People v. Harris

• Decision Date: 28 August 1986
• Docket Number: No. 2-85-0404,2-85-0404
• Citation: 497 N.E.2d 177,146 Ill.App.3d 632,100 Ill.Dec. 297
• Parties: , 100 Ill.Dec. 297 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Samuel HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 177

497 N.E.2d 177

146 Ill.App.3d 632, 100 Ill.Dec. 297

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Samuel HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-85-0404.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Second District.

Aug. 28, 1986.

G. Joseph Weller, Office of State Appellate Defender, Deputy Director, Kerry Evan Saltzman, Office of State Appellate Defender, Asst. Defender, Elgin, Ill., for defendant-appellant.

Fred L. Foreman, Waukegan, Kenneth Boyle, S.A.A.P., Director, Barbara J. Slingerland, Springfield, William L. Browers, S.A.A.P., Deputy Director, Elgin, for plaintiff-appellee.

Justice UNVERZAGT delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Samuel Harris, appeals from the judgment and sentence entered by the circuit court of Lake County, on charges of armed violence and retail theft pursuant to sections 33A-2 and 16A-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, pars. 33A-2 and 16A-3). The trial judge sentenced him to 10 years imprisonment on the armed violence charge and 1 year on the retail theft charge to run concurrent. On appeal, the defendant contends that his convictions must be reversed because the court tendered instructions to the jury which failed to conform to the charges alleged in the information, and, thus, he was convicted of crimes he was not originally charged with committing.

We affirm the judgment and the sentence of the circuit court of Lake county.

On February 21, 1985, the defendant was charged by information with three offenses: (1) retail theft, (2) aggravated battery and (3) armed violence. The armed violence statute provides, essentially, that a person commits armed violence when, while armed with a dangerous weapon, he commits any felony defined by Illinois law. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 33A-2.) In the present case, the armed violence charge was based on the felony of aggravated battery under section 12-4(a) of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 12-4(a)) (battery committed intentionally or knowingly, causing great bodily harm). The second offense mentioned above, aggravated battery, was charged under section 12-4(b)(1) of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 12-4(b)(1)) (battery committed with a deadly weapon). The defendant was also charged with retail theft under section 16A-3 of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 16A-3).

At trial the court instructed the jury. For the aggravated battery charge the court instructed the jury pursuant to Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, Nos. 11.07 and 11.08 (2d ed. 1981) (hereinafter cited as I.P.I. Criminal). These instructions provide, essentially, that a person commits the offense of aggravated battery when he knowingly causes great bodily harm. For the armed violence charge, the court gave the jury I.P.I. Criminal Nos. 11.19 and 11.20. These instructions state, in effect, that a person commits the offense of armed violence when he commits the offense of aggravated battery while armed with a dangerous weapon.

The jury found the defendant guilty of all three offenses. Subsequently, the trial court found that the offense of aggravated battery was a lesser-included offense of the armed violence offense, and, thus, did not sentence the defendant on the charge of aggravated battery. On May 15, 1985, the court entered judgment on the remaining charges, armed violence and retail theft. On that same day the defendant filed a motion for a new trial as well as the present appeal.

It is well settled that the jury can only be instructed concerning the crime charged. (People v. Payne (1983), 98 Ill.2d 45, 56, 74 Ill.Dec. 542, 456 N.E.2d 44 cert. denied (1984), 465 U.S. 1036, 104 S.Ct. 1310, 79 L.Ed.2d 708; People v. Stanko (1949) 402 Ill. 558, 561, 84 N.E.2d 839.) In addition, a defendant indicted of one offense cannot be convicted of an unindicted offense which is not a lesser-included crime of the offense for which he is charged. (People v. Hobson (1979), 77 Ill.App.3d 22, 28, 32 Ill.Dec. 940, 396 N.E.2d 53.) It is the defendant's position on appeal that the instructions given to the jury did not conform to the crimes charged in the information and, therefore, the jury convicted him of crimes he was not originally accused of committing.

Specifically, the defendant states that he was charged in count I with aggravated battery pursuant to section 12-4(a), as the predicate offense for the offense of armed violence, and in count II with aggravated battery pursuant to section 12-4(b)(1). He argues that this being the case, the jury should have been issued two separate instructions for each aggravated battery charge. In this instance, however, only the instruction pursuant to section 12-4(a) was tendered. Thus, not only was the jury not properly informed as to the applicable law, but, the defendant also reasons, the "door was inadvertently left open for the jury to confuse the two charges, and find the defendant guilty of only aggravated battery as charged in count II of the information." Relying on People v. Haron (1981), 85 Ill.2d 261, 52 Ill.Dec. 625, 422 N.E.2d 627, the defendant then notes that the Illinois Supreme Court recognized a distinction between the two aggravated battery charges and held that only an aggravated battery charge pursuant to 12-4(a) would support the charge of armed violence. (85 Ill.2d 261, 278, 52 Ill.Dec. 625, 422 N.E.2d 627.) Thus, the defendant concludes that the instructions tendered in this case allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty of armed violence pursuant to section 12-4(b)(1) rather than section 12-4(a), a crime unrecognized by our courts and also one he was not originally charged with committing. However, based on our review of the record, as well as the applicable case law, we see no reason to reverse the trial court's decision.

We note first, that with respect to the aggravated battery charge, the defendant correctly states that the jury failed to receive an instruction on count II, aggravated battery under section 12-4(b)(1). However, it is our opinion that based on the record in this case, the defendant has waived this issue.

It is well settled that the failure to object at trial to an asserted error in jury instructions waives the issue. (People v. Berry (1984), 99 Ill.2d 499, 503, 77 Ill.Dec. 438, 460 N.E.2d 742.) This is also true where the alleged error is not raised in a post-trial motion. (99 Ill.2d 499, 503, 77 Ill.Dec. 438, 460 N.E.2d 742.) It is also established that a party may not raise, on appeal, the failure to give an instruction unless he tendered it at trial. (People v. Underwood (1978), 72 Ill.2d 124, 129-30, 19 Ill.Dec. 12, 378 N.E.2d 513.) A trial court is under no duty to rewrite instructions. People v. Barnard (1984), 104 Ill.2d 218, 232, 83 Ill.Dec. 585, 470 N.E.2d 1005.

In the present case, the defendant failed properly to object to the instructions he now claims were erroneously given. Specifically, the defendant had "no problem" with I.P.I. Criminal No. 11.08. With regard to I.P.I. Criminal No. 11.07, the defendant also had no objections, specifically stating that the "only problem" he had was that the mental state of "knowingly" in the aggravated battery instruction should be changed to a mental state of "intentionally" with regard to the armed violence instruction. The defense also stated that the State's tendered aggravated battery "instructions [were] proper." The defendant also failed to raise any error regarding the instruction in his post-trial motion and failed to tender any instruction which would have cured the alleged defects in the instructions the court gave the jury.

Furthermore, this appeal does not involve a situation where grave error occurred below, requiring application of Supreme Court Rule 451(c) (Ill.2d R. 451(c)). (See People v. Berry (1984), 99 Ill.2d 499, 504, 77 Ill.Dec. 438, 460 N.E.2d 742.) In the present case, the defendant was not even "convicted" of the offense of aggravated battery under section 12-4(b)(1). Instead, after the jury returned a verdict which found the defendant guilty of that offense, the trial court found the aggravated battery charge to be a lesser-included offense of armed violence, and it did not enter judgment or sentence the defendant on that portion of the jury's verdict. Clearly, the defendant was not prejudiced by the jury's verdict on the aggravated battery charge.

Similarly, we also agree that under the circumstances the defendant waived the issue he raises with regard to the armed violence charge. In the present case, the defendant's only objection with regard to the armed violence instruction involved changing the...