¶ 21 With statutory construction, our primary goal is to ascertain the legislators’ intent, and the best indication of that intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the words they chose to use. Sekura v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, Inc. , 2018 IL App (1st) 180175, ¶ 40, 426 Ill.Dec. 158, 115 N.E.3d 1080. In light of the legislature's use of the words "[d]iscretionary" and "may," as well as our precedent on this subject, we find that the decision to transfer under this provision is a matter of judicial discretion. 705 ILCS 405/5-805(3) (West 2016); e.g. , People v. Moore , 2011 IL App (3d) 090993, ¶ 29, 354 Ill.Dec. 239, 957 N.E.2d 555 (transfer reversed where the juvenile ); People v. Clark , 119 Ill. 2d 1, 14, 115 Ill.Dec. 613, 518 N.E.2d 138 (1987) (...
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