People v. Harris

• Citation: 60 Cal.App.5th 557,274 Cal.Rptr.3d 787
• Decision Date: 03 February 2021
• Docket Number: E074136
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Terrence Tobert HARRIS, Defendant and Appellant.

60 Cal.App.5th 557

274 Cal.Rptr.3d 787

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Terrence Tobert HARRIS, Defendant and Appellant.

E074136

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Filed February 3, 2021

Mark D. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Meredith S. White and Alana Cohen Butler, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

MENETREZ, J.

Terrence Robert Harris pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and attempted murder. He filed a petition under Penal Code section 1170.95 (unlabeled statutory citations are to this code) to vacate those convictions. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that Harris is ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 because he was not convicted of murder. Harris appeals from the trial court's order. Because section 1170.95 does not provide relief for those convicted of voluntary manslaughter and attempted murder, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 2010, Harris was charged along with three other individuals with one count of premeditated first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)) and two counts of robbery (§ 211). One year later, an amended complaint filed against Harris included the original charges plus one count of voluntary manslaughter of the same victim in the murder count (§ 192, subd. (a)) and one count of attempted murder of another victim (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664). Harris pled guilty to the two counts of robbery and one count each of attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter in exchange for dismissal of the murder count. The parties agreed to a stipulated prison term of 16 years four months, which the trial court imposed at sentencing.

In 2019, following the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), Harris petitioned for resentencing under section 1170.95. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that section 1170.95 provides relief for murder convictions only.

DISCUSSION

A. Overview of Senate Bill 1437 and Section 1170.95

"Senate Bill 1437 narrowed the scope of liability for first and second degree murder by altering the doctrines that had allowed convictions for those offenses in the absence of malice. Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill 1437 made that change by amending sections 188 and 189" to provide that only defendants who act with malice can be convicted of murder, subject only to an exception for first degree felony murder, the scope of which has been restricted. ( People v. Sanchez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 914, 917, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 389 ( Sanchez ); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843, 272 Cal.Rptr.3d 814, 477 P.3d 539 ( Gentile ).)

"The Legislature also added section 1170.95 to the Penal Code. That provision creates a procedure for offenders previously convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to obtain the benefits of these changes retrospectively. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief under section 1170.95, subdivision (a), the petitioner is entitled to receive ‘a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and to recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts in the same manner as if the petitioner had not been previously been sentenced.’ ( § 1170.95, subd. (d)(1) ; see also id. , subd. (c).)" ( Sanchez, supra , 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 917, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 389 ; Gentile, supra , 10 Cal.5th at p. 843, 272 Cal.Rptr.3d 814, 477 P.3d 539.) Subdivision (a) of section 1170.95 provides that "[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts" when specified conditions are met.

B. Standard of Review

"We independently review questions of statutory interpretation. ( People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 309, 355 P.3d 480.) In interpreting a statute, our ‘ "fundamental task ... is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose." ’ ( People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100, 1105, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 714, 417 P.3d 191.) ‘ "Because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look first at the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning." ’ ( Ibid. ) ‘ "If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls. If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable construction, then we may look to extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history." ’ ( Id. at p. 1106, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 714, 417 P.3d 191.)" ( Sanchez, supra , 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 918, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 389.) "It is axiomatic that the ‘ " ‘language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend.’ " ’ " ( Id. at p. 919, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 389.)

C. Section 1170.95 Applies to Murder Convictions

Harris argues that he qualifies for resentencing relief under section 1170.95 as a person who pled guilty to attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter "in order to avoid a murder conviction" under a qualifying theory. ( § 1170.95, subd. (a)(2).) To reach this conclusion, Harris "reads section 1170.95 as containing an ambiguity that he argues must be interpreted in his favor in order to avoid rendering some of the statutory language surplusage, which he claims would create an absurd result." ( Sanchez, supra , 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 917, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 389.) This court has already rejected this argument in Sanchez , at pages 917-921, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 389 with respect to a plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Harris contends that Sanchez was wrongly decided. We do not agree and see no reason to depart from our previous holding. In addition, because there is no reason to treat a guilty plea to attempted murder differently from a guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter under the statute, we adopt our reasoning in Sanchez and also reject Harris's argument that section 1170.95 relief is available to him as someone who pled guilty to attempted murder to avoid a murder conviction.

Harris also argues that Senate Bill 1437 applies generally to attempted murder convictions. There is currently a split of authority on that issue, with some courts holding that Senate Bill 1437 does not apply to attempted murder at all, some holding that it applies only prospectively, and some holding that it applies both prospectively and retroactively to nonfinal convictions.¹ (See People v. Love (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 273, 278-279, 269 Cal.Rptr.3d 349 ( Love ) [summarizing the split of authority].) That split of authority is irrelevant in the present case because Harris's attempted murder conviction is final, and section 1170.95 sets forth "the exclusive avenue for retroactive relief under Senate Bill 1437." ( Gentile, supra , 10 Cal.5th at p. 853, 272 Cal.Rptr.3d 814, 477 P.3d 539.) No court has held that Senate Bill 1437 applies retroactively to final convictions of attempted murder.

We therefore do not address any of Harris's arguments about Senate Bill 1437's applicability to attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine either prospectively or retroactively to nonfinal convictions. Instead, we analyze Senate Bill 1437's applicability to final convictions of attempted murder through the sentencing relief procedure set forth in section 1170.95. ( Gentile, supra , 10 Cal.5th at p. 853, 272 Cal.Rptr.3d 814, 477 P.3d 539.) We join the other appellate courts that have concluded that relief under section 1170.95 is not available to those convicted of attempted murder. (See People v. Larios (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 956, 970, 256 Cal.Rptr.3d 223 ( Larios ), review granted Feb. 26, 2020, S259983; People v. Alaybue (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 207, 222-225, 264 Cal.Rptr.3d 876 ( Alaybue ); Love, supra , 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 292, 269 Cal.Rptr.3d 349 ; People v. Medrano (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1018, 256 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 ( Medrano ), review granted Mar. 11, 2020, S259948.)

Looking to the plain language of the statute, this court has already held that section 1170.95 applies only to defendants convicted of murder. ( Sanchez, supra , 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 918, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 389.) " Section 1170.95 allows ‘[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory [to] file a petition’ to seek to have that ‘murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts’ if certain conditions are met. ( § 1170.95, subd. (a).) Subdivision (d) of section 1170.95 reiterates that the available relief under the section is the vacating of a ‘murder conviction.’ ( § 1170.95, subd. (d)(1)-(2).)" ( Sanchez , at p. 918, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 389.) Section 1170.95 refers exclusively to murder convictions and does not mention voluntary manslaughter or attempted murder. ( Sanchez , at p. 918, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 389 ; Love, supra , 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 292, 269 Cal.Rptr.3d 349 ; Larios, supra , 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 969, 256 Cal.Rptr.3d 223.) Harris argues that because subdivision (a) of section 1170.95 specifies that a person convicted under a qualifying theory may petition for relief, the relief is not limited to those persons convicted of murder. The argument fails because the same subdivision provides that the relief petitioners may seek is "to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated." ( § 1170.95, subd. (a), italics added.) No one other than a person convicted of murder could seek to have a "murder conviction vacated." (Ibid. ) Use of the permissive word "may" in this provision therefore does not...