People v. Harris

Decision Date26 July 2021
Docket Number4-18-0806
PartiesTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JERRY D. HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon County No. 17CF1253 Honorable Thomas E. Griffith Jr., Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cavanagh and Holder White concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

DeARMOND, JUSTICE

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, holding defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated, any error in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1 2012) admonishments was not sufficient to constitute plain error, and the trial court's Krankel inquiry was sufficient.

¶ 2 On August 29, 2017, defendant, Jerry D. Harris, was charged with the offenses of attempt (first degree murder), a Class X felony with special sentencing provisions (count I) (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), (c)(1) (West 2016)); aggravated battery with a firearm, also a Class X felony (count II) (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1) (West 2016) (recodified as 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(a)(1))); aggravated discharge of a firearm, a Class 1 felony (count III) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2016)) and being an armed habitual criminal, a Class X felony (count IV) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2016)), for the shooting of Sedrick Cunningham on July 29, 2017, in Decatur, Illinois. After several continuances by the State and the defense, and after defendant had been released on his own recognizance and later rearrested, he eventually went to jury trial on counts I and II on August 21 and 22, 2018. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on both counts and found the aggravating factor that "defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm to [the victim] was proven." Defendant filed a "Motion for New Trial," arguing the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and the trial court conducted a "pre-inquiry Krankel hearing" (see People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984)), ultimately deciding defendant's claims did not amount to ineffective assistance. Defendant's posttrial motion was heard and denied, and the trial court sentenced defendant to 12 years on count I (attempt (murder)), with a 25-year add-on due to the aggravating factor, for a total of 37 years at 85%, and 3 years of mandatory supervised release. Defendant's motion to reconsider was later denied, and this appeal follows.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On July 29, 2017, in the early afternoon, Sedrick Cunningham was shot while standing in the 1000 block of Cerro Gordo Street in Decatur, Illinois. The shooter, known to Cunningham only as "Little C" and later identified as defendant, pulled up in a light blue Mercury Grand Marquis and began having words with Cunningham. The conversation escalated to an argument, and Cunningham struck defendant in the jaw, after which Cunningham said defendant produced a handgun and shot Cunningham in the left side. Once at the hospital, Cunningham told police what happened and identified defendant from a photo lineup. He said he had known defendant for "five, six" years and, although they were not friends, they "associated around people that we had mutual people that we hung around." Although he did not know defendant's name at the time, Cunningham said he learned defendant's name from friends who had conducted an internet search. He identified defendant in open court as the person he knew as "Little C" and the person who shot him.

¶ 5 Defendant asserted an alibi defense from the beginning filing a supplemental discovery response at the outset of the case which disclosed his location as other than the scene of the shooting, and he identified the witnesses who would corroborate his alibi.

¶ 6 Defendant was arrested on August 24, 2017, and arraigned on August 29, with the public defender appointed on his behalf. The matter was set for a preliminary hearing on September 20, and pretrial was set for November 21, 2017. At the November 21 pretrial, another attorney was standing in for the public defender representing defendant, and when asked about a possible jury trial date in February, counsel stated: "Well, he asked for the earliest available date. He's said that discovery is completed and he's disclosed alibi witnesses, so-" The trial court then indicated "that the defendant demands earliest jury trial date" and set the case for trial on January 9, 2018. Counsel did not object. On December 26, defendant filed a pro se handwritten "Motion for Speedy Trial (120-day)," which was stricken in January as moot since defendant had counsel at the time. The State filed a motion to continue on January 5, 2018. At the hearing on the motion, the State made representations that defendant was on "day 56" of his 120-day speedy trial term. Defendant's counsel said, "I think it's a few more days than that, but we're still not approaching the 120." The court noted his objection and granted the continuance. After discussion with counsel, the court asked, "So you want me to reset it for February 13th?" to which the State agreed and defendant's counsel responded, " [t]hat would be fine." On January 23, defendant filed another pro se motion, this time seeking dismissal of his charges pursuant to "725 ILCS 5/114-1," claiming his speedy trial term had run as of December 19, 2017, which motion was again stricken as moot since he was still represented by counsel.

¶ 7 On February 9, 2018, defendant was released from custody on his own recognizance due to ongoing medical issues and an upcoming medical procedure necessitating a delay in trial. His bond was later revoked, and he was reincarcerated, but from that point on, defendant made no demand for speedy trial as the case was continued for a variety of reasons and eventually proceeded to trial on August 21, 2018.

¶ 8 During jury selection, the court conducted its Zehr questioning thusly:

"I'm going to attempt to explain some constitutional principles. For this series of questions I have to be careful make [sic] a very precise record. So, I'll either have [sic] put up your hand or not put up your hand.
First question, the defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charges against him. This presumption remains with the defendant throughout the trial and is not overcome, unless by your verdict, you find that the State has proven the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Is there anybody here who has any difficult [sic] or disagreement with this proposition of law, the presumption of innocence. If so, please put up your hand? And let the record reflect that there are no raised hands.
Next question, the State has the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden remains upon the State throughout the trial. Does anybody have a difficulty or disagreement with this proposition of law, the burden of proof? If so, please put up your hand. And, again, let the record reflect that there are no raised hands.
Next question, the defendant is not required to offer any evidence on his own behalf. Does anybody have a difficulty or disagreement with this principle of law? If so, please put up your hand. And, again, let the record reflect there are no raised hands.
And final question, at least of this type, if the defendant does not testify it cannot be held against him. Does anybody have any difficult [sic] or disagreement with this proposition of law, the right to remain silent. If so, please put up your hand. And, again, let the record reflect there are no raised hands. And let the record reflect there are no raised hands. And let the record reflect that all of the jurors understand and accept the Zehr, Z-E-H-R principles.

All jurors, can all of you promise me that you will follow the law, even though you may not personally agree with the law? Please answer out loud."

¶ 9 Defendant did not object or seek different or additional questioning by the court.

¶ 10 A. The Trial

¶ 11 At trial, Cunningham described how the encounter with defendant occurred, how it escalated to a point where he hit defendant "in the jaw" as defendant sat in the light blue Mercury Grand Marquis he was driving, and how defendant then produced a gun and shot him in the left side. Cunningham said defendant then fled the area and Cunningham was taken to the hospital by a couple of friends. Cunningham acknowledged having consumed alcohol on the day of the shooting and agreed he was "a little bit [intoxicated]." He also admitted to previous convictions in 2008 and 2015 for driving while his license was revoked and aggravated battery in 2011. Once he was taken to the hospital, Cunningham gave a statement to the police and readily identified defendant from a computer-generated photo lineup.

¶ 12 By the time of the shooting, Cunningham said, he and defendant had some form of contact between 5 and 10 times and at trial he was "one hundred percent certain" of his in-court identification of defendant as the shooter. Cunningham told Officer Kyle Patten, a Decatur police officer he spoke with at the hospital, that the shooter was known to him as "Little C," whom he described as being "a black male about 35 to 40 years old, short in height, with the stocky build and dreadlock style hair." When Officer Patten ran the nickname "Little C" through "RMS," the police department database, the only name that came up in the Decatur area was defendant's. When Detective Brad Hall spoke with Cunningham in the emergency room, he also identified the shooter as "Little C," who he said was 37 years old, "a dark complected, black male, shorter, stocky build, wearing a white...

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