People v. Harris

• Decision Date: 09 July 2002
• Citation: People v. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d 452, 749 N.Y.S.2d 766, 779 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y. 2002)
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. DARREL K. HARRIS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

98 N.Y.2d 452

779 N.E.2d 705

749 N.Y.S.2d 766

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. DARREL K. HARRIS, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of the State of New York.

Argued May 6, 2002.

Decided July 9, 2002.

Kevin M. Doyle, Capital Defender, New York City (Susan H. Salomon, Barbara Zolot, Laura S. Kelly and Gregory A. Clarick of counsel), for appellant.

Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn (Jonathan L. Frank, Keith Dolan, Howard A. Getzler, Lori Glachman, Howard B. Goodman, Jacqueline M. Linares, Shulamit Rosenblum and Bruce Seeliger of counsel), for respondent.

Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, New York City (Peter B. Pope, Daniel Smirlock, Caitlin J. Halligan, Michael S. Belohlavek, Robin A. Forshaw, Michael S. Buskus and Jo W. Faber of counsel), in his statutory capacity under Executive Law § 71.

Sheri Lynn Johnson, Ithaca, for Cornell Death Penalty Project, amicus curiae.

Christopher Dunn, New York City, Norman Siegel, Arthur N. Eisenberg, Donna Lieberman, Marina Sheriff and Beth Haroules for New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation, amicus curiae.

Debevoise & Plimpton, New York City (Edwin G. Schallert, Adam D. Gale and Howard S. Hogan of counsel), Evan A. Davis, Norman L. Greene and Eric M. Freedman for Association of the Bar of the City of New York, amicus curiae. Randy Hertz, New York City, for Anthony Amsterdam and others, amici curiae.

Chief Judge KAYE and Judges LEVINE, CIPARICK, ROSENBLATT and GRAFFEO concur with Judge WESLEY; Judge SMITH dissents in part and votes to reverse and order a new trial in a separate opinion.

OPINION OF THE COURT

WESLEY, J.

In 1995, the New York Legislature restored the death penalty to New York's criminal statutes for the first time since 1984. Although this Court has on several occasions dealt with issues related to the new statute (see People v Mower, 97 NY2d 239; People v Edwards, 96 NY2d 445; Matter of Francois v Dolan, 95 NY2d 33; People v Couser, 94 NY2d 631; People v Mateo, 93 NY2d 327; Matter of Hynes v Tomei, 92 NY2d 613), this case presents the first full appeal of a sentence of death in New York in almost 20 years.

In the early morning hours of December 7, 1996, defendant entered a Brooklyn social club located on 178 Jefferson Avenue. Club 178, also known as Club Happiness, or KP's, is a small neighborhood club. Jerome Sims, Evelyn Davis, Michael Harris, Eddie Brown and Newbry Mitchell—all known to defendant—were in the club at that time. Defendant sat down at the bar and ordered a beer from Jerome Sims, the manager. After drinking his beer and smoking some cigarettes, defendant went to the bathroom. When he emerged, he spoke to Sims and then, while displaying a gun, announced "You all know what this is. Everybody get on the floor."

Defendant demanded money from Brown who handed defendant over $200. Defendant directed Sims to approach him. As Sims walked past him, defendant turned and shot Sims in the head at point-blank range. Defendant then shot Michael Harris in the back of his head at close range as he lay behind a table. Defendant turned to Evelyn Davis, fired a shot at her and set his sights on Brown. Defendant shot Brown in the head, seriously wounding him.

Davis escaped the shot unharmed. She begged defendant to let her go, pleading with him "I got five babies." As Davis tried to run out of the club, defendant stabbed her in the back. Davis struggled, screaming "let me out of here."

While defendant attacked Davis, Newbry Mitchell escaped out a door leading to the second floor of the club and jammed the door closed behind him. Defendant ran after him and attempted to open the door but soon gave up. Mitchell fled to the second floor. When Mitchell reached a window, he heard the sound of the club's front door slam shut. Mitchell peered out the window and saw Davis stagger across the street with defendant in close pursuit.

Davis ran to another social club nearby, Club 432, where she appeared breathless with blood coming from her mouth. She entered the club and sat down. When she heard the doorbell, she screamed "No, don't let him in. That's him, that's him. Everybody around the corner is shot. Darrel shot * * * Shirt Man [Eddie Brown], everybody is shot." No one opened the door. An ambulance arrived and took Davis to the hospital where she was pronounced dead.

Despite his head injury, Brown managed to leave the club. He was discovered by police officers who had stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation nearby. In the meantime, Mitchell, after returning downstairs and seeing the lifeless bodies of Harris and Sims, fled the scene. Defendant was apprehended approximately two weeks later.

Defendant was indicted on six counts of first-degree felony murder, for the deaths of Jerome Sims, Michael Harris and Evelyn Davis, with the robbery of Eddie Brown as the underlying felony for each count (Penal Law § 125.27 [1] [a] [vii]). He was also charged with six counts of first-degree same-transaction murder (Penal Law § 125.27 [1] [a] [viii]) and several other related offenses. On May 23, 1997, the District Attorney of Kings County filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty pursuant to CPL 250.40 (2).

Following his arrest defendant gave a number of statements implicating Newbry Mitchell. However, at trial defendant acknowledged sole responsibility for the crimes but contended that his actions were the result of extreme emotional disturbance (Penal Law § 125.27 [2] [a]). Specifically, defendant contended that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder related, in part, to alleged abuse and spinal meningitis as a child and the trauma of a prison riot that occurred when he worked as a corrections officer. During the riot, defendant rescued a fellow corrections officer, an act of heroism that earned him a Medal of Honor from the Department of Correction in 1987.

The trial commenced on May 4, 1998 and was completed on May 18, 1998.¹ After two days of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on six first-degree murder counts, attempted first-degree murder and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon.² The sentencing determination hearing took another week. After three days of deliberations, the jury sentenced defendant to death. This direct appeal pursuant to article VI, § 3 (b) of the State Constitution and CPL 450.70 (1) followed.

We conclude that defendant's guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt and that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. We further conclude, as discussed in the ensuing sections, that there was no reversible error in the conduct of the trial, and that the death sentence must be vacated.

I.

Defendant has briefed 28 issues and over 60 sub-issues seeking reversal of his conviction, vacatur of his sentence and other relief. Defendant attacks the constitutionality of the entire statutory scheme, and claims that his sentence is unconstitutional under Matter of Hynes v Tomei (92 NY2d 613).

We begin with the recognition that "death is different" (see Furman v Georgia, 408 US 238, 306 [Stewart, J., concurring]). The statutory scheme that makes the penalty a possibility imposes many standards and procedures that are different from other criminal proceedings. For our part, the statute confers a unique set of appellate responsibilities on this Court (CPL 470.30). In addition to the powers of an intermediate appellate court (CPL 470.15, 470.20) we are required to review the factual basis for the conviction and the sentence (see CPL 470.30 [1], [2]; NY Const, art VI, § 3 [a]). We are also directed to examine whether the death sentence was imposed "under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary or legally impermissible factor including whether the imposition of the verdict or sentence was based upon the race of the defendant or a victim of the crime for which the defendant was convicted" (CPL 470.30 [3] [a]). We must determine whether the death sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalties imposed in similar cases (CPL 470.30 [3] [b]) and whether the decision to impose the sentence of death was against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.30 [3] [c]). By its very nature a capital case requires the most meticulous and thoughtful attention. A mistake discovered years later may not be correctable.

II. Pretrial Motions

Defendant made several pretrial motions; two need be addressed more fully.³

A. Grand Jury Instructions on Intoxication

Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on a number of grounds. Among them, he contended that the integrity of the grand jury proceeding was impaired when the People refused to give an instruction on intoxication.⁴ The trial court determined that the instruction was not required in this case (People v Harris, 174 Misc 2d 654, 656). This Court has determined that a prosecutor is not required to present mitigating defenses to a grand jury (People v Valles, 62 NY2d 36, 38). We have recognized that the question whether a grand jury should be instructed with regard to a particular defense depends upon its potential for eliminating a needless or unfounded prosecution. Unlike exculpatory defenses, which may result in a finding of no criminal liability, mitigating defenses only reduce the gravity of the offense committed. Thus, while a grand jury instructed on an exculpatory defense might avoid an unwarranted prosecution, the same result would not follow if the grand jury were instructed on a mitigating defense (id.; see also People v Lancaster, 69 NY2d 20, 29). Like a mitigating defense, intoxication merely reduces the gravity of the offense by negating an element.

We see no reason to depart from Valles.⁵ The People here were not required to instruct the grand jury on intoxication.⁶

B. Challenge to the Felony-Murder Provision of Penal Law § 125.27 (1) (a) (vii)

Defendant moved to dismiss the counts of the indictment charging first-degree and attempted first-degree murder under the felony-murder provision...