People v. Harris
Court | New York Court of Appeals |
Writing for the Court | WILLARD BARTLETT |
Citation | 102 N.E. 546,209 N.Y. 70 |
Parties | PEOPLE v. HARRIS. |
Decision Date | 17 June 1913 |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Supreme Court, Trial Term, Wyoming County.
George Harris was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered.L. A. Walker, of Perry, for appellant.
John Knight, Dist. Atty., of Arcade, for the People.
The defendant has been convicted of the premeditated and deliberate killing of his wife by shooting her to death at the village of Perry, in the county of Wyoming, on the 20th day of November, 1911. Upon the trial, at the close of the people's case, his counsel in the course of his opening address to the jury admitted that the defendant fired the fatal shots, but said it would be claimed that he was not in a condition to be responsible for the act.
At the time of the homicide George Harris and Beatrice, his wife, were boarding and lodging at the house of John W. Wheeler in the village of Perry, occupying a room on the second floor. They were respectively 25 and 21 years of age. He worked in a cutlery manufactoryand she in a knitting mill in the village. They were married on December 8, 1906, in Perry, being both then engaged in the same employments. There had been two separations of the couple during their married life; one in 1910, when the wife gave birth to a child who survived but a short time, and the other from February to the early part of October, 1911, in consequence of the husband's drinking habits. The reconciliation which terminated this separation appears to have been due to the husband's advances quite as much as to the wishes of the wife. After they thus came together, at the beginning of October, 1911, they seem to have lived in harmony at Mr. Wheeler's in Perry until the evening of the homicide. On that day the defendant left off work about 10 o'clock a. m. because he did not feel well, and spent most of the time until evening frequenting a pool room with the exception of a visit home for dinner, when he met his wife and accompanied her part way to the knitting mill, to which she went to resume work in the afternoon. He stayed around this pool room until after 6 o'clock any drank a good many bottles of beer; he says possibly 10 or 12. Returning home while the Wheeler household were at supper, he went to the room occupied by himself and his wife, where she speedily joined him. Mr. and Mrs. Wheeler and the other boarders went out early in the evening and none of them had returned at the time of the tragedy which ensued. At about 8 o'clock the report of several pistol shots and the scream of a woman, apparently proceeding from the Wheeler house, were heard by the occupants of dwellings in the vicinity. Shortly afterward the defendant, apparently in a condition of great emotional excitement, appeared at the door of a neighboring residence and asked the inmates to get a doctor, saying that his wife had shot herself, and adding, in response to an inquiry as to what the trouble was: ‘Oh, we had a few words and I went out; oh, if she had only waited!’ A ghastly picture was revealed to the physicians and others who hastened to the defendant's room. His wife lay dead in her chair, evidently shot to death by a revolver which the incomers found held in her right hand. There were four wounds on her body, any one of which was sufficient in and of itself to have caused death. One cartridge remained intact in the pistol, except that it was dented in such a manner as to indicate that two efforts had been made to discharge it; the shells of the four other cartridges were empty.
From the very first the defendant insisted that his wife had committed suicide. According to his earlier statements, a controversy had arisen between them in regard to his drinking shortly after he came in; this went on until she asked him to get her a glass of water; while he was out in the hall on his way to procure it, he heard a shot; and returning to the room he saw smoke around his wife's head, upon which he rushed out, calling for Mrs. Wheeler.
When the defendant took the stand as a witness, after the concession of his counsel that he had fired the fatal shots, his account of the events immediately preceding the tragedy was as follows: I went home and went upstairs; took my hat and coat off. I don't remember whether I hung them up or laid them on the bed. Took a drink of whisky out of the bottle and sat down on the bed. My wife then came up and went over and sat in a chair. I kind of laid down on the bed there and we talked of different things. I can't remember all we said; something about going to keeping house. I don't remember all that was-I think we mentioned something about a pillow she was raffling off, and I felt sick and I vomited in the bowl there in the room; and then I kind of laid down in the bed again for a while, I couldn't say how long, and I went and got another drink of whisky out of the bottle, and my wife kind of objected to it, and we had a few words about my drinking. She said she thought I had had enough; that I didn't need any more. I took another drink of whisky and went back and sat on the bed. She said she guessed she had made up her mind to leave me on account of my drinking; she was going away with the man she loved. I asked her who that was, and she said ‘Ralph Traber.’ I told her that he would not go with her; that he was out of her class. She said that he would have to for he had got her in the family way while we had been apart. She said he would have to take care of her; he had got her in the family way while we had been apart. I don't remember what happened after that until some one told me she had been shot.'
The convenient presence of the revolver was explained by the statement that the defendant had taken it out of his trunk the day before and had placed it on the commode with the intention of selling it.
[1] As the case went to the jury, the defense had resolved itself into the contention that in consequence of intoxication and the emotion aroused by his wife's declaration of her illicit relations with Traber the defendant was incapable of the premeditation and deliberation requisite to constitute the crime of murder in the first degree. The evidence, however, was sufficient to warrant the jury in rejecting this view and in returning the verdict which they did.
[2] As has been pointed out, six attempts were made to discharge the revolver, four of which were successful. The time which must have elapsed between the first and the sixth effort might well be regarded as a sufficient period within which deliberation was possible. People v. Ferraro, 161 N. Y. 365, 375,55 N. E. 931, and cases therein cited. And the placing of the revolver in the hand of the victim so as to simulate suicide indicated the consciousness of having committed a premeditated crime. It is true the surrounding circumstances show that the premeditation and deliberation were of very short duration in all human probability; nevertheless, if these elements exist at all, they suffice to sustain a conviction of the highest degree of homicide. It remains to inquire whether any error of law was committed upon the trial to the substantial injury of the defendant sufficient to nullify the jury's disposition of the questions of fact in the case. Here we encounter several serious obstacles to the affirmance of the judgment.
[3] The apparent absence of any adequate motive on the part of the defendant for deliberately killing his wife was one of the difficulties of the prosecution in the way of obtaining a conviction of murder in the first degree. As indicative of the existence of a reason for desiring to get rid of his wife, the district attorney introduced evidence of his intimacy with a prostitute and another woman of questionable character. A woman, who declined to state whether she was a prostitute or not, testified to meeting the defendant at Hornell four or five years ago and to having received visits from him from time to time after that for four or five months. It was two or three years prior to the trial when she had last seen him, although she had sent him a postal card as late as November, 1910. After stating that she did not remember that he had written to her on the subject of marriage, she said, ‘He might have made the remark or written in some of his letters that we might be nearer to each other, or something like that;’ but in answer to a question from the court she said she did not think that this was since she left Hornell over four years ago. The other intimacy which the prosecution was permitted to prove was with a woman named Bonita La Marez, known as the snake charmer, who lived at a boarding house in Perry kept by Mrs. Anna E. Barber. In the summer of 1910, at the time of the absence of his wife, the defendant called upon this woman on a number of evenings in each week. When told that he was a married man, Mrs. Barber said she thought in improper for the defendant to call there but she did not stop it. The prosecution was also allowed to prove that letters passed between the defendant and Bonita La Marez during the same period to the extent of three letters from each. Their contents were not shown, nor was there any proof of illicit intercourse between this woman and the defendant.
The question of the admissibility of this evidence is raised by appropriate objections and exceptions. We think it was too remote and that it afforded no basis for any inference that the defendant desired to get rid of his wife by reason of his preference for any other woman. The rule is well established that when a husband is charged with the murder of his wife it is competent to show his relations with a paramour. People v. Scott, 153 N. Y. 40, 50,46 N. E. 1028. The reason of the rule is stated to be that such evidence tends to establish the absence of affection for the wife and a motive for getting rid of her. The rule, however, does not extend so far as to...
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Monk v. Bradt, 09–CV–0932(VEB).
...N.Y.2d at 27, 400 N.Y.S.2d 735, 371 N.E.2d 456 (quoting Richardson, Evidence, § 147, p. 117 (Prince 10th ed.) and citing People v. Harris, 209 N.Y. 70, 82, 102 N.E. 546 (N.Y.1913); McCormick, Evidence, § 185, pp. 438–440 (2d ed.)). Without an expert witness to explain the terminology employ......
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...instruction), the time necessary to form the necessary premeditation and thought may be "of very short duration." People v. Harris, 209 N.Y. 70, 75, 102 N.E. 546, 548 (1913). "Felony murder must occur while the actor or one or more of his confederates is engaged in securing the plunder or i......
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Chisley v. State, 106
...be evidence for the jury of deliberation and premeditation. State v. McNamara, 116 N.J.L. 497, 184 A. 797, 185 A. 479; People v. Harris, 209 N.Y. 70, 102 N.E. 546; Commonwealth v. Dreher, 274 Pa. 325, 118 A. 215; and Brown v. State, 62 N.J.L. 666, 42 A. 811. The jury could have considered a......
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Monk v. Bradt
...N.Y.2d at 27, 400 N.Y.S.2d 735, 371 N.E.2d 456 (quoting Richardson, Evidence, § 147, p. 117 (Prince 10th ed.) and citing People v. Harris, 209 N.Y. 70, 82, 102 N.E. 546 (N.Y.1913); McCormick, Evidence, § 185, pp. 438–440 (2d ed.)). Without an expert witness to explain the terminology employ......
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United States ex rel. Jackson v. Follette, 527
...instruction), the time necessary to form the necessary premeditation and thought may be "of very short duration." People v. Harris, 209 N.Y. 70, 75, 102 N.E. 546, 548 (1913). "Felony murder must occur while the actor or one or more of his confederates is engaged in securing the plunder or i......
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Chisley v. State
...to be evidence for the jury of deliberation and premeditation. State v. McNamara, 116 N.J.L. 497, 184 A. 797, 185 A. 479; People v. Harris, 209 N.Y. 70, 102 N.E. 546; Commonwealth v. Dreher, 274 Pa. 325, 118 A. 215; and Brown v. State, 62 N.J.L. 666, 42 A. 811. The jury could have considere......
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S., In re
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Relevance, materiality & presumptions
...issue which will confuse the main issue, unreasonably prolong the trial, or unfairly surprise the other party. Id. ; People v. Harris , 209 N.Y. 70, 102 N.E. 546 (1913). Lack of means to commit a crime (e.g., the defendant was not strong enough to strike the blow) is admissible. On the othe......