People v. Harris

• Citation: 540 P.2d 632,124 Cal.Rptr. 536,15 Cal.3d 384
• Decision Date: 07 October 1975
• Docket Number: Cr. 18430
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: , 540 P.2d 632 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mark Lee HARRIS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 536

124 Cal.Rptr. 536

15 Cal.3d 384, 540 P.2d 632

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mark Lee HARRIS, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 18430.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Oct. 7, 1975.

Joseph Shemaria, Hollywood, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward T. Fogel, Jr., and Gary R. Hahn, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

RICHARDSON, Justice.

Defendant was charged with burglary (Pen.Code, § 459). His motion to suppress evidence (Pen.Code, § 1538.5) was denied. After a jury trial, he was found guilty of first degree burglary and placed on probation. He appeals from the judgment of conviction, asserting that the motion to suppress should have been granted. We have concluded that the motion was improperly denied and that the judgment must be reversed.

The victims, Mr. and Mrs. Marx, were the sole occupants of a residence at 449 South McCadden Place, Los Angeles. They left their home one Saturday evening at 7 p.m. and returned about 10:15 p.m. Mr. Marx parked their car in the driveway and, as they approached the front door of the residence, they heard a noise which indicated to them that someone was inside. The Marxes returned to their car and drove to a neighbor's home to call the police. Finding no one at home, the Marxes then drove to another nearby residence and asked the occupant to summon the police. While there, they observed a car stop in front of their home. The driver stepped out of the vehicle and wiped its front and rear windows. Mr. Marx, believing that such activity was unusual and that there might be a connection between the driver and the person suspected of being inside his home, backed his car out of the neighbor's driveway and drove up behind the unknown car. Mrs. Marx copied the license number of that car. The other driver then drove away.

The police arrived at the Marx home at approximately 10:30 p.m. The Marxes gave the officers the license number of the car they had observed and the following description of the person they had seen in front of their home: male Caucasian, dark hair, moustache, about 5 8 tall, about 150 pounds, wearing a light cardigan sweater and dark trousers.

Among the arriving police were Officers Ryan and Snee who were given by the officer in charge a description of the suspect who had been seen in front of the residence. They also were told of the possibility that a second suspect was inside the Marx residence. The officer in charge further informed Ryan and Snee that he had heard dogs barking in succession in a northerly direction suggesting the possibility that someone was headed on that course.

Officers Ryan and Snee proceeded north on Highland, a street which runs parallel to, and a block west of, McCadden, and continued north two blocks to the intersection of Highland and Third Streets. The area was residential. Shortly thereafter, at approximately 11 p.m., they observed defendant and a male companion crossing Highland, westbound on Third Street, approximately three blocks from the Marx residence. The physical appearance of defendant and his clothing approximated the description furnished to the officers.

The suspects were stopped and interrogated separately. Defendant stated that he was looking for a girl named Donna who lived on McCadden Place. His companion said they had taken a bus to Highland and Wilshire--several blocks south of Third--and had been walking from the bus stop looking for a restaurant. Officer Ryan knew that there was a restaurant at Wilshire and Citrus, about 300 feet west of the bus stop. Both defendant and his companion appeared nervous.

The suspects were searched, handcuffed and placed in the back of the police car. Without asking the suspects' consent, Officers Ryan and Snee then drove the suspects back to the Marx residence for possible identification by the Marxes, who were unable, however, to identify either suspect as the man they had observed in front of their home that evening.

While Officers Ryan and Snee continued their interrogation of the suspects, other officers discovered that someone had apparently entered the house through the service porch window by climbing on top of a dusty teacart. A footprint of a ripple-soled shoe bearing the words 'Neoprine' and 'Oil Resistant,' was observed in the dust. Immediately after the Marxes failed to identify either suspect as the man they had observed in front of their home, a police sergeant noticed that defendant's shoe was ripple-soled. An officer removed defendant's shoe, took it to the teacart, and visually matched it with the shoeprint in the dust. Defendant and his companion were then formally placed under arrest.

Further police investigation revealed that the burglar or burglars had removed some change from a 'piggy' bank in the Marx residence, as well as a folded $10 bill and a $1 silver certificate, both of which had been deposited before the burglary in Mrs. Marx' jewelry box. An inventory search conducted incident to the suspects' booking subsequently disclosed a $1 silver certificate in defendant's wallet and a folded $10 bill in his companion's wallet.

Defendant, contending that his detention and subsequent conveyance to the Marx residence were unlawful, moved to suppress the currency together with evidence of the matching shoeprint. The motion was denied and the evidence (shoeprint and paper currency) introduced at trial formed the major basis for defendant's conviction.

1. The detention.

Although defendant contends otherwise, the officers had sufficient cause to detain defendant for initial questioning. It is well established that a temporary detention may be justified by circumstances falling short of probable cause to arrest a suspect. (People v. Mickelson (1963) 59 Cal.2d 448, 450, 30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658.) In amplification of this principle we recently explained, '(a) police officer may stop and question persons on public streets, . . . when the circumstances indicate to a reasonable man in a like position that such a course of action is called for in the proper discharge of the officer's duties. (Citations.) The good faith suspicion which warrants an officer's detention of a person for investigative reasons is necessarily of a lesser standard than that required to effect an arrest. (Citation.) Where there is a rational belief of criminal activity with which the suspect is connected, a detention for reasonable investigative procedures infringes no constitutional restraint. (Citation.)' (People v. Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 85, 91, 115 Cal.Rptr. 225, 228, 524 P.2d 353, 358; see People v. Gale (1973) 9 Cal.3d 788, 797--798, 108 Cal.Rptr. 852, 511 P.2d 1204; Irwin v Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.3d 423, 426--427, 82 Cal.Rptr. 484, 462 P.2d 12.)

The foregoing standard for Detention is of lesser degree than that applicable to an Arrest. Cause for arrest exists when the facts known to the arresting officer 'would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime.' (People v. Terry, (1970) 2 Cal.3d 362, 393, 85 Cal.Rptr. 409, 428, 466 P.2d 961, 980; People v. Ross (1967) 67 Cal.2d 64, 69--70, 60 Cal.Rptr. 254, 429 P.2d 606; People v. Ingle (1960) 53 Cal.2d 407, 412, 2 Cal.Rptr. 14, 348 P.2d 577.) The People concede that the circumstances were insufficient to furnish reasonable cause to Arrest the suspects. However, in the instant case, the circumstances did disclose a reasonable possibility that defendant and his companion were involved in the burglary. These circumstances included their presence in a residential area at 11 p.m., and the general similarity between defendant's appearance and the Marx' description of one of the suspects, thus meeting the requisite but lesser detention standards of 'good faith suspicion,' and 'rational belief of criminal activity' expressed by us in Flores. The initial Detention and questioning were entirely proper. (See People v. Watson (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 130, 134--135, 90 Cal.Rptr. 483.)

2. The transportation.

The principal difficulty in the matter before us arises from the police conduct following the detention when circumstances known to the police placed the case in that gray area in which the facts justify measures beyond detention but short of arrest. As we have noted, after questioning defendant and his companion the officers were presented with additional facts pointing to the suspects' possible involvement in the burglary, namely, their somewhat contradictory explanations regarding their presence in the neighborhood, and their nervous appearance. At that time the investigation imperceptibly entered a new stage. Suspicion was deepening. The officers fairly entertained growing doubts as to the veracity of defendant and his companion. The People urge that, at this point, despite the continued lack of reasonable cause to arrest the suspects, the officers properly could transport them to the scene of the crime for possible identification by the Marxes.

The propriety of such an in-the-field transportation of suspects prior to arrest poses the principle issue in the case. Here lies the pressure point between the individual's right of liberty and personal freedom, sanctified by the Fourth Amendment, on the one hand, and society's continuing needs to protect itself and its citizens from criminal marauders on the other. Accommodation of both of these considerations requires, on occasion, a balancing in its most sensitive form.

A detention of an individual which is reasonable at its inception may exceed constitutional bounds when extended beyond what is reasonably necessary under the circumstances. (See Willett v. Superior Court (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 555, 559, 83 Cal.Rptr. 22; Pendergraft v. Superior Court (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 237, 242, 93 Cal.Rptr. 155...