People v. Harris
| Decision Date | 20 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 63997,64008 and 64034,s. 63997 |
| Citation | 526 N.E.2d 335,123 Ill.2d 113 |
| Parties | , 122 Ill.Dec. 76 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Charles HARRIS, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Earnest WILSON, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Fred COLLINS, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Robert J. Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa (Pamela A. Peters, of counsel), for appellant Fred Collins.
Joseph M. Cernugel, Block, Krockey, Cernugel and Cowgill, P.C., Joliet (Joseph M. Cernugel, of counsel), for appellant Earnest Wilson.
Joseph C. Polito Kozlowski, Polito & Feeley, Joliet, for appellant Charles Harris.
Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Roma J. Stewart, Sol. Gen., Terence M. Madsen, Sally L. Dilgart, Gary Schwartz, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, for the State.
Earnest Wilson, pro se.
Defendants Charles Harris, Earnest Wilson, and Fred Collins were convicted of murder and conspiracy to commit murder after a joint jury trial in the circuit court of Will County. Following a bifurcated sentencing hearing, the jury found the defendants eligible for the death penalty, but found mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of death. The trial court subsequently sentenced the defendants to imprisonment for natural life on their murder convictions. No sentences were imposed on their conspiracy convictions. Following the denial of their post-trial motions, the defendants appealed their convictions to the appellate court. On appeal, the appellate court, in an unpublished Rule 23 order (143 Ill.App.3d 1163, 107 Ill.Dec. 644, 507 N.E.2d 557 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)), affirmed the defendants' convictions and sentences for murder and vacated their convictions for conspiracy. The State has not contested the vacation of the convictions for conspiracy, and this matter is not before us. We allowed the defendants' petitions for leave to appeal under Rule 315 (107 Ill.2d R. 315), and consolidated their causes.
The defendants in the instant case, as well as the victim, George Bailey, all resided in Unit B--West at Stateville prison on January 29, 1981, when the offense was committed. The facts adduced at trial established that the killing of inmate Bailey resulted from prison gang rivalry, specifically between the Black Gangster Disciples and the Black Disciples. The victim was a member of the Black Disciples. At the time of the murder, Bailey was also a member of a small group of privileged inmates who were assigned duties of "cellhouse help." Inmates assigned to "cellhouse help" enjoyed free range of the cellhouse to the extent that, unlike all other prisoners housed in B--West, their cells were unlocked and they could roam about the cellhouse uncuffed and unescorted by a prison guard. Defendant Earnest ("Smokey") Wilson, head of the Black Gangster Disciples, disapproved of Black Disciples serving as cellhouse helpers.
Approximately two weeks prior to the January 29, 1981, murder of George Bailey, Wilson held a meeting of inmates at his cell to "send a message" to all Black Disciple cellhouse helpers that they could either resign from their positions as cellhouse helpers or join the Black Gangster Disciples. Those in attendance at the meeting included Black Gangster Disciple members Rico Johnson, defendants Fred Collins and Charles Harris, three other Black Gangster Disciples, Franklin Murphy, Robert Watson and Charles Brooks (who were indicted along with Harris, Wilson and Collins for the murder of George Bailey, but were tried separately and convicted only of conspiracy), and three Black Disciple members, including George Bailey, who were also assigned as cellhouse help. Although two of the Black Disciples followed Wilson's suggestion and resigned their positions as cellhouse help, Bailey stayed on as cellhouse help in the B--West unit.
During the two-week period preceding the murder, the Black Disciples chanted "B.D. Power" every night around 8 p.m. Wilson expressed his dissatisfaction with this practice to Dirk Acklin, leader of the Black Disciples, but the chanting persisted. Sometime shortly after the meeting at Wilson's cell, defendant Collins was placed in segregation because he had been fighting with Bailey. Collins was returned, however, to the B--West unit as a cellhouse helper on January 29, 1981.
On the evening of January 29, 1981, Wilson met in his cell with inmates Moore, Collins, Harris, Murphy, Brooks and Watson. They smoked some marijuana and discussed the fate of George Bailey. According to James Bates, a Black Disciple housed in the cell adjoining Wilson's, Wilson announced that they should "get" Bailey. Collins said he intended to "get" him anyway. Wilson sent Harris to order Rico Johnson to distribute the gang's weapons from his cell where they were stored. At trial, Johnson testified that he gave an aluminum bat to Collins ("Bobo") and shanks to Harris ("Sundown"), "Big Crip," "Rob" and "Gator." Bates then called Bailey down to his cell to report the conversation he had overheard in order to warn Bailey that he might be in danger. Bailey, however, expressed no fear, and showed Bates a shank he was carrying for protection.
Bates further testified that a unit recount was called at 9:45 p.m., requiring all inmates, including cellhouse help, to return to their cells. According to Bates, Bailey returned to his cell, talked briefly with his cellmate and, moments later, was struck from behind by a baseball bat wielded by Collins.
As the guards began to lock up the cellhouse helpers, Bates saw Collins approach Wilson's cell and signal to Wilson using gang-related gestures. He overheard Collins remark, "It's taken care of." Bates claimed that, after lock up, he saw Collins throw the bat out of his cell.
On February 5, 1981, George Bailey died. The autopsy revealed that his skull had been fractured in several places, consistent with repeated blows from a baseball bat.
As stated previously, the defendants were convicted by a jury of murder and conspiracy to commit murder, and were subsequently sentenced by the trial court to natural life imprisonment on their murder convictions. No sentences were imposed on their conspiracy convictions. The appellate court affirmed the defendants' convictions for murder and vacated their convictions for conspiracy. We granted the defendants' petitions for leave to appeal under Rule 315 (107 Ill.2d R. 315), and consolidated their causes.
The defendants' first contention in their appeal before this court is that the trial court erred in refusing to ask certain supplemental questions proposed by their defense counsel during the voir dire of prospective jurors. Specifically, the defendants argue that the Will County circuit court judge who tried the instant case erred by not following the ruling set forth in the third district appellate court opinion of People v. Zehr (1982), 110 Ill.App.3d 458, 66 Ill.Dec. 155, 442 N.E.2d 581, which held that questions tendered by defense counsel concerning the State's burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, and the defendant's right to forego testimony on his behalf, are proper subjects for the voir dire inquiry. At the time of the defendants' trial, the petition for leave to appeal from Zehr had been granted and the case was pending before our court. After the defendants' trial, we affirmed the appellate court's holding in Zehr (People v. Zehr (1984), 103 Ill.2d 472, 83 Ill.Dec. 128, 469 N.E.2d 1062), and, thereafter, in People v. Britz (1986), 112 Ill.2d 314, 97 Ill.Dec. 768, 493 N.E.2d 575, we held that our earlier decision in Zehr was to be given prospective application only. Although the defendants are mindful of our holding in Britz, they nevertheless argue that since the "Zehr rule" was the applicable law on voir dire in the third district appellate court at the time of the defendants' trial, the Will County judge trying their case was bound by that decision, and his failure to apply the appellate court's holding in Zehr constitutes reversible error.
The State counters the defendants' argument in two ways. First, the State maintains that an appellate court decision is not binding on the trial courts, including trial courts within its own district, so long as that decision is the subject of a petition for leave to appeal which is pending in our court. The State alternatively argues that because the Zehr rule was given prospective application by this court in Britz, the defendants should not now receive de facto retroactivity by means of the Zehr appellate court opinion. The State reasons that pursuant to Britz, the effective date of the "Zehr rule" is the date of the release of the Zehr opinion by our court, specifically March 23, 1984 ( Zehr, 103 Ill.2d 472, 83 Ill.Dec. 128, 469 N.E.2d 1062), and that since jury selection in the instant case began in May 1983, Zehr is therefore inapplicable.
It is fundamental in Illinois that the decisions of an appellate court are binding precedent on all circuit courts regardless of locale. (People v. Thorpe (1977), 52 Ill.App.3d 576, 579, 10 Ill.Dec. 351, 367 N.E.2d 960.) In taking this principle one step further, it is the defendants' contention here that in those instances where two or more appellate districts are in conflict, as was the situation after the appellate court for the third district authored Zehr, the circuit court is bound by the decisions of the appellate court within its own district. (See, e.g., Garcia v. Hynes & Howes Real Estate, Inc. (1975), 29 Ill.App.3d 479, 482, 331 N.E.2d 634.) This, then, is the basis for the defendants' argument that the trial court in the instant case was bound by the Zehr appellate court opinion, and erred by not applying the Zehr holding during the voir dire of prospective...
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