People v. Harris

• Citation: 568 N.Y.S.2d 702,570 N.E.2d 1051,77 N.Y.2d 434
• Parties: , 570 N.E.2d 1051 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Bernard HARRIS, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 12 February 1991
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 702

568 N.Y.S.2d 702

77 N.Y.2d 434, 570 N.E.2d 1051

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Bernard HARRIS, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 12, 1991.

[77 N.Y.2d 435] Bernard Harris, pro se.

Robert T. Johnson, Dist. Atty. (Peter D. Coddington, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

Ronald G. Blum, Barrington D. Parker, Jr., Debra Freeman and Marc J. Schoenfeld, New York City, amicus curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SIMONS, Judge.

This matter is before us on remand from the United States Supreme Court following reversal and reinstatement of the judgment against defendant (see, New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 110 S.Ct. 1640, 109 L.Ed.2d 13, revg. People v. Harris, 72 N.Y.2d 614, 536 N.Y.S.2d 1, 532 N.E.2d 1229). We must now determine whether evidence submitted in support of defendant's conviction, though admissible under Federal standards, should be suppressed under our State constitutional provision prohibiting unlawful searches and seizures (see, N.Y. Const., art. I, § 12).

The challenged evidence consisted of statements defendant made to the police after they arrested him in his apartment for the murder of his girlfriend. The police had probable cause, developed during the five days between the crime and the arrest, but arrested defendant without a warrant in violation of the rule in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639. ¹ Defendant made an inculpatory statement in his apartment, another one hour later at the police station and a third statement on videotape. The first statement was suppressed as the product of the illegal arrest and the third was suppressed because it was involuntary. Those rulings are not challenged. The issue now before us relates to the second statement. Defendant claimed that it should be suppressed under the Federal and State Constitutions (see, U.S. Const. 4th Amend.; N.Y. Const., art. I, § 12).

When we previously reviewed the question, we found the station house statement was tainted by the prior illegality and unredeemed by attenuation. Accordingly, we suppressed it on Fourth Amendment grounds (People v. Harris, 72 N.Y.2d 614, 620-624, 536 N.Y.S.2d 1, 532 N.E.2d 1229, supra ). The holding represented our view of what the Federal Constitution required and was consistent with an earlier decision in this Court on the subject (see, People v. Conyers, 68 N.Y.2d 982, 510 N.Y.S.2d 552, 503 N.E.2d 108; see also, United States v. Johnson, 9th Cir., 626 F.2d 753, 759, affd. 457 U.S. 537, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202; United States v. George, 9th Cir., 883 F.2d 1407, 1416, n. 8).

The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari and reversed (New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 110 S.Ct. 1640, 109 L.Ed.2d 13, supra ). It held that the police illegality was in the entry, not the arrest, and that exit from the apartment necessarily broke any causal connection between the wrong and the later statement. Inasmuch as the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant, the exclusionary rule did not bar use of his station house statement even though the warrantless arrest in defendant's apartment violated the rule in Payton v. New York (New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 21-22, 110 S.Ct. 1640, 1644-1645, 109 L.Ed.2d 13, supra). No attenuation was required, the Court held, because the deterrent value of suppressing this type of statement was minimal: "[i]t is doubtful * * * that the desire to secure a statement from a criminal suspect would motivate the police to violate Payton " (New York v. Harris, supra, at 21, 110 S.Ct. at 1644).

Inasmuch as the Supreme Court ruled against defendant on his Federal claim, we are now obliged to consider on remand the other claim he advanced, whether the State Constitution requires suppression of the station house statement. ² We conclude that the Supreme Court's rule does not adequately protect the search and seizure rights of citizens of New York. Accordingly, we hold that our State Constitution requires that statements obtained from an accused following a Payton violation must be suppressed unless the taint resulting from the violation has been attenuated.

Because the language of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and section 12 of article I of the New York State Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures is identical, it may be assumed, as a general proposition, that the two provisions confer similar rights (see, People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 304, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 501 N.E.2d 556; People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 406-407, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 488 N.E.2d 439; People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160, 165, 445 N.Y.S.2d 57, 429 N.E.2d 735). Such consistency is desirable because it facilitates implementation of search and seizure rules. Nonetheless, the two documents do not present a monolithic legal code. Our federalist system of government necessarily provides a double source of protection and State courts, when asked to do so, are bound to apply their own Constitutions notwithstanding the holdings of the United States Supreme Court (see, People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, 68 N.Y.2d 553, 557, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844, 503 N.E.2d 492, quoting People v. Barber, 289 N.Y. 378, 384, 46 N.E.2d 329). Sufficient reasons appearing, a State court may adopt a different construction of a similar State provision unconstrained by a contrary Supreme Court interpretation of the Federal counterpart. The present case comes to us on remand to determine whether we should do so here.

We detailed some general rules governing independent State review in People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 301-302, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 501 N.E.2d 556, supra and have revisited the subject several times since (see, e.g., People v. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d 224, 228-230, 544 N.Y.S.2d 796, 543 N.E.2d 61; People v. Griminger, 71 N.Y.2d 635, 638-639, 529 N.Y.S.2d 55, 524 N.E.2d 409; People v. Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d 375, 378-379, 521 N.Y.S.2d 212, 515 N.E.2d 898; People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, supra, 68 N.Y.2d at 557-558, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844, 503 N.E.2d 492). Two different analyses are employed: an interpretive analysis which examines the language of the provisions and a noninterpretive analysis which "proceeds from a judicial perception of sound policy, justice and fundamental fairness" ( People v. P.J. Video, supra, 68 N.Y.2d at 303, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 501 N.E.2d 556). In the present case, the language of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and section 12 of article I of our own Constitution not only contain similar language but share a common history ( see, People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 298, 304, n. 4, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 501 N.E.2d 556, supra; People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 406, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 488 N.E.2d 439, supra ). If a distinction is to be made in what they require, therefore, it must rest on a noninterpretive analysis of the State provision in which the Court focuses not on the text of the clause but on matters peculiar to this State. In doing so, we have considered such factors as "any preexisting State statutory or common law defining the scope of the individual right in question; the history and traditions of the State in its protection of the individual right; any identification of the right in the State Constitution as being one of peculiar State or local concern; and any distinctive attitudes of the State citizenry toward the definition, scope or protection of the individual right." ( People v. P.J. Video, supra, 68 N.Y.2d at 303, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 501 N.E.2d 556.)

Employing this analysis in the past, we have delineated an independent body of search and seizure law under the State Constitution to govern citizen-police encounters when doing so best promotes " 'the protection of the individual rights of our citizens' " (People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 304, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 501 N.E.2d 556, supra, quoting People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 407, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 488 N.E.2d 439, supra; see, People v. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d 224, 228, 544 N.Y.S.2d 796, 543 N.E.2d 61, supra ). Whether this is a case requiring a special State rule to protect the constitutional rights of accuseds necessarily requires consideration of the consequences flowing from the police illegality and whether some deterrent is necessary to remove any incentive to the police to violate the law. It is not dispositive that defendant waived his Miranda rights before speaking. The interest in deterrence does not disappear just because defendant's statement was voluntary or because he waived his right to counsel. Indeed, if the statement was involuntary there would never be need to consider the violation of the Search and Seizure Clause (see, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601-602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2260-2261, 45 L.Ed.2d 416; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216-217, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2258-2259, 60 L.Ed.2d 824; Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 2667, 73 L.Ed.2d 314).

We turn, therefore, to the circumstances peculiar to New York and conclude that although attenuation may not be necessary to deter Payton violations under Federal law or in the Nation generally, the Supreme Court's rule is not adequate to protect New York citizens from Payton violations because of our right to counsel rule.

The safeguards guaranteed by this State's Right to Counsel Clause are unique (N.Y. Const., art. I, § 6). By constitutional and statutory interpretation, we have established a protective body of law in this area resting on concerns of due process, self-incrimination and the right to counsel provisions of the State Constitution which is substantially greater than that recognized by other State jurisdictions and "far more expansive than the Federal counterpart" (People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 338-339, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474, 558 N.E.2d 1011; People v. Davis, 75 N.Y.2d 517, 521, 554 N.Y.S.2d 460, 553 N.E.2d 1008; People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 483-484, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 348 N.E.2d 894; see also, 1 LaFave and Israel,...